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Abstract 
Gene doping is the most recent addition to the list of banned practices formulated 
by the World Anti-doping Agency. It is a subset of doping that utilizes the technology 
involved in gene therapy. The latter is still in the experimental phase but has the potential 
to be used as a type of medical treatment involving alterations of a patient‘s genes. I 
apply a pragmatic form of ethical inquiry to evaluate the application of this medical 
innovation in the context of sport for performance-enhancement purposes and how it will 
affect sport, the individual, society and humanity at large. I analyze the probable ethical 
implications that will emerge from such procedures in terms of values that lie at the heart 
of the major arguments offered by scholars on both affirmative and opposing sides of the 
debate on gene doping, namely fairness, autonomy and the conception of what it means 
to be human. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction & Overview 
Introduction 
Modern pharmaceutical and technological advancements have improved the 
ability to alter the biological capabilities of individuals. Particularly, these traits include 
those that influence the athletic capabilities of humans. Physical capacities that can be 
enhanced include speed, strength, fatigue resistance, rate of injury recovery and pain 
tolerance associated with heavy training. In producing an elite athlete, one attempts to 
optimize the individual’s innate biological factors by manipulating aspects of their 
environment. The methods that are used include diet, equipment and high quality training 
programs. It is clear that society accepts the manipulation of some aspects of the athlete’s 
environment and does not consider such conduct shameful or unethical. Yet, this is 
clearly not the case for performance-enhancing drugs whose usage is commonly referred 
to as ―doping.‖   
The world watched in utter fascination as Ben Johnson shattered the world record 
for the 100m sprint at the 1988 Olympics. Only two days passed before Johnson tested 
positive for a banned substance known as stanozolol (anabolic steroid). The praise and 
glory that this athlete received from the public was immediately replaced by ridicule. In 
conjunction with other well-known cases such as the 1998 Tour de France, this scandal 
raised attention around the issue of doping in sport and emphasized the need for an 
international independent organization that would oversee and coordinate anti-doping 
regulations and penalties for infractions. For this cause, the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) was established in 1999. As its name implies, WADA holds that doping is 
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unacceptable as it is against the spirit of sport and can be dangerous to the health of the 
athletes. Therefore, the fundamental goal of WADA is to eliminate all forms of doping in 
sport (Artioloi, Hirata, & Lancha, 2007). While it is currently agreed by sport governing 
bodies that doping, which includes prospective uses of genetic technology, is undesirable 
in sport and thus should be banned, it is important to question whether this stance is 
based on sound ethical arguments.   
To be clear, doping is performed by some athletes to improve their athletic 
performance and thereby gain an athletic advantage over their competitors. One example 
of banned performance-enhancers is blood doping that involves a blood transfusion of 
one‘s own oxygen-rich blood or hormone administration to increase one‘s red blood cell 
count prior to an athletic competition. This practice improves oxygen delivery, and thus, 
one‘s aerobic endurance, meaning it is only beneficial to athletes in sports that demand a 
high aerobic capacity. Stimulants represent another form of banned substances such as 
ephedrine or amphetamine, which are mostly used to reduce fatigue and pump up one‘s 
adrenaline and aggression. A third common example of doping is the administration of 
anabolic steroids. Generally, steroids increase protein synthesis which allows an athlete 
to build up greater muscle mass during strength training.   
Gene doping, the most recent addition to the list of banned substances and 
practices, is a form of doping that utilizes the technology involved in gene therapy. The 
latter is still in the experimental phase, but has the potential to be used as a form of 
medical treatment involving alterations of a patient‘s genes (Haisma & De Hon, 2006). In 
the near future, it is expected that such genetic technology will yield a profound impact 
on sport as it begins to be applied to athletes or by parents of embryos as a method of 
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athletic performance enhancement (McCrory, 2003). Due to these predictions of a 
genetically enhanced future for sport, some camps within the sporting community 
including WADA are currently concerned. Some of this concern can be attributed to the 
possible incompatibility with autonomy as an educational goal since genetic enhancement 
may endanger the individual‘s autonomy or right to an open future. For example, this 
may occur if children are coerced by parents or authority figures to pursue a single 
direction in life such as that of an elite athlete (Campbell, 1990). For this reason, it is 
conceivable that moral examination should focus on the types of, as well as goals behind, 
genetic enhancement and the consequences that it would have on the participants and the 
sporting world at large. 
WADA acknowledges past trends in which drugs that are still in the experimental 
phases of research often manage to enter the athletic world (Haisma & de Hon, 2006). 
Although at present gene doping is virtually impossible to detect (McCrory, 2003), it has 
been added to the official doping list formulated by WADA (WADA, 2009). 
Consequently, WADA has publicly stated that, in order to remain one step ahead of 
genetically enhanced athletes, it has devoted funds for research on detection methods and 
control programs for gene doping in sport (Munthe, 2005). In fact, WADA has already 
suggested that some detection methods that may be used for gene doping currently exist 
or are in the developmental phase of research. These methods will undoubtedly require 
genetic testing procedures (Munthe, 2005).      
 Subjecting athletes in the future to genetic tests in order to detect those who have 
been genetically enhanced gives rise to a wide array of ethical issues such as possible 
misuse of information about the individual by health-insurers and employers (Munthe, 
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2005). Andy Miah (2005) suggests that those ethical issues that could potentially emerge 
from the use and abuse of genetic information have drawn less attention in the sport 
ethics community than is warranted because he views them as currently representing our 
most pressing concern with respect to gene doping as they do not considerably depend on 
future technology. Furthermore, it is argued that predicted possibilities of detecting this 
form of gene doping presented by WADA and the Olympic Movement are overly 
optimistic and simplified. Reliable and effective control programs will have to include 
quite extensive procedures of repeated sample taking and genetic mapping of athletes 
(Munthe, 2005) which may undermine the dignity and liberty of athletes. For instance, 
administration of these tests will, without doubt, demand the consent of the athletes. 
While consent should be freely given, coerciveness would be present if one considers that 
athletes who refuse to submit to the test would be disqualified from competing. 
 In addition to ethical questions about coerciveness in testing, many ethical 
questions arise regarding fairness and privacy in the use of genetic information; for 
instance, who ought to have access to genetic information of individuals? Similarly, who 
should have the right to control personal genetic information and how should this 
information be used? Other questions arise about what kind of psychological impact or 
stigmatization may occur due to an individual‘s genetic differences. It has been suggested 
that some of these ethical questions may be extrapolated from issues that have already 
been addressed in the medical domain due to genetic testing for health purposes (Munthe, 
2005). This leads one to question whether, and to what extent, the conclusions that have 
been drawn from medical ethics regarding genetic therapy extrapolate to the use of these 
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medical procedures to enhance the performance of healthy athletes. Christian Munthe 
warns that, 
it is a matter of urgency to consider to what extent this ethical controversy can be 
predicted to extend also to such uses, and what implications this will have for the 
question of what ethical requirements must be met by a control programme for 
gene doping, in order for it to be a defensibile practice. (p. 108)   
Main Questions 
Ultimately, I will apply a pragmatic approach to ethical inquiry, which will be 
described later, in an attempt to determine the desirability of permitting or inhibiting the 
integration of gene doping for athletic enhancement purposes. To reach this objective, I 
will analyze the ethical implications that such procedures will have on sport, the 
individual, society and humanity at large. My primary aim will be to assess the most 
probable consequences of gene doping on the values that can be identified as lying at the 
heart of the major arguments offered by scholars on both affirmative and opposing sides 
of the debate on gene doping found in the sport philosophy and ethics literature. 
Specifically, the purpose of my research will be to analyze the implications of gene 
doping athletes on the value of fairness, autonomy and the conception of what it means to 
be human.  
Rationale for the Study 
Justification of General Topic 
To deter my pursuit of the topic and the questions I have chosen to address for my 
thesis, a critic could very well point to the countless pieces of literature on the topic of 
doping in general that have been published to date and the breadth of ethical issues that 
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have been covered within those scholarly pieces. From this, one might claim that there is 
no compelling need for further research in ethics on the topic. Such a claim would rest on 
an underlying assumption that gene doping is merely a subspecies of other forms of 
performance enhancement, such as anabolic steroids, already present in sport and 
extensively examined over the last several decades in the sport philosophy literature. If 
one grants the precision of this assumption, this leads to the notion that the ethical 
implications linked to gene doping are no different than those associated with 
performance-enhancement drugs. Such criticism could potentially debunk the rationale 
behind my study.  
As a response, I will refer to an early article on gene doping and sport where Miah 
(2001) convincingly contends that genetic technologies are indeed qualitatively different 
than current drug doping techniques in sport by outlining the main differences that exist 
between gene doping and conventional forms of doping as well as the novel ethical 
considerations that genetic technologies produce. One major difference is that while 
conventional drug doping techniques can only be used post-birth, genetic technology may 
be employed pre-birth and may also alter the hereditary or germ-line cells within the 
body. The most obvious ethical implication that emerges from this distinguishing 
characteristic of pre-birth gene doping is that the decision to enhance is not made by the 
recipient of the enhancement which potentially threatens the individual autonomy of the 
enhanced individual. Also, since genetic technology may be employed without the 
consent of the individual, it appears nonsensical to denote him or her as a cheater or 
clearly artificial or unnatural. Allegations of artificiality are also complicated by the fact 
that the use of the individual‘s own tissues is not compromised by genetic technology 
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given that it simply alters one‘s natural genotype, unlike medical instruments such as 
prosthetic limbs, which are external to the individual. Additionally, Miah suspects that 
parents might feel coerced into enhancing their children before they are born so that they 
are not starting out their lives disadvantaged relative to others. Consequently, widespread 
utilization of that technology could reduce genetic diversity, perhaps increasing the 
vulnerability of the human species if some extent of diversity is a requirement for 
survival at the species level.  
Thus, the vast array of new ethical consequences that could begin to surface in a 
sporting environment where gene doping athletes dwell clearly warrants ethical reflection 
aside from that which has already taken place in literature in sport philosophy and ethics 
on conventional drug doping. Yet, even if one can appreciate the qualitative differences 
between gene doping and performance enhancement drugs, the latter of which has been 
one of the most discussed topics in sport philosophy literature to date, it might still be 
argued in the other direction that the breadth of sport philosophy and ethics literature that 
has specifically examined gene doping is much too extensive to warrant the need for 
further study. Furthermore, there are clearly differing viewpoints and camps in gene 
doping debates and to conjure up a consensus on whether or not gene doping is ethically 
permissible seems extremely problematic, if not impossible. In the following section of 
my proposal, I will introduce my pragmatically informed approach to ethical analysis that 
will provide a new orientation through which the issue of gene doping can be analyzed. 
As will be made evident, it is far from my intention to seek the absolute truth with respect 
to the ethical permissibility of gene doping in a sporting context or to set the stage for 
conclusively mediating this debate; rather, my primary objective is to examine the issue 
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using a theoretical framework that has not yet been utilized in ethical inquiries on gene 
doping despite, as I will subsequently outline, its usefulness and relevance to this issue. 
Justification of Chosen Theoretical Approach 
As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, pragmatism refers to  
the doctrine that an idea can be understood in terms of its practical consequences 
.…assessment of the truth or validity of a concept or hypothesis according to the 
rightness or usefulness of its practical consequences. (Pragmatism, n.d.)  
My decision to engage in a pragmatic mode of thought is supported by theoretical 
literature on bioethics research (Brendel & Miller, 2008). Pragmatic reasoning has been 
characterized as a useful organizational tool for bioethics, providing focus in 
deliberations on far from simplistic situations that struggle to bring differing ethical 
concepts together (Schermer & Keulartz, 2003) and as a potential aid to policy evaluators 
due to its ability to link theory to practical outcomes (Patton, 2002). Moreover, 
philosophy of science literature has demonstrated the applicability of pragmatism to a 
wide range of real-life bioethical challenges (Arras, 2001; Brendel, 2003; Cooke, 2003; 
Hester, 2003).  
As many different forms of pragmatism exist, I must clarify the distinct class of 
pragmatism that I will employ. In particular, freestanding pragmatism has been 
recommended for clinical research ethicists because it represents a valuable guide for 
them in deciding whether to permit or hold back the use of technological innovations in 
medicine to improve the human condition while protecting human rights. I will refer to 
this version of pragmatism since my analysis of gene doping will also involve the abstract 
decision of endorsing or holding back a technological innovation. Freestanding 
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pragmatism should not be understood as a systematic and structured guide for ethical 
analyses; rather, it ought to be perceived as an open form of inquiry that focuses on 
reasoning practically about ethical dilemmas. This kind of moral thinking is ―bottom up‖ 
as it is context-dependent and responds to particular dilemmas (Brendel & Miller, 2008). 
A pragmatic perspective promotes consideration of the ethical values as guides, as well as 
a realization that context is crucial to resolving ethical dilemmas. 
While an alternative ethical approach in which absolute moral imperatives are 
context-independent would result in a ―tyranny of principles‖ (Toulmin, 1981), 
freestanding pragmatism provides structure for researchers without restricting flexibility. 
As a novice researcher, this structure will increase my levels of confidence and comfort, 
but will still leave room for flexibility that is required to effectively reason through 
ethical complexities. It is impossible to conceive that there can be universal agreement on 
how to resolve every ethical dilemma that is posed by controversial biomedical 
advancements. Some sport philosophers, such as Tamburrini and Miah, believe that 
genetic enhancement in sport represents the natural ―next step‖ in sport‘s progression, 
while Brown, Lenk, and others believe that we should avoid genetically modifying 
individuals for sport. As core values could possibly conflict with one another, pragmatic 
ethics will be invaluable in the challenging process of attempting to compromise between 
competing objectives. 
I will aim to adhere to the six distinct features of freestanding pragmatism (Arras, 
2001). These six features will guide my ethical problem solving: contextualism, which 
implies that concrete as opposed to abstract examples will be used in moral problem-
solving; instrumentalism, which means that I will focus on practical effects on prominent 
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values; eclecticism, in the sense that I will be using more than one source of values in 
ethical analysis; theory independence in that I will avoid breaking the issue down into 
components in the formulation of a theory; reflective equilibrium, which refers to the fact 
that I will be engaged in a constant reexamination of my assumptions to maintain 
consistency with respect to the judgments I will be making; and search for consensus so 
as to integrate alternate points of view during moral problem-solving.  
Now that I have outlined the reasoning behind my choice to employ a pragmatic 
approach in my study, I will subsequently turn my attention over to the justification of 
each of the three values around which I have chosen to concentrate my pragmatic ethical 
inquiry, commencing with fairness.  
Justification of Chosen Values  
Schneider (2009), Lenk (2007) and Loland (2009) investigate performance 
enhancement in sport from different perspectives; yet, the value of fairness is central to 
the arguments made by all three of these authors. Both Lenk (2007) and Loland (2009) 
directly refer to the work of John Rawls (1958) and his notion of fairness in their 
explorations of performance enhancement in sport. Schneider (2009) advocates a revival 
of the value of a fair win and autonomy among athletes. If one attempts to decipher her 
rationale behind supporting this sporting ideal, it likely is very close to what Lenk (2007) 
and Loland (2009) have described in their respective articles. Lenk refers directly to the 
fair opportunity principle (FOP), which advocates for the removal of, or compensation 
for, those inequalities that significantly influence sporting outcomes, but for which 
individuals cannot be held liable since such inequalities are not significantly malleable. 
This leads to the notion that the winner of a competition ought to earn his or her victory 
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in virtue of his or her own merit rather than some factor for which people have no control 
over such as their genetic endowment. In competitions where gene doping is not equally 
accessible to all, a genetically doped winner would have unfairly gained victory, and to 
reiterate the words of Schneider, an unfair win is no win at all.  
Yet, Murray (2009) explains how the FOP clearly runs counter to the position that 
is endorsed by Rawls. In actuality, Rawls, according to Murray, supports a refocused 
attention on improving fairness in basic institutions through the Difference Principle (DP) 
by ensuring that the current strengths and talents serve the interests of all, and it is 
certainly not the case, as Loland would have us believe, that Rawls advocates the 
crippling or leveling out of individual talents as through genetic technology for instance. 
Clearly backed by the ideas of Rawls, Murray refutes the need to implement in sport 
some sort of practice such as gene doping in order to establish equality in genetic traits.   
In a similar fashion, Brown (2009) also depicts Rawls‘ DP. He first introduces his 
application of this principle after assessing implications of fairness and justice with the 
arrival of genetic technology in sport. Brown questions whether we should attempt to 
advance biotechnology when access to and thus benefits associated with such forms of 
technology will be limited to wealthy members of society. Brown states that the pursuit 
of enhancing general-purpose capacities that assist individuals in obtaining primary 
goods of human life could represent justified applications of the technology. Unlike 
Murray (2009), he firmly stresses that we should try to avoid both somatic and germ-line 
forms of genetic enhancement in sport. His warning is based on two kinds of danger that 
have been linked to genetic technologies for athletic purposes, one being the previously 
described future futility in enhancing narrowly defined traits and the other being that 
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there is a high risk of harm especially due to our meddling with the future of our children 
and possibly the future of their successors.  
In the sport philosophy literature, Tamburrini (2007) and McNamee (2007) have 
also developed arguments pertaining to fairness in favour of and against transhuman 
athletes respectively. Upon evaluation of these arguments, I have noted several flaws in 
both positions that I assert must be addressed if cogency is to be granted to the arguments 
upon which either position stands. Tamburrini claims that to the extent that gene doping 
can provide a means for those individuals lacking innate athletic talent to catch up with 
others who happen to be blessed with superior athletic abilities, it can improve the 
fairness inherent in sport. Furthermore, since all athletes will be genetically identical with 
respect to physical capacities, this leaves other traits and capacities to determine the 
winners of competitions, such as dedication and effort, which Tamburrini believes are 
virtues that actually justify the praise and credit that winners are granted since they are in 
some way controlled by the individuals themselves. However, due to the current lack of 
scientific understanding on this matter, I find it is, at present, too naive to assume that 
fairness will be enhanced in sport, at least in the way that Tamburrini (2007) has claimed 
it will. Consequently, I believe that to persuasively argue for the capacity of gene doping 
to increase fairness in sport, one must look elsewhere for support.   
A fairness-based argument against transhumanism, which advocates the ―belief 
that the human race can evolve beyond its current limitations, especially by the use of 
science and technology‖ (Transhumanism, 2008) is that it would represent yet another 
avenue through which the wealthy segments of the population will dominate their poor 
counterparts. This argument is based on the idea that only those who can afford the 
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application of genetic technology will be able to reap the praise, credit and monetary 
rewards associated with commercialized elite sport (McNamee, 2007). I agree with 
Tamburrini‘s (2007) critique of this particular argument against transhumanism in which 
he asserts that merely because a technology is initially expensive, and therefore, only 
available to wealthy individuals fails to sufficiently justify the prohibition of this 
technology. Eventually, all participants of sport will be able to reap its benefits. 
Therefore, McNamee‘s reasoning in this particular case fails to convince us to withhold 
this technology.    
The connection between fairness and autonomy, the second chosen value I 
examine, is made apparent through the works of the three authors with which I 
commenced this segment of this chapter. Schneider (2009) seems to agree with Lenk 
(2007) and Loland (2009) on fairness as an essential sporting ideal. However, she would 
likely criticize the approach taken by Lenk and Loland as unduly paternalistic. In this 
way, the value of autonomy is highly evident in her arguments. To elaborate, she claims 
that the issue of performance-enhancing drugs should be explored from the perspective of 
the athlete since they are the central actors affected by them. Schneider sees anti-doping 
organizations as futile as long as the decisions that are made regarding what should be 
considered doping and how doping bans are to be fairly enforced fail to consult athletes. 
More specifically, Schneider argues that sport-governing bodies should focus on 
protecting the safety and development of athletes; in Kantian terminology, they should 
view athletes as persons with rights rather than replaceable commodities or as actors 
perpetuating the institution of sport. This seems to be consistent with both Loland and 
Lenk, as they both recognize the need to avoid performance-enhancement strategies that 
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require a dependence on the expertise of others, which would make athletes lose a 
significant amount of control and authorship over their athletic performances. From this 
viewpoint, gene-doping athletes resemble machines dictated by scientists who are 
motivated by a desire to apply their technological innovations. Thus, a Kantian 
foundation is clearly embedded in the arguments set forth by all three of these 
philosophers and although their approaches differ superficially, they seem to be saying 
many of the same things.  
Thus, in a similar manner to fairness, the second value, autonomy, which will 
shed light on another aspect of gene doping and transhuman athletes requiring ethical 
review, explicitly emerges through several scholarly pieces on the issue. Tamburrini 
(2005) fuels the debate when he assesses how paternalism and autonomy are implicated 
through germ-line genetic modifications of embryos. First, he argues that prior to the 
initiation of genetic engineering for athletic enhancement purposes, it will be developed 
for medical therapy applications and so it will most likely adhere to reasonable levels of 
safety. Tamburrini foresees it as being no more harmful than contemporary elite sports 
training measures. Tamburrini concludes that genetically engineering a child‘s athletic 
ability will only add to the set of skills and capacities that the child has to work with and 
could open up an opportunity without eliminating others. 
Van Hilvoorde (2005) agrees with Tamburrini (2005) on the notion that genetic 
enhancement is associated with a risk of threatening an individual‘s autonomy rather than 
necessarily implicating an essential reduction in autonomy. The point of departure 
between the two authors is with regard to the severity of that risk. Specifically, van 
Hilvoorde claims that Tamburrini inaccurately perceives the risk as reasonably low 
  15 
because he fails to recognize the enormous influential power that genetic engineering will 
have on directing a child‘s future choices.  
In contrast, Sherwin (2007) raises the issue of autonomy and paternalism with 
respect to genetic enhancements that would be performed by competent adults, not 
children. She challenges the free choice argument, which holds that a fully informed 
rational adult should be permitted to exercise his or her own autonomous choice to 
employ genetic enhancement so long as it does not entail an excessive degree of danger. 
Sherwin‘s response to this argument is that it rests on a traditional interpretation of 
autonomy that views it in simple individualistic terms and assumes that individuals are 
completely unaffected by their societal surroundings when making decisions. As an 
alternative, she suggests a relational approach to understanding autonomy that recognizes 
that people form their values through dialogue and interactions with others. Through this 
understanding, one can see how only the very first athletes who decide to utilize genetic 
enhancement techniques will be exercising their freedom of choice or autonomy. The 
athletes who subsequently follow the lead of these initial users will likely be giving into 
the pressure to genetically dope in order to remain competitive in a genetically enhanced 
world of elite sport. Thus, Sherwin argues that the prevalence of gene doping will reduce 
autonomy overall and widespread use due to this coercive environment could lead to 
serious negative consequences for the collective and long-term interests of athletes. These 
notions illustrate the importance of assessing the value of autonomy and all other values 
for that matter from alternate perspectives prior to making allegations that the value is 
enhanced, hindered or unaffected by gene doping and transhuman athletes in sport. 
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Based on the third value I will be examining, McNamee (2007) makes the case 
against transhumanism. A main argument he sets forth against genetically enhancing 
individuals beyond what up until now has represented our humanly limits is that it will, in 
turn, change our self-understanding as human beings. It could result in a change in what 
we consider to be a good life but McNamee steers clear of accusations that a change in 
humanity‘s self-understanding necessarily represents a moral decline and recognizes that 
it could just as easily symbolize moral progress. Thus, this argument does not justify the 
endorsement of, or objection against, transhumaism.  
In addition, another one of McNamee‘s (2007) arguments, which is based on a 
notion that gene doping will give rise to artificial selection in which mankind acts as the 
instigator, replacing natural selection, also fails to fully support opposing transhumanism. 
Specifically, McNamee argues against transhumanism because it would result in humans 
having a high degree of control over humanity based on preferences regarding the traits 
that should be modified which are inescapably linked to normative judgments. This 
initiates a new kind of human nature, but again, he does not offer any sort explanation as 
to why we would be worse off in a world with this new kind of human nature except for 
the fact that we understand it less than the present one.  
At least at this stage in the scientific understanding of genetic enhancement, I tend 
to agree with McNamee (2007) that we should not welcome transhumanism into sport. 
However, I do not think that McNamee‘s arguments offer a sufficient basis for soundly 
arguing against this new control over human nature. He compiles several claims that 
appear to be illogically sequenced and, more importantly, he fails to adequately explain 
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the assumptions or reasoning behind the value judgments he makes in support of his 
position. For example, McNamee (2007) cites Jurgen Habermas when he claims that  
interfering with the process of human conception and by implication human 
constitution, deprives humans of the naturalness which so far has been a part of 
the taken-for-granted background of our self-understanding as a species….(and 
that) Getting used to having human life at the biotechnologically enabled disposal 
of our contingent preferences cannot but help change our normative self-
understanding. (p. 188) 
I would pose several questions to McNamee, starting with how naturalness is necessarily 
revoked by humans that utilize genetic enhancement to transcend current limits. Also, 
why is this change in our normative self-understanding necessarily implicated by 
transhumanism? And, for that matter, what justifies predictions that such a change will be 
one for the worse? I will attempt to address these questions in my study by referring to 
Jonsson‘s (2007) exposition of cyborg athletes and Murray‘s (2009) article where he 
highlights three conceptions of human nature in relation to sport.  
To briefly illustrate these three different conceptions of human nature, it is helpful 
to consider the viewpoint ventured by Jonsson (2007) in which he advocates the 
welcoming of cyborg or gender-neutral athletes that may emerge out of gene doping 
applications and how his viewpoint would be judged differently depending on the 
particular concept of human nature that is assumed. While the first conception of human 
nature in relation to sport that is addressed by Murray (2009) as a normative guide that 
informs us on what is right and good would strongly reject Jonsson‘s advocacy of cyborg 
athletes, the second heroic/Romantic/Promethean viewpoint of humanity that would place 
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the highest degree of importance in a human‘s capacity to indulge his or her creative will 
and ingenuity in tinkering with his or her own body would support Jonnson‘s (2007) 
promotion of cyborg athletes. Murray depicts the third concept of human nature as a 
more realistic middle ground between the two previously illustrated extreme ways in 
which we can understand human nature. It views human nature as complex, multi-layered 
and to some extent limited and capable of both moral and immoral acts. Adhering to the 
third concept of human nature that Murray addresses would probably lead to a more 
cautious assessment of cyborg athletes. According to this conception of human nature, 
cyborg athletes, or athletes who do not clearly fall under one traditional gender category, 
would not necessarily be considered a morally good or bad thing. Perhaps, this could 
provide partial reasoning behind the part of Jonsson‘s (2007) main thesis that states that a 
cyborg threatening society‘s gender categories is not morally problematic. And, perhaps 
this might convince us that we should explore the second component of his thesis that 
claims that the real moral issue concerns the very existence of these gender categories in 
society.   
Theoretical Foundation 
In order to clarify the meaning of the term ―paradigm,‖ I will quote David 
Morgan (2007) who states that ―a paradigm is a shared belief system that influences the 
kinds of knowledge researchers seek and how they interpret the evidence they collect‖ (p. 
50). As previously mentioned, I will be applying a pragmatic methodology to my 
research. As a pragmatic researcher, I affirm the ontological position that an external 
reality which is independent of our minds does exist; yet, this external reality is 
ultimately unknowable (Cherryholmes, 1992). Based on this belief, the attempt of any 
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human to discover truth is futile since it is impossible to know, without doubt, that what 
has been discovered is an accurate representation of external reality (Cherryholmes, 
1992). Researchers should avoid claiming that they have discovered the external or 
absolute truth and should recognize that what they have come to understand or explain 
through research can, at most, represent a provisional version of the truth (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Just as the once widespread and undoubted belief that the world 
was flat was turned upside down, all of our conclusions, in fact, even our most seemingly 
undeniable beliefs, are provisional in the sense that they are always subject to revision. 
The implications that this will have on my study is that the conclusions that I will 
generate from my research could never be considered perfect, certain or absolute 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
Furthermore, in contrast to the positivist notion that studies advance our 
knowledge of the external world, my conclusions on the ethical permissibility of gene 
doping should be assessed based on their utility in promoting and not conflicting with the 
reader‘s notion of a desirable community and not how accurate they are in explaining 
reality. The community that I propose to the reader as being desirable and relevant to the 
specific ethical issue at hand is one that upholds certain values. Thus, rather than a 
positivist search for absolute truth, I will be involved in the pragmatic pursuit of what is 
useful (House, 1992).  
The pragmatist approach promotes a focus on tailoring the method, or 
combination of methods if applicable, to the specific purpose and context of the study so 
that the research questions can be most adequately answered (Hoshmand, 2003). For this 
reason, the pragmatic paradigm has been suggested as a solution to the debate between 
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positivism and constructivism, also known as the ―paradigm wars‖ (Creswell 2003). The 
pluralist perspective based on pragmatism helps to break down traditional dichotomies 
and the notion that research based on opposing paradigms is incommensurable which 
improves communication within and between different academic disciplines (Maxcy, 
2003; Watson, 1990).  
The search for utility provides the pragmatic researcher with a connection 
between abstract epistemological ideas and the technical methods that drive the study. 
Consistent with the ideas of classical pragmatists, my undertaking of this research is not 
aimed at the abstract quest to further humanity‘s body of knowledge. Instead, my use of a 
pragmatic approach is meant to contribute to an understanding of gene doping that is 
practically useful in informing how we might respond to its arrival in sport based on 
values. Either subconsciously or deliberately, the choices of researchers are always based 
on their values. My decision to use a pragmatic approach forces me to acknowledge how 
my own values shape my research goals, as will be discussed in the Reflexivity section. 
Limtations and Delimtations 
 It is important to make note of the main limitations that I will have to accept as I 
begin to engage in this study. For one, given that I am not sufficiently proficient in any 
other language beyond English, my research will be limited to English sources. This 
could very well affect the outcome of my thesis due to potentially failing to discover 
alternate perspectives, arguments, or critiques written in other languages with respect to 
the issue. Another limitation I will face is the absence of studies utilizing a pragmatic 
approach to ethical query into the issue of gene doping or other forms of performance-
enhancement in sport for that matter. Therefore, seeing as how I will be using a novel 
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approach to tackle this issue, I will have to rely on my own comprehension of this 
theoretical framework as I attempt to extrapolate pragmatic techniques used in different 
disciplines of research to determine how the approach can be applied in this case.  
In addition, it is equally important to declare to the reader the restricted scope I 
have voluntarily chosen for the purpose of my study, also referred to as the delimitations. 
It may be argued that this issue integrates ethical issues of sport, as well as ethical issues 
of medicine since gene doping could represent a misuse of medical procedures in sport. 
Based on this premise, one might concur that both principles of medical ethics and sport 
ethics should be addressed. However, Miah (2005) advises us to appreciate that sport 
functions somewhat under its own norms and rules, which are often distinct from those of 
broader society, and that core values of sport including fairness, integrity, respect and 
equity must be considered.  
Furthermore, the mere fact that gene doping will initially represent a medical 
innovation fails to warrant the requirement of a medical ethics perspective when 
discussing the issue of gene doping within the realm of sport, at least in the sense that the 
principles of medical ethics such as beneficence and non-maleficence (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001) do not need to be consulted. In fact, in the event that gene doping for 
athletic enhancement purposes was to be included as a medical practice, it would fall 
under the domain of sports medicine which has been criticized for failing to represent a 
legitimate form of medicine (Edwards & McNamee, 2006). Based on this, I would like to 
argue that it would be illogical to impose the core values of medical ethics onto ethical 
inquiries on the permissibility of gene doping for sporting purposes. In support of this 
view, I will highlight arguments made by scholars who, in an attempt to articulate a 
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conceptual difference between ―treatment‖ and ―enhancement,‖ allude to the very idea 
that sports medicine is not medicine. 
Jeungst (2009) outlines three main orientations that might be used for the purpose 
of debating gene doping in a sporting context, namely depicting ―enhancement‖ as any 
intervention that: falls beyond the medical profession‘s domain, augments an individual‘s 
functional capacities above that person‘s normal range or occurs where no pathology is 
present. All three of these orientations would support the contention that when it aims to 
promote athletic performance in already healthier portions of the population, as would be 
the case in gene doping, sports medicine appears to miss the primary goal of medicine 
which is identified by Edwards and McNamee (2006) as alleviating suffering and 
extending life. An objection could be raised against the utility of any of the three 
abovementioned approaches in this debate. Specifically, gene doping in sport could be 
depicted as treatment if it is framed as a form of prevention for elite athletes reverting 
back to the normal range of functional capacities. I agree with Edwards and McNamee 
(2006), Morgan (2009) and Juengst (2009) on their response to this objection. These 
authors dismiss this counter-attack as too permissive because such an interpretation can 
easily be exploited to expand the range of practices that are deemed to be forms of 
treatment to include those which are actually sorts of enhancement. What is made 
apparent through attempts to conceptually clarify the treatment-enhancement distinction 
is that it makes the most sense to categorize the particular practices of sports medicine 
that fail to aim to alleviate suffering, which in the future could include gene doping, as 
types of enhancement, not treatment. Hence, the inclusion of a strict bioethics or medical 
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ethics perspective when constructing the list of values that ought to dictate my pragmatic 
ethical investigation of gene doping in sport is not warranted.  
I believe that this decision is also supported by an alternative conceptual 
understanding that is proposed by Morgan (2009) in which the line that separates 
enhancement from treatment is not merely a metaphysical or natural one; rather, it is 
socially constructed. This leads Morgan to shift his focus to discerning between two 
forms of enhancement, namely those that should be deemed acceptable in sport and those 
that should be prohibited. On this note, Jeungst (2009) contends that the central concern 
with the prospective introduction of gene doping into the world of sport is the worry that 
it threatens what is at the very heart of sport‘s celebration of human excellence, namely 
the hierarchal ranking of inherited talents. Morgan bases the kinds of enhancement he 
thinks should be banned from sporting practices, which are those that improve certain 
innate features that are crucial to performance in the competition such as gene doping, on 
this key normative theme unique to sport and not at all on core values of medical ethics.  
A second delimitation must also be acknowledged. Through my central research 
question, I will attempt to determine whether by allowing athletes to become genetically 
enhanced, we necessarily threaten the value of fairness, autonomy and what it means to 
be human. If I concur that, yes, these core values are indeed threatened by allowing gene 
doping in sport, I still cannot deduce from this that banning gene doping from sport is 
morally justified. This is because other ethical problems briefly discussed in the 
introduction to this chapter may arise due to particular measures that sport governing 
bodies will have to employ in order to effectively enforce anti-gene doping policy. These 
problems could include coercion into genetic testing, endangering privacy by virtue of 
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the individual‘s genetic map which may also decrease fairness if it leads to denial of 
services or entitlements to individuals who have particular conditions or genetic 
predispositions (Billings, Kohn, de Cuevas, Beckwith, Apler, and Natowicz, 1992). 
Clearly, it is of equal importance that ethicists determine whether the consequences that 
can be attributed to the incorporation of genetic testing in sport are useful in promoting or 
actually conflict with our vision of a desirable community. This could potentially serve as 
a secondary research question, which could also be studied through the pragmatically 
informed steps I have chosen for my ethical inquiry, but which I am opting to omit from 
my thesis for the sake of time and manageability. 
Chapter Development 
 Five chapters will comprise my thesis. This chapter will serve as my introductory 
first chapter. The second chapter will entail a thorough examination of my chosen 
theoretical approach through the literature on pragmatism in general as well as on 
freestanding pragmatism in particular. I will review basic descriptive literature on this 
theoretical framework as I have already done (Cherryholmes, 1992; House; 1992; James, 
1897; Maxcy, 2003; Morgan, 2007; Mills, 1969; Cooke, 2003; Hestel, 2003), in addition 
to literature in which pragmatism is applied as a form of ethical analysis. I will locate 
much of this ―applied‖ research from sources within the discipline of education as well as 
mainstream and clinical research ethics. The strengths and weaknesses, flaws or limits 
associated with using this approach will also be acknowledged. 
One of the most distinct features of pragmatism is the emphasis on utility of 
courses of action. The utility of a particular course of action is assessed on the grounds 
that that particular action is useful in promoting a desirable community. For example, 
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there are those individuals who might desire, and contrastingly those who might object 
to, a community in which parents are permitted to genetically design their offspring, 
whether prior to or after that child‘s birth, to make them better suited for success in a 
particular sport. Thus, the first step of my pragmatic ethical inquiry, which will take place 
in the third chapter, will involve deciphering the type of community that I feel is the most 
desirable.  
In my case, I have determined which principles or values that appear to be related 
to the issue could impact the decision of whether we should permit gene doping and 
welcome the introduction of transhuman athletes in sport. In order to do this, I referred to 
the probable consequences that philosophers have argued may result in the event that 
gene doping is practiced in sport. A pragmatic method of ethical inquiry would require 
one to put forth an adequate defense for a hypothetical community and to justify the 
preference for that community over all the other alternative communities that one could 
conceive. Leading up to the final chapter, I will be involved in this phase of the 
traditional pragmatic process only to the extent that I have identified which particular 
values such a desirable community would endorse and that gene doping debates seem to 
center around. It is worth noting that the sequence of these two initial steps, namely 
identifying a desirable community and identifying desirable values in that community, 
need not be strictly distinct and will not be required to occur in the order in which I have 
presented them. For my purposes, I have already selected three values that appear to be 
most relevant to this issue and will only be describing my notion of a desirable 
community by defining these three values. The kind of community I propose will be most 
useful when considering the ethical issues that may ensue with the prospect of gene 
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doping athletes in sport is one that upholds the value of fairness, autonomy and the 
concept of what it means to be human.  
Therefore, in the third chapter, I will aim to define each of the three values in 
sufficient detail with support from philosophical sources, as well as sources from sport 
philosophy and ethics. For instance, in order to precisely clarify what it is that I mean by 
fairness, Rawls and his notion of fairness (1958) will be integrated with the works of 
sport philosophers that conceptualize fairness in terms of access and sport as a 
competitive endeavour including Lenk (2007), Loland (2009), and Schneider (2009). 
Autonomy will be understood with support from moral philosophy references, 
predominantly Kant‘s (1785/1964) Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. In 
addition, I will critically review the works of Tamburrini (2005), van Hilvoorde (2005), 
and Sherwin (2007) with respect to gene doping and autonomy in sport. I will attempt to 
reason through and clarify the different perceptions of human nature outlined by Murray 
(2009). Additionally, if necessary, I will explore these or other conceptions further 
through sources in mainstream philosophy to suggest some universal features that are 
shared by all of humanity, as well as how these features may interact with gene doping 
practices. 
In the fourth chapter, I will present all of the potential ways that transhuman 
athletes and gene doping can affect fairness, autonomy and the conception of human 
nature. The possible consequences of gene doping and transhuman athletes in sport will 
be assessed by envisioning whether each would promote, conflict or be congruent with 
one or more of the three values and what this implies for the permissibility or desirability 
of gene doping in sport.  
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I suspect that one of the most challenging aspects of the method I have chosen 
will be to compromise and find an adequate balance and prioritization among competing 
values. In the fifth and final chapter of my thesis, this balancing act of values will be 
made possible by one of the main pragmatist commitments that holds that ethical values 
and principles do not have absolute status. When it comes to moral problem solving, 
values, rules or principles should function hypothetically. Thus, I will likely be 
confronted with dilemmas involving competing values, especially due to the fact that I 
will be considering core societal values strictly in a sporting context which may be 
guided by a different set of values or a different understanding of particular values than 
other societal institutions or practices. As explained by Dewey (1929/1985),  
A moral law, like a law in physics, is not something to swear by and stick to at all 
hazards; it is a formula of the way to respond when specified conditions present 
themselves. Its soundness and pertinence are tested by what happens when it is 
acted upon. (p. 222)  
In the concluding chapter, the likely consequences of transhumanism and gene 
doping in sport will be used as a reference when I critically assess each of the moral 
values that I have elected in terms of three specific criteria, namely its relevance to the 
issue, scope and relative strength as compared to competing moral values. This will allow 
me to comment on the usefulness of this particular list of values in examining gene 
doping and transhumanism in sport. Ultimately, in this concluding chapter, ethical 
permissibility will be granted to the position on gene doping that promotes the desired 
community. Given my pragmatic approach and due to the fact that I limited my study to 
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three values, it is almost certain that this permissibility should be understood as 
conditional and context dependent. 
Reflexivity 
As mentioned, I must describe the type of community that I feel is most desirable 
using values that such a community would advocate which in my opinion include the 
values that I have identified as residing at the core of this issue, namely fairness, 
autonomy and the concept of what it means to be human. I may be criticized because my 
notion of the ideal community and important values can be reduced to mere opinion 
which is shaped by an individual‘s unique set of experiences and cultural, personal and 
political background.  
It follows then that there are bound to be people that disagree with me on the 
particular values I have claimed are important enough to dictate our actions on this issue. 
More deeply still, the values I have put forth have been formed by the desired end goals I 
hope will be promoted through my research. These goals have, in turn, been shaped by 
my experiences in life that have given rise to my current perspective. Due to my middle 
class status, I have had the opportunity to participate in organized sport throughout the 
entire course of my life and have enjoyed it thoroughly. I have grown up in an era and 
culture where females are encouraged to participate in sport and foundational values 
including fairness, equality and autonomy among citizens serve as ideals. I recognize that 
I have gained a plethora of valuable skills and experience through my participation in 
sport that I have definitely transferred into various other aspects of my life. My love for 
athletics has likely contributed to my concern that some practice may threaten the 
goodness of sport. I credit my experience in sport as contributing to the development of 
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many of my skills such as my work ethic. This probably was rooted by the clear link 
between my success in sport and the amount of effort I would invest in it. This 
experience is consistent with what I have learned through the Western society in which I 
live that promotes a democratic capitalistic notion of meritocracy that effort should 
equate to success. My interest in this topic is embedded in my desire to maintain the 
goodness of sport, by which I simply mean the potential of sport to be positively 
experienced by its participants and sport‘s ability to develop good character and positive 
values in individuals.  
This leads me to question whether due to its subjective nature, the pragmatic 
approach is extremely conducive to the researcher‘s biases, and, as a result, is 
disadvantageous in terms of consistency and reliability in moral decision-making. Yet, as 
has been shown above, this flexibility can be viewed as a virtue because it allows for the 
congregation of multiple perspectives so that they can inform one another, which is more 
conducive to the cultivation of a general consensus on controversial issues such as the 
one at hand. As this relates to my study, the values I selected were not chosen until after a 
thorough review of literature on the issue of gene doping. This is not to say that my 
choice of core values is exclusive and accurate or that no other relevant values are at 
stake here. Recall that a pragmatic epistemological stance requires one to give up on the 
belief that we can mirror reality. As a pragmatic researcher, I am not concerned with 
discovering absolute truth, such as the intrinsic values of sport or the ethical principles 
that would best guide our sporting and other social practices; not only is this impossible, 
it is also not necessarily useful (House, 1992).  Rather, if it is useful for inquiry, I will use 
it. In fact, whether or not I have accurately and fully depicted the values that are most 
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susceptible to hindrance or enhancement would not affect my conclusions on gene doping 
since pragmatic conclusions are context-dependent.  
I will attempt to test the utility of this particular list in preserving the ―goodness‖ 
of sport by considering each value separately and envisioning the consequences that 
would likely occur if sport participants were to violate that value in sport. For instance, if 
honesty were a value around which I was focusing my ethical inquiry, I would envision 
consequences like cheating to ensue if honesty was virtually absent from sport. And if 
such deceptive rule violations were prevalent due to a lack of honesty, then acceptance of 
the rules that constitute the game would not be evident and this would prevent any real 
game from taking place (Suits, 1978). 
Moreover, the interpretation of each value, such as fairness, is influenced by the 
cultural context in which it is expressed. It may be argued that there are no absolute 
definitions of terms such as ―good,‖ ―evil‖ or ―harm‖ as the definitions of these words 
vary along the wide spectrum of cultural and religious views. In some cultures, these 
words may even lack meaning. Given that this thesis will hopefully, at least modestly, 
contribute to debates on gene doping and considering that WADA‘s ban against gene 
doping is universal, should we be worried that some cultures could very well not even 
hold these same values at a high level of priority let alone interpret them in the same 
way? The alternative to a universal prohibition against gene doping may be selectively 
forbidding it only in cultures that would interpret values in a manner that supports a ban 
on gene doping. This, however, is unacceptable, as it would defeat one main purpose of 
gene doping bans which is to aim to preserve an equal playing field in sport. 
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To reiterate the words of Patton (2002), I do not need to worry about questions 
about subjectivity because ―the ideals of absolute objectivity and value-free science are 
impossible to attain in practice and are of questionable desirability in the first place since 
they ignore the intrinsically social nature and human purposes of research‖ (p. 50). Patton 
advises against the use of the terms objectivity and subjectivity in critiques of 
methodological paradigms. I will follow Patton‘s (2002) pragmatically informed 
recommendations to ―stay out of futile debates about subjectivity versus objectivity‖ (p. 
50). Instead, the emphasis that better suits pragmatic research is intersubjectivity as I will 
need to move back and forth between various frames of reference. 
Trustworthiness 
While rejecting the utility of debates concerning objectivity and subjectivity, I 
will discuss concerns of trustworthiness. In this regard, the quality of my research can be 
judged based on balance, which is often referred to as neutrality, fairness and 
completeness (Patton, 1997). In order to maintain a neutral position, I merely will be 
testing a theory that gene doping and transhuman athletes could potentially conflict with 
the value of fairness, autonomy and our conception of human nature, as opposed to 
having a particular theory in mind that I will set out to prove. This neutrality will ensure 
that I will not oversimplify the complicating ethical issues involved in order to prove a 
particular theory such as that gene doping is, without doubt, against core societal or sport 
values. Moreover, as I will be acting as the instrument of data collection, I must 
thoughtfully deal with any potential sources of error and bias.  
Some of the ways I will resolve or reduce concerns of bias and error in my 
research will include systematic data collection procedures in the sense that I will be 
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following the distinct features or guidelines of freestanding pragmatism. This subclass of 
pragmatism endorses eclecticism that I have upheld in the sense that I have drawn from 
multiple sources of values, namely all sides of the gene doping debate. This will enhance 
the quality and balance of my research because my ethical assessment will be based on 
more than one ethical viewpoint, which will increase the range of interpretations of 
relevant values considered.  
As noted by Morgan (2007), the pragmatic approach necessitates abductive 
reasoning in that it involves moving back and forth between inductively converting 
observations into theories and deductively assessing those theories through action. The 
assessment of formulated theories would enhance the credibility and trustworthiness of 
the conclusions. Gene doping in sport has been predicted to have an immense impact on 
sport as we know it potentially threatening or promoting ethical values of sport and 
greater society. I will assess the consequences of gene doping that are expected to arise. 
However, one may argue that these expectations of consequences are based on mere 
hunches. Some may criticize my approach to ethical inquiry on the grounds that the 
accuracy of predictions could never be judged unless they were experimentally observed 
in practice. As a response to this objection, I will refer to William James (1897), a 
prominent pragmatist who expressed that  
moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution 
cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly 
exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. (p. 10)  
 Yet, is there a way to maximize the confidence in my predictions of 
consequences without observing them in practice through experiments? According to 
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Patton (2002), all qualitative inquiry depends on and uses the researcher‘s experiences in 
the world and insights about those experiences. This could imply that past experience can 
be used to strengthen the accuracy of the expected outcomes of gene doping or genetic 
testing in sport. Keeping in mind the contextual implications, if it can be carefully 
established that scientific innovations, such as pharmaceutical advancements, already 
present in the sporting arena are sufficiently similar to gene doping, then the impact that 
they have had on sport could help us to assess our prophecies.  
Moreover, WADA‘s fixed moral stance against gene doping assumes that one 
does not need to consider the manner in which it is performed prior to concluding that it 
is an unethical practice. From a pragmatic perspective however, the details that will likely 
be involved in the process of genetic enhancement in sport may tip the balance of ethical 
permissibility one way or another. A comprehensive understanding of the prospects of 
gene doping in terms of how it will likely be used in the future is absolutely crucial to the 
validity of ethical arguments that support or reject its practice in sport. For example, it is 
important to question whether reasonable safeguards would be placed against adverse 
effects. Therefore, I will seek to maintain consistency in my arguments with the most 
recent scientific findings on gene doping in as far as it could affect my assumptions and 
thereby conclusions. 
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Chapter Two 
An Examination of Pragmatism, Pragmatic Axiology and Freestanding Pragmatism 
Introduction 
This chapter will present a thorough examination of my chosen theoretical 
approach. I will begin by providing a historical and descriptive account of my theoretical 
framework and its epistemological origins. The work of William James, John Dewey and 
Charles Sanders Pierce will be referred to in order to depict a broad range of thought 
regarding pragmatism. The axiological, and more specifically, ethics branch of 
pragmatism will then be illustrated, followed by a critique of pragmatism. This will lead 
to an explication of the rationale behind my selective adoption of freestanding 
pragmatism. I will then review and critique freestanding pragmatism and consider how it 
has been applied in different disciplines such as legal and bioethics theories. The 
strengths, weaknesses and limits associated with using this approach will also be 
acknowledged. Finally, I will defend against possible objections to freestanding 
pragmatism as a useful approach for my study.  
Pragmatism 
A Historical and Descriptive Account 
Created as a branch of philosophy nearly one hundred years ago, pragmatism to 
this day is regarded as the most distinctly American contribution to the field (Dickstein, 
1998). Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that entails a body of concepts and theories 
(Hester, 2008). William James first coined the term ―pragmatism‖ in an 1898 lecture at 
the University of California at Berkley that he later published as an essay entitled, 
―Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results.‖ As a foundation for critiquing 
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abstractions and absolutist thinking, James created the philosophical underpinnings of 
pragmatism that emphasize practice and action.  James claimed that he was merely 
extending ideas that originated from his friend, Charles Pierce, roughly twenty years 
earlier. Interestingly, however, Pierce was less than pleased with receiving this credit 
because of the direction James had taken his ideas. The notion of pragmatism was met 
with controversy, as it was opposed by many critics who characterized it as nothing more 
than an extreme version of relativism – a philosophical theory that claims that ―truth‖ 
must always be understood relative to some frame of reference  – that challenges any 
concept of objective truth. 
 In this same period, a contemporary of James, John Dewey, developed a classical 
thread of pragmatism whereby the admirable effects of pragmatism reside in its 
translation of ideas into action and in its endorsement of challenging the status quo while 
reaching into the unknown future (Dickstein, 1998). James and Dewey, among other 
early pragmatists, argued that pragmatism could be instrumental in combating restricted 
gender roles, imperialism and racism, and advocating for democracy. To these scholars, 
pragmatism required an awareness of the experiences of those members of society who 
had traditionally been ignored such as women and minority groups. In the first few 
decades of the twentieth century, pragmatism was well suited for the political climate in 
the United States that was marked by liberalism, progressivism and social reform. 
Pragmatism confronted the religious and cultural authority and a simplified definition of 
truth, while promoting plurality as opposed to narrow immersion in a single perspective. 
 As reflected by the subtitle of his book, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old 
Ways of Thinking, James (1907) viewed pragmatism as not entirely novel in its approach 
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to problems (Dickstein, 1998). Pragmatists view philosophers, as well as other scholars 
and researchers, not as discoverers of absolute principles, but as advocates of ideas that 
project their own temperaments and desires. In James‘s eyes, the pragmatic movement in 
general endorses and makes explicit a phenomenon, which already subconsciously 
underlies research, inquiries and decision-making. In Pragmatism, James (1907) 
articulates his belief that laws and languages, as well as what we consider to be ―truths‖ 
are ―man-made things.‖ He confirms as much when he states that ―Human motives 
sharpen all our questions, human satisfactions lurk in all our answers, all our formulas 
have a human twist‖ (p. 159).  
During the early days of pragmatism, a diverse group of critics were vocal about 
their distaste for this new philosophical enterprise. Many of them were opposed to 
pragmatism because of the ends that could be, and were being, justified through its 
application. Surprisingly, a particularly destructive attack on pragmatism came from 
someone who initially assented Dewey‘s philosophy. Specifically, Randolph Bourne 
criticized Dewey‘s pragmatic rationalization of the U.S. joining the First World War 
(Dickstein, 1998). He was concerned by the fact that pragmatism could be used as a tool 
to achieve what he deemed were morally foul ends. Moreover, Marxist critics accused 
pragmatism for serving as grounds to justify ruthless capitalistic business practices such 
as accepting or offering bribes.  
Although for different reasons, conservatives also rejected pragmatism. For them, 
the fundamental flaw of pragmatism was in its apparent relativistic perspective that 
questioned and negated absolute principles and values (Dickstein, 1998). Early 
pragmatists insisted on questioning many of one‘s beliefs, whether religious, political, 
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scientific, or philosophical. They recommended that our experiences as historical and 
social beings serve as the basis upon which we should evaluate these beliefs.  
By addressing the points of weaknesses that critics associated with pragmatism, 
James and Dewey produced some of their best works on pragmatism. For instance, 
pragmatism was charged with providing a rationale for anyone to believe whatever 
falsehood he or she finds to be expedient. James (1955) responds to this criticism by 
detailing the criteria that must be met in order to provide pragmatic verification of a 
proposition. The first criterion is that the proposition must fit with what we have come to 
know as the natural world through experience. So for example, the proposition that it 
only snows when the temperature is below zero degrees Celsius can be supported by 
one‘s experiences in the world, including that one never encounters snow in locations that 
are always warmer than zero degrees Celsius. Secondly, the proposition should be 
compatible with one‘s collection of beliefs that have persevered notwithstanding the 
testing of those beliefs by experience. With respect to this criterion, let us say that I have 
a belief that has been supported by experience that altitude and temperature are inversely 
related. As it relates to the proposition that it only snows when the temperature is at or 
below zero degrees Celsius, this means that it could be snowing on a mountaintop but 
raining lower down the mountain if the temperature at the former but not the latter is 
below zero degrees Celsius. Thus, the proposition fits with the belief. The third and final 
consideration that must be met in order to deem a proposition as a pragmatic truth is that 
it yields overall satisfaction. For example, how likely is it that some other atmospheric 
condition besides subzero temperature is actually the antecedent of snowfall but 
coincidentally accompanies temperature drops below zero degrees Celsius during each of 
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my experiences with snowfall? If this is highly plausible, I would be dissatisfied with 
holding it as a pragmatic truth. But, since all of our experiences and the scientific 
understanding of snow formation leads to satisfaction with this proposition, it can finally 
be recognized as a pragmatic truth.    
For analytic philosophy, language, in addition to logic, represents its subject 
matter. Language is also considered important by pragmatic thinkers like James and 
Dewey, but only because of its ability to provide a passage through which we can 
understand the experience of others (Dickstein, 1998). For this reason, James discusses 
the need for consistency with oral and written communication. Given that we are unable 
to test every proposition for ourselves, we are to indirectly access the experience of 
others through language and historical knowledge. This kind of reasoning reveals the 
importance of having a method of inquiry that leads one to a clear and useful 
understanding of terms and phrases.  
Pierce’s Pragmatism – An Account of Meaning 
 According to Atkin (2004), in C.S. Pierce‘s 1878 article, ―How to Make our Ideas 
Clear,‖ early formulations of pragmatism are introduced for the purpose of creating a 
principle of inquiry and account of meaning. Pierce‘s pragmatic maxim is intended to 
provide a means through which one can come to attain a full understanding of a concept 
or term. He builds this maxim on the idea that there are three levels of clarity that can 
describe one‘s knowledge or understanding of a term.  
First of all, possessing the lowest grade of clarity of a concept is to have some 
unreflective working knowledge of the concept through lived experience. For example, if 
I know that by jumping off a building, a force will pull me downward to the ground, this 
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demonstrates that I possess the first level of clarity of the concept of gravity. A second 
level of clarity would require one to have the capability of providing a general definition 
of the concept, such as a force that requires that what goes up must come down. A full 
understanding of a concept, which Pierce (1878/1992) signifies as the third level of 
clarity, can be acquired if we: 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception 
of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (p. 132)  
In simpler terms, the richest understanding of a concept requires, not only that one 
is familiar with the concept through daily living and is able to define it, but also that one 
has an understanding of the effects which can be reasonably expected to emerge if that 
concept is held to be true. For example, if I hold the concept of gravity to be a downward 
force on objects that are thrown up in the air, an effect of this proposition would be that 
dropping a rock from the CN Tower could potentially harm bystanders walking on the 
ground below.  
At this point, I will use another helpful example that is provided by Atkin (2004) 
of the concept of ―vinegar‖ in order to elucidate the process that leads to acquisition of 
the third grade of clarity. From a definition that vinegar is a diluted acetic acid or that 
vinegar is a substance that is sharp to taste, one is able to generate conditional 
propositions that describe the outcome of acting upon the entity. For example, if I assert 
that vinegar is acetic acid, this could cause me to believe that if litmus paper is dipped 
into it, it will turn red. Therefore, if one continues to make a list of such conditional 
propositions, which illustrate the effects that a concept has on other objects, this allows 
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one to achieve the highest grade of clarity regarding that concept. This final level of 
clarity is what is known as the pragmatic maxim and represents the heart of Peirce‘s early 
theory of pragmatism. 
Based on this kind of criteria that comprises a full comprehension of a concept, it 
is possible to deduce what Peirce‘s pragmatic theory tells us about the meaning of 
concepts. The meaning of a concept is conveyed through various conditional hypotheses 
that pertain to a propositioned definition of it. Pierce asserts that it is the effects of the 
term‘s interaction with the other concepts that give rise to its meaning. Thus, if we are to 
understand the meaning attributed to a concept, we must understand the consequences of 
averring that meaning. In other words, a concept does not have meaning beyond its 
practical effects. Consequently, an attractive feature of Pierce‘s pragmatic maxim is that 
it allows us to determine where our efforts should be directed based on what concept 
poses greater potential impact to our lives. 
Pragmatic Inquiry 
Inquiry in pragmatic terms refers to cognitive assessment aimed at formulating a 
solution to the problem that is in question (Morris, 1970). Pragmatists use the scientific 
method to inform their preferred process of inquiry. In Pierce‘s paper, titled ―The 
Fixation of Belief,‖ an inquiry‘s only objective is to settle opinion with regard to a matter 
on which persons are in disagreement (cited in Morris, 1970). However, he states that 
people will try to deny this and insist that what we seek through inquiry is the ―true‖ 
opinion, and not just one that is firmly believed. According to Pierce, this claim lacks 
credibility. He believes that although an opinion that is held may be true, we are not able 
to know with full certainty whether that opinion is indeed true. Pierce is more interested 
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in inquiry as a seemingly infinite process performed by a community of inquirers. His 
concept of a ―true‖ opinion would be one that does not currently demand modification by 
subsequent inquiry. Pierce stresses this notion of inquiry in lieu of a ―one-time‖ inquiry 
that would be based on a specific problematic situation. He believes that a general 
meaning could never hold for each occasion and that it would always be subject to 
revision. This perspective of inquiry is highly reflective of the method used by the 
scientific community in which further investigation builds upon previous inquiries.  
 Dewey differs from Pierce with respect to his notion of inquiry. He does not see it 
as a process to occur over an indefinite period, but like both James and George Herbert 
Mead, another contemporary pragmatist, Dewey views inquiry as directed at a specific 
and immediate problematic situation (Morris, 1970). Moreover, a judgment to Dewey, 
represents a planned course of action hypothesized to be a solution for a problematic 
situation that exists within a particular context. Thus, in order to obtain verification for 
the judgment or idea, or to be able to deem the idea as true, Dewey states that the action 
proposed to resolve the problem must be performed to show that it actually does solve the 
problem. However, to accurately represent Dewey‘s ideas, I will adhere to the distinct 
language he uses in his book Logic: The Theory of Inquiry where he demonstrates his 
preference for the concept of warranted assertion over terms such as truth or knowledge. 
So, it is more accurate to say that Dewey considers an assertion as warranted, not truth, if 
it is built on the grounds of relevant evidence pertaining to the particular problem and if it 
resolves the problem in question. In this respect, a warranted assertion for Dewey must be 
determined for that particular situation only. This clearly differs with Pierce‘s point of 
  42 
view, which is based on the fact that one can never be certain in what one believes is true, 
thereby demanding an indefinite process of inquiry.  
 In Morris‘s (1970) overview of pragmatic methodology, he maintains that 
scientific inquiry, which is clearly embedded in the pragmatic method of inquiry, was 
indeed the main type of inquiry that influenced early pragmatists. What is meant by 
scientific is that the inquiry‘s main tenets are compatible with the basic terms of the 
pragmatic maxim – that its hypotheses are empirically observable. Dewey and Pierce 
agree with one another on the general steps of scientific inquiry. For these two scholars, 
the process of inquiry begins with a problem being observed. Each problem exists against 
a backdrop, which is unproblematic in the sense that it is ―known.‖ Through abduction, a 
solution to the problem is hypothesized. To be clear, abductive reasoning involves 
determining or hypothesizing a sufficient but not necessary explanation for a particular 
occurrence. For example, a possible cause for a crack in my car‘s windshield is that it 
was hit by a rock while I was driving down the highway. Next, the consequences 
associated with the hypothesis are deduced, which are then tested. The testing of these 
effects actually represents the testing of the hypothesis. Testing is based upon inductive 
reasoning whereby the deduced consequences that were predicted to occur if the 
hypothesis is acted upon are observed (or not) when the hypothesis is acted upon. If the 
problem is resolved, the hypothesis is verified. The outcome can then be applied to 
inform or guide hypotheses of solutions to relevant problems.   
This general pragmatic approach can be illustrated through an example of a 
pragmatic research study conducted within the field of education. The hypothetical 
pragmatic investigation on effective reading instruction, which Cherryholmes 
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(1992) details in “Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism,‖ provides a simple 
template for educational researchers interested in this form of inquiry. I have 
included this hypothetical model because I believe it is applicable to other areas of study 
including my own.  
The typical pragmatic inquiry into reading instruction begins with a review of the 
outcomes of research that exists on the subject. The effectiveness of different reading 
approaches can be judged by comparing the reading test scores of pools of students where 
each group is taught using a particular approach to reading instruction. In this respect, 
pragmatic researchers give priority to the practical outcomes of controlled studies 
because of their capacity to inform future observations and experiences. The findings 
of each of the research studies that are reviewed could very well lend credence to vastly 
different approaches to instruction on reading. It is possible that two or more approaches 
that are based on contradictory assumptions or supporting arguments are found to be 
effective. Effectiveness in this case is judged on the degree to which the approach to 
instruction teaches individuals how to read and is not the sole tool in the pragmatist‘s 
arsenal. In the subsequent stage of the pragmatic inquiry, the researcher reflects on the 
type of community that he or she wishes to promote and determines which particular 
approach to reading instruction would, if adopted, promote that community. In other 
words, the researcher asks, what kinds of reading and readers would my desired 
community value and/or require for its existence? The origins of pragmatism suggest a 
community that endorses democratic ideals and values. According to Bernstein (1998), a 
community in the pragmatic sense must be made up of members who are critical thinkers 
and are capable of rationality. Bernstein also notes Dewey‘s advocacy of a pluralistic 
  44 
society as opposed to a homogeneous population, as well as his notion that unity must 
respect all of the distinctive features comprised by the population.   
To more fully depict the process of inquiry, it is helpful to describe examples of 
contrasting approaches to reading that would be judged differently depending on 
the values of the preferred community. A technical reading approach would value the 
purpose of reading to retain the information from the passage in stark contrast 
with reading for aesthetic pleasure or reading through a critical lens. Any reading 
approaches that interfere with the values the desired community would uphold are 
eliminated from the pragmatist‘s teaching options. To the extreme, the pragmatist 
might even choose to actively oppose those approaches that conflict with the values he or 
she is trying to promote.  
Thus, the process of pragmatic investigation outlined above is inherently marked 
by a belief that what works should not always be equated with what is desirable. This 
reflects Rorty‘s (1990) idea that ―A God‘s eye-view is one that is irrelevant to our needs 
and practices‖ (p. 2). This is articulated in the educational researcher‘s pragmatic inquiry 
in that although there were objectively effective reading instruction approaches or 
approaches that ―worked,‖ some of these would be dismissed. The grounds for choosing 
to eschew or actively oppose certain approaches that were shown to be objectively 
effective would be those that do not suit the researcher‘s interests given the predicted 
consequences associated with them.  
 Thus far, I have only discussed the pragmatic approach to inquiry in general terms 
that are widely applicable and relevant to many disciplines. One might question whether 
the central features of pragmatic methodology remain the same when applied to different 
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areas of research that are associated with distinct types of problems. The pragmatic 
method of inquiry does not seem different when applied to scientific and moral study 
until we present the role of values within moral investigation.  
Pragmatic Axiology & Ethics 
John Dewey and Pragmatic Axiology 
 The following section will focus on John Dewey‘s pragmatic theory since he was 
responsible for developing pragmatism in the direction of value and ethics (Morris, 
1970). While Pierce and other early pragmatists possess a natural scientist orientation, 
Dewey‘s moralist orientation informs his work on pragmatism. Pierce‘s scientific frame 
of reference results in his being primarily interested in the (conditional) ―truth‖ of the 
hypothesis and indefinite inquiry. In contrast, Dewey‘s work reveals that he focuses on 
specific problems and whether the asserted solution is ―warranted.‖ He extrapolates 
pragmatism‘s general theory of inquiry to value-based problems within fields such as 
ethics, education, social philosophy, religion and philosophy.  
 The understanding of a few core concepts is required in order to convey a detailed 
account of pragmatic axiology that provides a connection between value and theory. 
What Dewey means by the phrase, ―to value‖ entails two distinct common uses, one of 
which can be described as the appraising/evaluating aspect of the term, while the second 
can be referred to as the prizing aspect of valuing (Morris, 1970). If an individual claims 
that something is worthy of ―prizing,‖ this represents the latter notion of valuing. 
According to Morris (1970), Dewey views the concept of value not merely as something 
that is prized, but rather ―a thing that, after having envisaged the consequences of prizing 
it, is prized‖ (p. 85). Values are to be determined by the process of inquiry and should not 
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merely be transported to a specific problem because of their usefulness in previous 
relevant inquiries. Performing an inquiry can reveal whether the resolution did in fact 
resolve the problem. The outcomes of previous evaluations can definitely be used for new 
inquiries, but only to the extent of serving as guides.  
 Central to pragmatic axiology, Dewey describes evaluation as the process of 
determining what to prize (Morris, 1970). Pragmatism never sees things isolated from the 
context in which it is situated. The context and circumstances that surround the issue or 
entity shapes its value and meaning to us. Any problem under examination comes with a 
set of features – objects, beliefs and meanings – that are considered unproblematic with 
respect to the particular problem. As this notion relates to pragmatic axiology, 
unproblematic prizings serve as the known context in which the problematic situation is 
set, thereby contributing to the evaluation of hypotheses concerning what to prize. For 
example, in the U.S.‘s current struggle to discern the degree to which they prize universal 
health care, the value of the democratic process of deliberation is considered to be 
unproblematic. Thus, democracy would represent one aspect of the unproblematic 
context surrounding this contemporary problem. Its applicability in helping to form a 
resolution to this issue can then be tested. In this respect, evaluation in pragmatic 
axiology involves cognitive judgment, is empirical and can be tested with some 
unproblematic prizings.   
 For Dewey, the solution to a value-laden problem must be expressed through the 
means that are accessible (Morris, 1970). The judgment of the means proposed to solve 
the problem will be based on how effective the means are in achieving the desired ends. 
Moral ends are necessary to obtain a pragmatic sense of what constitutes moral action. In 
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at least one crucial respect, the prominent contributors to pragmatism, Dewey, James and 
Mead, share a central feature that resonates with one significant aspect of Kantian ethics. 
This is in their belief that all persons affected by a situation in which values conflict must 
be viewed and acted upon in a manner that demonstrates their status as ends and not 
solely as means.  
 To summarize, value problems can be categorized as political, ethical or aesthetic 
in nature (Morris, 1970). The pragmatic approach to the theory of value examines values 
from the perspective of an individual within and interacting with the world around him or 
her. The general theory of inquiry already described is applied to axiological kinds of 
evaluative inquiry such as that which is concerned with ethical issues. Thus, no general 
differences distinguish this type of inquiry from scientific inquiry. Each inquiry, 
regardless of the discipline within which it falls, occurs in a context that is unproblematic 
for that particular conflict. Also, to reiterate, a relevant inquiry that has been successful in 
solving the problem it intended to solve can contribute to the development of a volume of 
knowledge or, as Dewey preferred, a body of warranted assertions. These warranted 
assertions should not be categorically applied to each new relevant problem. Instead, the 
body of knowledge acquired through previous inquiry should conditionally guide 
inquirers in the way they approach new value problems.   
Limitations of Axiological Pragmatism 
 Unfortunately, as noted by Morris (1970), no attempt is made by Dewey to 
integrate his general theory of inquiry with his work in ethics and aesthetics. Moreover, 
despite agreeing on how a pragmatic axiological evaluation would be carried out, two 
pragmatists could make two radically different evaluations. For example, Mead and 
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James are in agreement on the evaluation process concerning whether the U.S. should 
join the League of Nations following the First World War but not in the outcomes of their 
respective evaluations. 
 One point of weakness that might be attributed to pragmatic axiology is based on 
ambiguity that is present within pragmatic semiotics (Morris, 1970). This results in some 
terms and sentences being equivocal in their meaning such that they can be misconstrued. 
Pragmatic theorists fail to provide the reader with a clear and explicitly articulated 
meaning of commonly used terms. For example, it is not clear how axiological analyses 
such as judging what is good relates to analyses of non-axiological analyses of 
determining what is fact. Also, ―practice‖ and ―good‖ are not always differentiated from 
one another. In summary, within pragmatic semiotics, there is sometimes a vague relation 
between axiological and non-axiological types of inquiry.    
Pragmatic Ethics 
Morris (1970) concisely defines ethics as ―the theory of moral behavior‖ (p. 91). 
Pragmatically speaking, moral behavior is to be judged on how it influences the 
individual. Evaluation of moral problems is inquiry into what is morally right versus 
morally wrong behavior and is judged upon how the behaviour affects the individual as 
well as others. For moral inquiry, a pragmatist holds that each value that is relevant to the 
issue must be considered. Also, the pragmatic ethicist emphasizes the uniqueness 
associated with each dilemma. This in turn implies that a single rule preceding the 
inquiry into the problem is insufficient. This notion leads to the criticism pointed at 
pragmatic ethics that claims that it leaves no room for accrued stocks of moral wisdom 
based on what has worked in the past. One can respond to this criticism by referring to 
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Dewey‘s (1939) book Theory of Valuation where he purports that generalized ideas are to 
be used to direct the examination of things in the concrete. In addition, knowledge is 
developed through the inquiry and is to be tested by considering the outcome of applying 
the knowledge to the issue. It cannot be denied then that moral principles are considered 
valid and applicable to pragmatic ethics. On this note, the reader is cautioned to take heed 
so as not to misinterpret the pragmatist‘s view of principles. Pragmatic ethics clearly does 
not accept principles - moral or otherwise - in the traditional sense of the term that 
authorizes absolute adherence to the principle of relevance.   
Criticisms of Pragmatic Methodology 
 Critics of Pierce and Dewey accuse the theory behind pragmatic inquiry of not 
adhering closely enough to the respective philosophical ideas of pragmatism and vice 
versa (Morris, 1970). For example, Pierce‘s account of pragmatism demonstrates that he 
indeed holds a metaphysical principle, namely that we ought to continually engage in 
further inquiry. If one considers Pierce‘s view that one can never be certain in the truth of 
an idea and that it is always subject to revision through further inquiry, it follows that we 
cannot even hold his apparent metaphysical principle of continuity. This suggests that 
such a belief, which is foundational to pragmatism, cannot be acted upon in practice. This 
objection can be refuted because pragmatists do not require that beliefs be proven before 
they can be applied in practice; it simply has to be shown that holding a certain belief is 
useful or productive. Pragmatists recognize the fallibility and thus the provisional nature 
of their claims. I agree with Dickstein (1998) who believes that Rorty‘s account of 
pragmatism leads to a more constructive and hopeful perspective. Rorty argues that if one 
admits the pragmatic assertion that we have made all our beliefs rather than discovered 
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them, this does not mean that we need to discard them. In this sense, Rorty‘s views can 
be used to aid a response to the abovementioned criticism.  
 Critics of Dewey charge his theory with only allowing for what is within the 
inquiry to be known and that only immediate experience can be used for inquiry. This 
leads to the allegation that Dewey has the mind creating the object or entity it knows 
(Morris, 1970). Dewey responds to this criticism by describing his belief that experience 
is just one aspect of nature and does not constitute all of nature, a position he denotes as 
cultural naturalism. Morris (1970) describes Dewey‘s interpretation of, ―a theory of 
inquiry‖ as ―an inquiry into inquiry‖ (p. 69). This means that a general theory of inquiry 
requires the study of specific inquiries. Dewey establishes that these specific inquiries are 
not limited to direct experiences of the inquirer. Instead, inquirers can appeal to 
consultation to indirect evidence that can be supplied by others. Morris illustrates this 
kind of acceptable evidence with an example. The sample problem concerns whether a 
person was born where the evidence used to support the birth may involve reports by 
others of the occurrence, the recording of the event by a video camera or some other 
reliable device. In these ways, it is clear that the pragmatic theory of inquiry and the 
methodology advocated by Dewey are in fact consistent with his metaphysical notion of 
cultural naturalism.   
Problems with the Pragmatic Maxim 
According to the pragmatic maxim, a clear understanding of a concept requires an 
understanding of the possible effects that can be reasonably expected to emerge if that 
concept is held to be true. One objection to the pragmatic maxim could be based on the 
fact that it gives rise to too much being referred to as meaningful. This criticism of over-
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inclusion is attributed to the guidance that is given by the maxim that is based on the 
possible effects and not the actual effects that have been observed. Thus, this may lead to 
an immensely vast list of expected outcomes as opposed to confirmed actions through 
experience being considered meaningful. Simply put, too much is deemed to be 
meaningful. For instance, the existence of God becomes meaningful simply because 
belief in the existence of God generates practical effects of human beings exhibiting more 
prudent behavior.   
Another objection could be made to the pragmatic maxim that criticizes the fact 
that all conditional propositions are future-oriented. This unavoidable fact about the 
maxim seems counter-intuitive when assessing hypotheses that are based on the past. For 
example, the meaning of ―O.J. Simpson was guilty of murder,‖ would lead to conditional 
statements concerning the future. Such conditional statements might include ―if Simpson 
tries on the glove recovered at the scene of the crime, it will fit‖ or ―If we check the scene 
of the crime, we will find Simpson‘s DNA.‖ However, this challenge to the maxim, 
because it seems counterintuitive for hypotheses about the past, does not imply that one 
ought to stop using it.  
Giving up on Epistemological Pragmatism – The Shift to Freestanding Pragmatism 
 One thought-provoking critique of pragmatism concerns an implication that can 
be drawn from its epistemological crux, namely that one should not attempt to explain 
―truth‖ or ―reality‖ because one can never be certain of one‘s beliefs. House (1992) is one 
scholar that refuses to accept this notion. He spurns the belief that the quest for truth is 
futile and misguided merely because we cannot be unequivocally certain about it. 
Furthermore, House is not convinced that the discovery of ―truth‖ is beyond our grasp. 
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He cites advancements in understanding the physical and biological sciences as proof that 
we have been successful in explaining reality. House also appeals to our intuition by 
pointing to our understanding of the human body, an understanding that has dramatically 
improved over these past two centuries. In positing that we do not understand the human 
body any better than we did 200 years ago, one would be hard pressed to find supporters. 
It is not that House rejects the notion that our understanding of the world (scientific or 
otherwise) might be wrong. Rather, in certain cases where hypotheses have been wholly 
corroborated by rigorous studies, House questions the plausibility of our being wrong. I 
tend to share this skepticism with House. For illustrative purposes, imagine telling an 
oncologist that the condition we call cancer might not be the result of uncontrollable 
division of malignant cells. I acknowledge that my general description of cancer may be 
an overly simplistic account, but this should not detract from my point. Even if current 
scientific understanding of cancer represents only part of the picture of the true 
mechanism behind the disease, what experts have come to illuminate is likely going to be 
supplemented as opposed to being discarded by new findings.           
 Considering the context of the origins of pragmatism, I tend to find the 
aforementioned objection to pragmatic epistemology particularly dissuasive. It is possible 
that this point of critique seems so conspicuous to us today because of the distinct 
outlook we possess as world citizens in the year 2011. Simply put, our knowledge base 
has considerably expanded which is largely attributable to exponential growths in 
technological sophistication. It is conceivable that we are more confident today with our 
understandings of the world than people were at James‘s time because of modern 
technological tools that are now available equating to amplified precision and depth. 
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Perhaps James‘s skepticism in our ability to know when we have discovered truths 
conflicted to a lesser degree with his worldview created by the circumstances of his time. 
Thus, we must refrain from accusing James of failing to make his views compatible with 
the apparent reality of the world. Indeed, his pragmatic views may have fit more neatly 
into his lived experience than in ours.                                                                             
 Although the preceding paragraph sheds some light on what might have prevented 
James from being more critical about his skepticism, it is not meant to imply that we 
should accept his epistemological viewpoint. Evidence today seems to greatly contradict 
his suggestion that the current knowledge base might not be of higher accuracy, breadth 
and detail relative to that of our predecessors. The sciences have come a long way in 
providing detailed accounts of human beings and the world around us. As found 
embedded in rhetoric used by pragmatists, our notions and concepts must endure testing 
and jibe with our real-world experiences and observations. Ironically, this line of 
reasoning compels me to give up the epistemological nuts and bolts of pragmatism and 
focus on the methodological approach of pragmatic ethics. This supports my adoption of 
freestanding pragmatism that is pragmatic in nature but can be understood independently 
from pragmatic epistemology. I will demonstrate below how freestanding pragmatism 
suits my endeavors in this study.                                                                       
 Pragmatists claim that we must give up on seeking ―a God‘s-eye point of view‖ of 
the world because not only is such a view impossible (Putnam, 1990) but it also is 
fruitless when it comes to our needs and practices (Rorty, 1990). Does the claim itself 
that we are not able to know when we have acquired a God‘s eye view not necessitate a 
God‘s eye view of the human race? Is this not a paradox? I believe so. After all, the 
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proposition presupposes that as human beings we are unable to view the world around us 
impartially and objectively and that doing so would not be useful for our needs. 
As an extension to this critique, I believe that examining the effects of the 
pragmatic belief of certainty on the relative value of basic and applied research might 
shed some light on an inherent weakness of pragmatism. When thinking about how the 
pragmatist believes our investigative efforts should be directed, I do not think it would be 
a mischaracterization to say that applied research is of much higher importance to the 
pragmatist then basic descriptive research. This seems to be implied by the notion of 
utility and the preference of searching for what is useful for our practices versus what is 
―true.‖ However, a certain level of basic knowledge is required in order to conduct and 
generate applied research. Simply put, the two go hand in hand. Moreover, what is useful 
is often (but not always) dependent upon descriptions of external reality. This can be 
demonstrated by applied research in the cardiac sciences. For instance, the aspect of 
research that seeks out treatments for a cardiovascular condition known as 
atrioventricular fibrillation would rely on descriptive basic knowledge of the anatomical 
and electrophysiological functions and mechanisms of the heart. As illustrated in this 
medical case, useful or applied knowledge depends on descriptive or basic knowledge. 
However, pragmatists might still be able to redeem themselves by agreeing to an explicit 
and qualified statement such as, attempts to describe external reality may be acceptable 
insofar as they are helpful to our uses.    
 According to House (1992), the pragmatist claim that searching for ―reality‖ is 
misguided does not necessarily follow logically from the idea that absolute certainty in 
our knowledge of reality is impossible. He also questions why we should insist that 
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external knowledge is impossible to recognize without doubt once we have acquired it. 
House poses some excellent rhetorical questions on this matter. For example, why must 
we completely relinquish all searches for explanations of reality merely because we 
cannot be one hundred percent certain that these explanations accurately describe reality? 
In the words of House:  
Why make such an extravagant demand that we be absolutely certain or abandon the 
search all together?….Scientists are aware there may be better explanations soon, but 
this does not stop their highly successful pursuit or convince them that there is no real 
world or that there is one but it is unknowable. They may be wrong, in fact, are certain 
to be wrong in many cases. From this viewpoint, pragmatists seem overly pessimistic 
about the possibility of explaining the world…we do know more about some things 
than we did a few hundred years ago. (p. 18) 
Freestanding Pragmatism 
Overview of a Freestanding Approach  
 During the 1940s and 1950s, pragmatism much like progressive liberalism began 
to be viewed as overly optimistic and naïve in light of the tragedies the world witnessed 
during times of depression and war (Dickstein, 1998). This led to a decline in interest 
with pragmatism. However, since then, there has been a revival in interest in this area of 
philosophy. In more recent years, Rorty and others have contributed to evaluations of 
different versions of pragmatism that have come forth following the inception of the 
original ideas of its founders. Starting in the 1990s, theorists began to formulate a 
methods-based paradigm for both legal and bioethics research and practice (Hester, 
2008). These proponents advanced arguments for grounding bioethics and legal practice 
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– two unavoidably ―applied‖ fields – in induction, experimentation, fallibility, as well as 
other pragmatic characteristics without demanding reference to classical or neo-
pragmatists and the ―canons‖ or theoretical ideas that correspond with them. Today, this 
approach is known as freestanding pragmatism.   
  To reaffirm, the recent revival of pragmatism can largely be attributed to the 
emergence of freestanding legal pragmatism as well as pragmatic bioethics. The former 
attempts to use law for social change. In his paper, Grey (1998) asserts that pragmatism 
within legal theory can and should be understood independently from the metaphysical 
and ontological assertions that comprise its philosophical roots. In other words, one does 
not need to commit to pragmatic propositions about truth or an external reality in order to 
apply the method of pragmatism to legal theory. Grey convincingly argues that legal 
pragmatism can stand free of philosophical pragmatism partly because it must be 
practical in a way that philosophy is not. In philosophy, ―it is enough that a question 
should provoke wonder or curiosity, and should lead on to interesting arguments, 
explanations, or speculations‖ (Grey, 1998, p. 265). In fact, a pragmatic atheist who 
claims that human beings can never know for certain whether what they have discovered 
accurately reflects external reality can still agree on pragmatic legal theory with a 
religious individual who has no doubts that his or her beliefs truly represent external 
reality. This can be illustrated by a case where Jehovah Witness parents refuse a blood 
transfusion for their son who will die without it because of their religious convictions. In 
this circumstance, the beliefs of the patient‘s guardians interfere with the medical 
profession‘s value of beneficence that suggests that the physician should do what is 
necessary to heal the individual. In assessing this situation, a pragmatic atheist and a 
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Jehovah Witness might settle on highly different solutions to this problem even though 
they might both agree on the use of pragmatic methodology in approaching the issue.   
 Regarding pragmatically informed legal theory, Grey (1998) says that ―...nothing 
in it is incompatible with belief in a transcendent God who rules over a creation in which 
human beings, though fallen, may know absolute truths‖ (pp.169-170). While this is the 
case for legal theory, the same cannot be said about philosophical pragmatism. If one 
believes without doubt that God exists, he or she cannot also believe in the pragmatic 
philosophical canon that external reality is unknowable to the human race or that humans 
are incapable of knowing when their beliefs or descriptions truly reflect external reality.  
Legal pragmatists hold that one grand theory cannot capture all that is important 
in the law in all its complexity and that theory should not be imposed onto practice from 
the top down (Grey, 1998). Instead, theory should guide practice throughout a process 
investigating whether the intended enhancements have taken place and what unforeseen 
positive or negative effects have occurred. The same approach can be adopted in applied 
ethics. Generally, a pragmatic approach to law is one that is contextual in that it is 
informed by practice and custom, and what is considered instrumental because it aims to 
advance the human good of the community. For example, justice often represents the 
human good that the legal profession aims to advance. Lastly, legal pragmatism is 
antiformalist in the sense that it prioritizes consideration of the outcome over logical 
consistency of absolute principles. 
  To more thoroughly understand freestanding pragmatism, the distinct branch of 
pragmatism that will support my analysis, I will refer to the six distinct features of 
freestanding pragmatism described by Arras (2001). To reiterate what was introduced in 
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my first chapter, the following six features will guide my process of ethical problem 
solving: 1) contextualism, which implies that concrete as opposed to abstract examples 
will be used in moral problem-solving, 2) instrumentalism, which means that I will focus 
on practical effects on prominent values, 3) eclecticism, in the sense that I will be using 
more than one source of values in ethical analysis, 4) theory independence in that I will 
avoid breaking the issue down into components in the formulation of a theory, 5) 
reflective equilibrium, which refers to the fact that I will be engaged in a constant 
reexamination of  my assumptions to maintain consistency with respect to the judgments 
I will be making, and 6) search for consensus so as to integrate alternate points of view 
during moral problem-solving.  
Addressing Concerns with Freestanding Pragmatism 
In addition to freestanding legal pragmatism, bioethics is a field that has also 
contributed to the contemporary resurgence of pragmatism. Regarding the six central 
features of freestanding pragmatism, Arras (2001) states that they are much too general 
and already infused in different approaches to bioethics. He uses these two points of 
criticism to suggest that freestanding pragmatism brings nothing completely novel or 
unique to the table. More specifically, Arras claims that because appealing to alternative 
approaches can support the features of pragmatism, pragmatism is not needed. However, 
the aforementioned premise does not automatically lead to the inference that pragmatism 
as an approach should be ignored or dismissed all together. If this were the case, any 
approach that possesses commonalities with others ought to be disregarded since 
alternative approaches can be employed in its place. I might be convinced of eliminating 
one of two approaches that promote identical sets of features; however, in light of the fact 
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that pragmatism assembles a unique constellation of traits represented in freestanding 
pragmatism‘s six central features (Schermer & Keulartz, 2003), its worth is certainly 
justified.  
In response to the second attack on (freestanding) pragmatism, namely that the 
features of pragmatism are already inscribed in other approaches to bioethics, Hester 
(2003) argues that this should be viewed in a positive light as a sign of its success in 
becoming used as a philosophical foundation. In fact, pragmatism‘s manifestation in 
many practices of modern (American) society can be acknowledged as Dewey‘s final 
legacy. The fact that these features have been largely engrained into the inner-workings 
of society supports the use of freestanding pragmatism in particular and the idea that we 
do not need to explicitly refer to Dewey or other classical pragmatists for that matter. 
Although Hester (2003) recognizes that a deep understanding of the ideas of 
classical pragmatists can be helpful to the practice of pragmatic bioethics, he states that 
explicit reference to pragmatic theory is rarely if ever needed. Classical pragmatic 
philosophers share a core belief that inquiries should aim to achieve practical benefits for 
people in their daily lives (Brendel, 2003). It is interesting to note that pragmatism itself 
endorses the contention that we should be ―freestanding‖ from appeals to (its) potentially 
dogmatic philosophical theories or principles. A revered quality of freestanding 
pragmatism lies in its avoidance of the fallacy of relying on appeals to a body of experts 
or authority, as would be the case if it relied predominantly on the ideas of the founders 
of pragmatism for support. Freestanding pragmatists can cite these ideas, but only insofar 
as they assist in formulating cogent philosophical arguments. The emphasis of 
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freestanding pragmatism should be on the pragmatic ideas surrounding the method and 
immersion in the factual details of the problem itself. 
With that said however, it has been argued that the features of freestanding 
pragmatism understood ―independently‖ of the philosophical theories of pragmatism give 
the impression that the list of features is not logically assembled. On this matter, Hester 
(2003) purports that the thoroughly thought out theoretical ideas behind pragmatism, 
particularly the notion of inquiry, represent the ―glue that holds together this unique 
addition to bioethical theory and practice‖ (p. 558). I concur that no reference to the 
underlying philosophical concepts could lead to confusion and ambiguity regarding the 
need to uphold the guidelines of freestanding pragmatism. This is why, for my case, I 
disagree with a totally freestanding approach to pragmatism that leaves no room to 
supplement it with an understanding of the ideas that gave rise to its emergence.  
Theories are useful in so far as they can be helpful in a practical context 
(Tollefson & Cherry, 2003). For my purposes, I am adopting the freestanding approach 
but I have also demonstrated the philosophical origins of freestanding pragmatism. I have 
done this in order to defend against critics such as Arras who claim that freestanding 
pragmatism is merely a movement that advocates a miscellaneous jumble of 
characteristics whose connections with one another are undefined and vulnerable to 
attack. It is only to address this potential counterattack on my freestanding pragmatic 
approach that I have consulted pragmatic philosophy. Hence, while I have examined 
philosophical pragmatism in order to inform and defend my ethical analysis, I will avoid 
being constrained by an emphasis on the epistemological and metaphysical roots of 
pragmatism while performing my ethical analysis. Still, I recognize that citing 
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philosophical pragmatic concepts and theories might make my study vulnerable to the 
claim that it is not completely or truly ―freestanding.‖ I am not concerned with such 
challenges. A true pragmatist would encourage one to use the pragmatic approach as a 
guide that can be reshaped and altered based on sound lines of reasoning. My ethical 
analysis will be based on my interpretation or version of freestanding pragmatism that 
may or may not make reference to its antecedents.  
Thus, in order to convince others that freestanding pragmatism is not founded on 
poorly connected features or attributes, I will explain the philosophical theses, or more 
accurately antitheses, that form pragmatism. These antitheses – anti-foundationalism, 
anti-essentialism, anti-dualism, and anti-skepticism – reveal the ties between the six 
distinct features of freestanding pragmatism. Schermer and Keulartz (2003) ascertain that 
contextualism, eclecticism and theory independence can be traced back to anti-
foundational and anti-essential ideas or separation from fallacious appeals to dogmatic 
philosophical theories. To echo the words of Grey (2008), pragmatism emphasizes the 
importance of outcome over logical consistency of absolute principles. The emphasis on 
searching for practical resolutions gives rise to instrumentalism.  
Understandably, when it comes to issues of morality or ethics, many would be 
dissatisfied with an equivocal description of pragmatism‘s instrumentalism that simply 
turns to the common pragmatic rhetoric that we should aim for what works or produces 
the best outcome. Such an account of instrumentalism leads one to question the sense or 
context in which we should understand the term ―works?‖ What criterion, if any, does 
pragmatism offer to measure and compare its solutions? For example, a utilitarian 
approach determines solutions by assessing the effects on overall happiness while 
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deontology dictates ethical decisions by considering moral obligations and duties. But for 
pragmatism, there appears to be no moral standard in instrumentalism. Schermer and 
Keulartz (2003) consider the central objective of decision-making in pragmatic ethics to 
be based on what leads to peaceful and cooperative living and working together. To be 
sure, such conditions foster productivity in society.  
The abovementioned antitheses of pragmatists reveal that they oppose four 
principles. They are against foundationalism, essentialism, dualism, and skepticism 
because they see these principles as complicating the attainment of an effective solution 
or adequate consensus with respect to a problematic matter. In other words, these notions 
stand in the way of acquiring fruitful cooperation. Foundationalism and essentialism do 
this by their excessive concerns with transforming everything into abstract or general 
terms when in fact reality requires flexibility and consideration of particular conditions 
and context. It might be help to consider the following analogy that demonstrates the 
virtue of a flexible versus rigid theoretical approach.  
A current bioethical issue that can be linked to the issue at hand concerns the 
judgment of whether or not it is acceptable to expose healthy children to the risks of 
clinical research (Fisher, Kornetsky, & Prentice, 2007). This relates to our ethical 
question regarding whether we should object to the use of a therapeutic intervention that 
has been designed to treat a disease in order to enhance the athletic performance of 
healthy children. An alternative approach that may have been used to assess this issue of 
gene doping is moral absolutism. From an absolutist viewpoint, one could maintain that it 
is never ethically permissible to genetically enhance healthy children if it imposes greater 
than minimal risk. In concert with this type of absolutist perspective, U.S. federal 
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regulations governing clinical research ethics strictly exclude healthy children from 
participating as research subjects unless risks that are significantly greater than minimal 
are absent or the intervention is likely to be directly beneficial to the participant (Shaw et 
al., 2004).  
In contrast, a pragmatic perspective promotes consideration of the ethical values 
as guides, as well as a realization that context is crucial to resolving ethical dilemmas. 
Thus, a pragmatist might deal with this ethical situation by considering conditions 
beyond direct benefit and risk to the participant that could potentially justify the inclusion 
of children in research in particular cases based on the values he or she aims to promote. 
To relate this back to my research, I will treat the values I have chosen as guides which 
are subject to limits due to contextual circumstances and predictions of likely 
consequences of alternative decisions and actions. Pragmatic research ethics will be 
invaluable in the challenging process of attempting to compromise between competing 
objectives. A pragmatic approach will be used as I attempt to assess consequences and 
their effects on values in practical contexts of sport, as well as moral tradeoffs.    
Similarly, dualism hinders productive solutions by imposing an oversimplified 
view of the world where entities are figuratively categorized into one of two groups, 
black or white, with no respect for potential gray zones. This tendency prevents debates 
from getting very far when there are differences in opinion and no starting points for 
agreement. The contextual nature of pragmatism allows for the avoidance of false 
dichotomies between domains or terms such as ―science‖ versus ―ethics.‖ Pragmatists 
also oppose skepticism because constantly questioning everything impedes moving 
forward, working through real problems and addressing our needs.       
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 In addition, pragmatists care deeply about fruitful cooperation and peaceful 
cohabitation. This leads them to be concerned if the process of moral inquiry in ethics 
fails to promote a democratic value or does not consider the say of all whom are affected 
by the problem. In order for the process to be fair, all moral arguments must be given due 
consideration. Current practice in bioethics discourse fails to adhere to the democratic 
concerns of pragmatic ethics. For this reason, Schermer and Keulartz (2003) feel that 
Arras (2001) misses an important characteristic of the pragmatic process that contributes 
to his mistaken belief that pragmatism has nothing novel to add to bioethics.  
 My approach to the ethical issue at hand will entail confrontation of both extreme 
sides of the gene doping debate as well as more moderate or reserved views on the 
matter. So, in this sense, I will employ a democratic approach. However, it could be 
argued that a more comprehensive pragmatic process of ethical inquiry would not solely 
seek out the perspectives of sport governing bodies and academics who have formally 
studied gene doping. The views of the public, the fans and athletes also need to be 
included in the decision-making process. One aspect that is important to pragmatic ethics 
discourse is to establish procedural conditions that ensure that all relevant arguments are 
fairly represented and considered. Furthermore, an argument could be made supporting a 
priority scheme in which the opinions of athletes hold the greatest weight since they are 
the ones most directly affected by the integration or prohibition of gene doping practices 
in sport. It seems intuitive that the voices of coaches, medical staff, organizers and fans 
also get heard in determining the way in which this issue is dealt. This would permit the 
moral decision to be made based on the ―better‖ argument – that is, more convincing and 
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more persuasive and not which argument was more visible because more power or 
money was backing it.  
In addition to ensuring fair representation of arguments and perspectives, 
Schermer and Keulartz (2003) state that applied pragmatic ethics can include the 
following tasks: providing arguments, critically assessing and modifying arguments or 
even entire vocabularies and discourses, exploring and describing moral worlds that 
could possibly emerge in the future as well as working with heterogeneity of world 
views. One way to deal with heterogeneity in opinion could be to search for consensus or 
compromise but this does not always have to be the goal sought through applied ethics. 
According to Schermer and Keulartz, the pragmatic bioethicist should select which 
task(s) to undertake by examining the nature of the moral problem being addressed in 
addition to the particular context in which it occurs. The entire process should be 
informed by the ultimate purpose of encouraging productive and cooperative living and 
working together.  
A couple of pragmatic features that have not already been discussed have been 
posited by Schermer and Keulartz (2003) as essential attributes of pragmatism that, when 
added, contribute to its pertinence and usefulness to bioethics as well as other areas of 
applied ethics. These two elements that have particular relevance to the issue I am 
analyzing include a consideration of the moral implications associated with the 
simultaneous evolution of society and technology in addition to a focus on harmonious 
living and working together as a moral standard. Ever-changing technologies constantly 
bombard us with social problems that could conflict with our living and working 
together. It has been suggested that a pragmatic approach represents a valuable guide that 
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clinical research ethicists and bioethicists can follow. The reason for this is that a 
pragmatic approach can help them as they attempt to prioritize and uphold values of 
advancing medical technology to enhance the human condition and simultaneously 
protect human rights of those involved (Patton, 2002). This two-fold goal can be likened 
to my quest to protect the positive values of sport and protect the rights of participants 
from potentially harmful technological practices while promoting those technological 
practices that enhance or endorse those values or rights. Pragmatism appreciates the 
creativity that is required in order to produce appropriate solutions to these kinds of 
problems. It is ―bottom up‖ in the sense that pragmatic moral thinking is highly context-
dependent and is generated as a response to particular dilemmas (Brendel & Miller, 
2008). Thus, pragmatism will help me to meet the challenge of integrating seemingly 
conflicting valued goals, such as the protection of human rights and scientific discovery 
and progression. This can be exemplified in clinical research ethics where the goal of 
advancing medical science must be limited so as not to threaten the rights and well being 
of research participants.  
While protecting research subjects is of grave importance, clinical research 
ethicists have been criticized for tending to neglect giving sufficient consideration where 
it is due, namely the ethical value of scientific investigation. The trouble with solely 
considering protection of human subjects can be illustrated by a hypothetical setting in 
which the demands on research are so strict that no risks can be posed to subjects without 
the potential to obtain medical benefits (Emmanuel, Wendler, & Grady, 2000). This kind 
of perspective in clinical research would fail to consider the ethical significance of all 
consequences for human welfare. For instance, in addition to considering the 
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consequences of conducting the research, a pragmatist view would hold us accountable 
for considering implications of not conducting the research as well. Therefore, with 
respect to my particular research questions, I must emphasize that it is just as important to 
consider the implications of having policies that restrict gene doping in sport as it is to 
reflect on the consequences of permitting this kind of doping. 
An illustration of freestanding pragmatism that fails to account for all the 
abovementioned features highlighted by Schermer and Keulartz (2003) as pertinent 
characteristics of pragmatism is incomplete. Acknowledgment must be made to 
freestanding pragmatism‘s recognition of the ever-changing technologically based culture 
in which we live, the significance it attributes to fair and democratic decision making 
protocols and its focus on heuristics and creativity for solutions. If a version of 
pragmatism that pays tribute to these features is provided, it becomes clear that 
freestanding pragmatism is indeed a useful and novel approach to applied ethics.  
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Chapter Three 
A Clarification of the Three Values 
Introduction 
I consider utility of courses of actions to be the single most important feature of 
pragmatism. The utility of a particular course of action is assessed on the grounds that 
that particular action is useful in promoting a desirable community. Given that 
individuals can dramatically differ in their ideas regarding what constitutes a desirable 
community, it is imperative that I clearly define mine to the reader. The particular values 
I have chosen that reflect my notion of a desirable community appear to be very closely 
related to the issue and will impact the decision of whether we should permit gene doping 
and welcome the introduction of transhuman athletes in sport. By examining the probable 
consequences that philosophers have argued may result in the event that gene doping is 
practiced in sport, I have selected three values that would be affected as a result of these 
consequences, namely fairness, autonomy and the concept of what it means to be human. 
In my introductory chapter, I defended my choice of these three values because of their 
apparent relevance to this issue. In my concluding chapter, I will return to an assessment 
of the utility of these three values in formulating an adequate resolution to the problem in 
question. Ultimately, it will be left to the reader‘s discretion to decide whether or not 
these values should hold precedence in decision-making on this matter. For now 
however, this chapter marks the first step of my pragmatic ethical inquiry, which involves 
deciphering the relevant values belonging to the type of community I feel is most 
desirable.  
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As already described in my introductory chapter, I will provide a comprehensive 
exposition of each of the three values starting with fairness. I will primarily consult 
Rawls and his notion of fairness (1958) while tying in as I see fit the conceptualizations 
of fairness in terms of access and sport as a competitive endeavour. Sport philosophers 
who discuss fairness will be cited from time to time including Lenk (2007) and Loland 
(2009). Autonomy will then be described with support from Kant‘s moral understanding 
of autonomy. In addition, I will return to the works of Tamburrini (2005), van Hilvoorde 
(2005), and Sherwin (2007) in order to disinter notions of autonomy in sport. The concept 
of what it means to be human will be the third value that I will illustrate. I will portray the 
different perceptions of human nature that are outlined by Murray (2009). The aim here 
will be to determine whether it is feasible to suggest some universal features that are 
shared by all of humanity and if so what they are. To summarize, the kind of community 
I propose will be most useful when considering the ethical issues that may ensue with the 
prospect of gene doping athletes in sport is one that upholds the value of fairness, 
autonomy and the concept of what it means to be human. In the manner just described, I 
will now turn my attention to defining each of these three values.  
Disclaimer 
Before I commence, I must be clear with the reader that I have relied almost 
exclusively on online encyclopedias in order to understand seminal works in philosophy 
on fairness and autonomy. Specifically, I have not read Kant‘s (1785/1964) Groundwork 
for the Metaphysics of Morals or Rawls‘s (1971) book A Theory of Justice. Thus, any 
reference I make to either of these two sources has emerged from the secondary accounts 
of Internet encyclopedia sites.    
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Fairness 
An Overview of Rawls’s Notion of Fairness    
 The concepts of fairness and justice are applicable to all social institutions within 
a wide range of domains that surely include sport. Naturally, sport philosophers refer to 
the work of John Rawls and his highly influential notion of fairness in their explorations 
of ethical issues in sport. With respect to their arguments on performance enhancement, 
Lenk (2007) and Loland (2009) are important examples. 
John Rawls (1958) defines fairness because he believes that it makes up a 
fundamental idea within the notion of justice that he attempts to address. First, Rawls 
superficially describes fairness as ―right dealing between persons who are cooperating 
with or competing against one another‖ (p. 178). He elaborates on this general definition 
by asserting that fairness can be a feature of games, competition, bargains or any activity 
in which individuals voluntarily engage and do not possess authority over one another. 
The rules that constitute the activity or practice and the allocations of benefits and 
burdens incurred through involvement in it are established and accepted by the 
participants themselves.  
It follows from this that fairness is called into question if any participant feels as 
though he or she is being shortchanged or coerced into acknowledging an expectation 
that he or she does not perceive as legitimate or reasonable for any person to 
acknowledge. Therefore, a fair practice or activity must adhere to the claims or principles 
held to be acceptable by the members that are involved. In Rawls‘s (1958) words, ―A 
practice is just or fair, then, when it satisfies the principles which those who participate in 
it could propose to one another for mutual acceptance‖ (p. 178). The principles that are 
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reasonably expected of all individuals involved in the activity can be appealed to if the 
fairness associated with the practices is in question at any point. Therefore, a 
distinguishing feature in the type of scenario in which fairness can be an issue is that 
persons voluntarily agree to impose on themselves and each other particular expectations 
regarding conduct and interaction with one another. Rawls argues that if the members of 
the group do not freely agree upon and accept the terms and conditions that guide their 
practices with one another, formation of a true sense of community is impossible.     
At this point, one might be wondering what if any difference lies between the 
terms justice and fairness. Rawls (1958) describes justice and fairness as ostensibly being 
one in the same but digs deeper to discover what distinguishes them from one another. 
His analysis results in the affirmation that the term justice is more applicable to practices 
where the aforementioned choice to participate is inexistent. Rawls provides slavery as an 
example to demonstrate a case where choice might be absent. This is in contrast to 
practices including business competition and games which Rawls states are settings in 
which it makes more sense to discuss fairness. Using this line of reasoning, fairness 
rather than justice is the more logical choice when discussing practices in sport. This is 
true at least for adult participation in sport but what about if we are discussing sport 
practices in the context of youth athletics? Perhaps when it comes to minors, the use of 
the term fairness is less applicable if participation is the choice of a parent or authority 
figure. Regardless, since there is considerable overlap between fairness and justice, both 
terms will be examined. 
Rawls (1958) describes a hypothetical situation where individuals have freely 
agreed upon the rules that constitute a practice or transaction and have accepted them as 
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fair. He asserts that once individuals have entered into this so-called transaction, they 
then have a duty to uphold the rules that they have accepted. This will likely mean that 
they must restrain their conduct in some way. And it goes both ways. If a person has 
complied with the rules, he or she has the right to the assent of those parties who have 
gained benefits due to his or her adherence. It would be unfair to that person in the event 
that some individuals were to acquire the benefits without paying their own dues so to 
speak. What Rawls appears to be arguing can be understood as the notion of tacit consent 
whereby an individual implies that he or she accepts a practice along with its terms and 
conditions by accepting the benefits associated with it. Tax evasion and failing to pay 
one‘s union duties represent examples offered by Rawls where individuals unfairly relish 
in the benefits associated with practices without incurring the corresponding burdens. 
According to Rawls, having to accept the burdens if one accepts the benefits associated 
with a practice does not embody a categorical rule since there may be exceptions that 
would not demand that one complies with the rules. For example, if the costs of union 
duties are excessively high and the establishment is not doing its job in advocating for 
employee rights, an employee might be justified in withholding payment to the union.  
Generally though, a person must declare his or her discord with the practice ahead 
of time and not just at the arrival of one‘s turn to uphold his or end of the deal (Rawls, 
1958). Furthermore, one should also try to eschew reaping the benefits gained through 
the practice if one does not intend to adhere to the rules. Rawls depicts these duties as 
forming the notion of fair play and acknowledges that speaking about fairness in this 
respect goes beyond common notions of fairness. He holds that one does not merely need 
to uphold rules in order to act fairly. Unfair acts typically refer to exploiting situations 
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perhaps through any potential vagueness inherent in rules even if no rule was actually 
broken.  
Rawls (1958) describes fairness as a feature the presence or absence of which is 
often questioned based on sentiment. In other words, participants might describe a feeling 
that the terms of a practice treats them unfairly. According to Rawls, an undertaking that 
would be correctly characterized as acting unfairly is demanding the enforcement of a 
rule in circumstances that do not justify such enforcement because it is advantageous for 
that person. Perhaps this might be illustrated by an example in sport where one athlete 
demands the testing of a formidable opponent. The Australian Sports Anti-Doping 
Authority has set up an online protocol and a confidential hotline where athletes or others 
can report an athlete, team, coach, medical personnel or other person whom they suspect 
has been involved in doping. People are able to submit information about a reported 
incident while remaining anonymous if they so choose. Although the conditions of 
testing are normally random, an athlete can claim that he or she has reason to believe that 
his or her opponent is cheating. However, the real reason behind the request for testing is 
the athlete‘s knowledge of his or her opponent‘s use of cough medicine that he or she 
knows could be confused with a prohibited substance because of limitations associated 
with testing procedures. In this case, the athlete who requests testing can be rightly 
accused of attempting to frame his or her opponent which surely treats that person 
unfairly.                                                                                                    
 Moreover, another unfair act could be avoiding detection due to particular 
circumstances that do not allow for effective enforcement of a certain rule (Rawls, 1958). 
For example, a professional athlete that gene dopes today despite WADA‘s rule against it 
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would be taking advantage of the placement of this rule at a time when detection 
measures to enforce the rule do not yet exist. In broader terms, acting unfairly might 
comprise acting in a way that opposes the intention of a practice. A concrete example that 
illustrates this abstract notion of acting unfairly is a professional athlete who dopes while 
using masking agents to avoid being caught and accused of violating bans on doping. In 
this way, such an athlete would be acting contrary to the purpose of such a rule that seeks 
to protect the structural goal of sporting competitions today. Loland (2009) describes this 
goal as comparing competitors with one another based on their performance of relevant 
skills while they adhere to the rules. At this point, I could of course critique this apparent 
purpose of sporting competitions and divulge my own sentiments but I will refrain from 
doing so as defining the three values as they relate to my ethical analysis is my immediate 
concern for this chapter. However, discourse concerning the purpose of sporting contests 
will likely be recalled in a later chapter.  
Regarding fairness, Rawls (1958) depicts fair play as a prima facie duty or an act 
that generally tends to represent a duty. As evident by the term ―generally,‖ Rawls states 
that there are exceptions to imposing prima facie duties as opposed to the common sense 
understanding of duties. This contextual sense of duty is undoubtedly suitable for my 
pragmatic perspective. Moreover, a prima facie duty is a particular act in certain 
circumstances that makes it the right thing to do in that instance. Fidelity and gratitude 
are also prima facie duties. What these acts have in common is that they demand restraint 
in conduct that might at times hold back individuals from performing acts that would 
yield results that are most advantageous to that individual. According to Rawls, such 
actions would be contrary to those endorsed by a strict rational egoist where one solely 
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seeks out his or her own interests. But Rawls maintains that acting in a way that is at 
times contrary to one‘s interests is a natural effect of participating in a practice guided by 
a set of rules that one has perceived and accepted as fair and from which one has received 
benefits.  
I would describe such setups where people agree to sometimes act in ways that 
appear to oppose their own interests as ―give-and-take‖ compromises that are intended to 
bring about the best possible arrangement for all people involved. These arrangements 
not only consider the immediate concerns of individuals but their future interests as well. 
To justify the presence of such arrangements, it is helpful to consider the product of each 
person simply acting as he or she pleases without regard to any one else‘s interests. In 
one instance, you might benefit greatly from acting with sole regard to improving your 
own situation but you could lose all of what you have gained and more when a person 
doing the same crosses you.      
One can think of examples where these situations are set and created by certain 
parties. For example, political alliances between nations create conditions where each 
country involved agrees not to attack or harm any of the other participating nations‘ 
interests. Such a setup is designed to protect each party and allows for mutual 
cooperation to achieve similar aims and interests. Generally, it is in the interest of a 
nation to engage in an alliance, however there are times when such an agreement might 
prevent a country from acquiring considerable benefits.  
Let us elaborate on this example with a hypothetical situation involving three 
countries – X, Y and Z. In this example, country X and Y are joined by an alliance with 
one another that forbids country X from purchasing the petroleum or oil of country Z (an 
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enemy of country Y). If country X supports country Z by buying its oil, it is feared that 
the money accrued through the oil industry will be used by country Z to fund the 
development of unprecedented state-of-the-art military technology and arms that would 
annihilate country Y. However, country X is in a state of economic depression and 
country Z sells oil for a much cheaper rate than all other exporters of oil. In fact, the 
average amount of money that each citizen of X spends on oil if it is purchased from any 
country other than country Y is excessive and significantly reduces the average annual 
expenditure country X citizens devote to establishing, expanding and investing in 
businesses and spending on domestic goods and services.  
Thus, because of country X‘s agreement with country Y that obstructs a main 
channel through which country X could refuel its economy (no pun intended), country X 
is forced to remain in a state of economic depression. Despite this drawback associated 
with country X‘s alliance with country Y, it still might be in X‘s overall best interest to 
maintain its agreement with Y. For example, country Y might have agreed to use its own 
unmatched intelligence and military resources to aid country X in the case of any attacks 
on country X that would make country X‘s economic depression seem not so troubling at 
all. Thus, while the leaders of country X might be perceived as opposing country X‘s 
interests, it is a more accurate characterization to state that they are merely prioritizing 
them.  
Aside from the way compromises that are manifested through fair play arguably 
serve the best interests of those involved, Rawls (1958) attributes a deeper and perhaps 
nobler reason to demonstrate this kind of conduct. Rawls points out that acting fairly by 
constraining one‘s actions is a kind of conduct that shows that an individual 
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acknowledges others as persons sharing similar feelings and interests. This seems to 
represent what we commonly refer to as empathy. Sympathy or compassion are distinct 
from empathy in that the former terms refer to the desire to alleviate another person‘s 
suffering whereas empathy need not as it is simply the recognition or understanding of 
another‘s feelings as being similar to one‘s own (Wispe, 1986). Thus, feeling empathy is 
seemingly necessary for acts of sympathy or compassion.  
Rawls states that in order to recognize others as persons with whom we share 
similar feelings we must recognize and act in accordance with the duty of fair play. He 
claims that this parallels the argument that for a person to acknowledge the suffering of 
others, he or she must at some time or other help or want to help a suffering individual or 
person in pain. Similarly, the duty of fair play revolves around the mutual 
acknowledgment of the aims and interests of others involved in the practice and 
ultimately displays recognition of other individuals as persons as opposed to mere 
obstacles that stand in the way of achieving one‘s objectives. Clearly then, the manner in 
which a person treats others reveals how he or she views them – as persons or conversely 
as obstacles that stand in the way of acquiring his or her own desires. Based on this 
reasoning, Rawls asserts that, in general, recognizing prima facie duties including fair 
play as well as accepting principles of justice depicts one‘s treatment of others as persons 
with similar interests, capacities and feelings. In terms of sport, athletes at the very least 
must share an interest in all participants including themselves adhering to the rules. 
To summarize, Rawls (1958) describes a just practice as one where the principles 
that dictate the expected actions of all individuals involved are upheld. These principles 
must be ones that would have been committed to without knowing the details regarding 
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one‘s status or condition at the time the principles and rules are applicable to one‘s 
actions. The original position is the name Rawls attributes to this perspective whereby 
one decides on principles of conduct without knowing one‘s particular circumstances. 
This will be elaborated on later but for now it is sufficient to say that Rawls believes that 
this perspective permits the rules that are decided upon to be fair for all without 
prejudice.  
As already alluded to earlier, if a person acquires the benefits associated with a 
practice and deems it to be fair, he or she relinquishes his or her freedom to base 
decisions and actions in certain situations purely on self-interest. In that event, the duty of 
fair play must be adhered to so that the rules are maintained. It is also important to point 
out that you must be able to complain about rules you do not perceive as fair and the rules 
themselves cannot be incompatible with justice. Moreover, the claim that in order for a 
practice to be just even unjust rules that constitute the practice that have been deemed to 
be acceptable by the participants must be adhered to makes no sense at all from the 
viewpoint of justice as fairness. Yet other ideas besides fairness that have been used to 
define justice such as those based on classical utilitarianism fail to discredit some unjust 
rules.     
A recent example in sport displays the importance of being able to challenge rules 
one perceives as unfair or unreasonable discrimination. An international court case that 
was initiated by Oscar Pistorius, a runner with two prosthetic lower limbs, in an effort to 
repeal the ban enforced by track and field‘s international governing body that prohibits 
athletes with carbon-fibre prosthetic legs from competing alongside able-bodied athletes. 
This case resulted in a ruling that permitted Pistorius to compete in the 2008 Olympic 
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Games provided that he qualified. The claim that Pistorius‘s legs make his running more 
economical and thus provide him with an unfair advantage was ascertained as being 
based on insufficient evidence and unfairly administered lab tests. For instance, the 
researchers were directed by the international governing body of track and field to solely 
study the fastest segment of Pistorius‘s run. Clearly, having channels such as the legal 
system available for participants to challenge unfair or unjust rules or protocol based on 
reason is essential to ensuring fairness of practices.   
Defending Rawls’s Notion of Fairness by Critiquing an Alternative Conception     
This provides a suitable segue to Rawls‘s comparison of his concept of justice as 
fairness with the classical utilitarian conception of justice. For this comparison, Rawls 
(1958) refers to the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick in their classical 
utilitarian thoughts on justice. The heart of utilitarianism is its emphasis on maximizing 
utility, which can be understood as happiness or pleasure as opposed to pain and 
suffering. General happiness is the sum of all individual functions of utility where each 
individual is weighed equally.  
Although on face value one might think that the utilitarian advocacy for equality 
appears to have the same effects as do the principles of justice, Rawls (1958) argues that 
this is not the case. Rawls alleges that this alternative account of justice has flaws that are 
avoided by his definition of justice through the concept of fairness. To start with, the 
classical utilitarian notion of justice reduces the quest for justice to a search for the most 
efficient framework that produces general welfare. Utilitarians view principles of justice 
as the most important features of social institutions and advise that they are handled with 
the utmost care because of the huge impact that they have on us due to facts of human 
nature. Classical utilitarians base decisions concerning the justice of a practice on the 
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distribution of benefits and burdens to individuals that results from the allocation of 
rights and duties dictated through the practice throughout the course of its existence. 
Moreover, the aggregate satisfaction of desires of individuals is the criterion used to 
determine how to structure practices and assign resources so that they are in accordance 
with principles of justice as typically seen in the health care system. 
An objection to justice in this sense is the common accusation that utilitarianism 
focuses on the ends while minimizing the value of the means that are used to reach them. 
Specifically, the understanding of justice captured by classical utilitarianism attempts to 
emit the general welfare but in doing so in some cases might permit practices that people 
would otherwise find morally repugnant. This is based on the fact that nothing prohibits 
the utilitarian from accepting circumstances if it can be argued that the allocation of 
rights and duties gives rise to the most happiness for the most people (Rawls, 1958). 
Positive value is attributed to the satisfaction of a desire or interest regardless of what that 
desire is or what claims are required by pursuit of that desire. For example, if a CEO of a 
corporation wishes to minimize the company‘s expenditures in order to increase the 
company‘s value for stockholders, satisfaction of this end would be positively viewed 
from a utilitarian perspective. Furthermore, if the means that the company uses to 
minimize its expenditures is significantly underpaying its employees, the burden placed 
on the workers would factor into the equation but would not discount the value of the 
satisfaction of the CEO‘s desire. Executive decisions are to be made by ideal executive 
legislators that are external third parties and should maximize the value of utility in 
satisfying the interests of those involved.  
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A more powerful example offered by Rawls (1958) might be more effective than 
my example above in revealing the problem with classical utilitarianism as a foundation 
for principles of justice. According to utilitarian ideas, slavery is considered unjust solely 
because the benefits incurred by slave owners are disproportionately less than the 
disadvantages it brings to slaves and society. On the other hand, Rawls claims that his 
conception of justice as fairness would give no credit to the advantages derived through 
slavery to the slave owner. Thus, from his perspective, determining the justice or lack 
thereof of slavery would not be an issue of determining whether the advantages of being 
a slave owner outweigh the disadvantages of being a slave. Rawls admits that there might 
be reasons for slavery in certain circumstances. For example, slavery might be rooted in 
tradition and in one instance is impossible to completely abolish until it is gradually taken 
a part piece by piece. Such reasons however are never sufficient in overriding the burdens 
appointed to slaves and to society. Rawls contends that the amplified moral concerns we 
naturally feel toward issues of justice can be supported by reference to his notion of 
justice as fairness. In addition, he argues that this is not the case for a classical utilitarian 
concept of justice that merely prescribes weighing advantages against disadvantages to 
depict the efficiency of social institutions in satisfying interests and desires.   
Of course, simply depending on feelings or inclinations is not good enough. 
According to the concept of justice as fairness, slavery‘s injustice is derived from the fact 
that not all parties involved would mutually acknowledge its terms and rules as 
acceptable. Manifestly, from the general position with no knowledge of one‘s place in the 
practice, one would certainly disagree with the practice of slavery. Thus, the essence of 
slave owning is unequivocally unjust and thereby the benefits associated with it have no 
  82 
bearing on assessing the value of the practice. Simply put, according to justice perceived 
through fairness, slavery can never be just. On the other hand, the classical utilitarian 
concept of justice acknowledges claims of slave owners that are unwarranted since they 
have no moral entitlement to these benefits. Hence, Rawls purports that if the definition 
of utility fails to exclude the satisfaction of interests or desires that contradict principles 
of justice, classical utilitarianism should be discontinued as a frame of reference through 
which to understand justice.   
However, Rawls (1958) claims that altering the classical utilitarianism-based 
concept of justice in this manner is inconsistent with the fundamental ideas of the 
utilitarianism. Not counting certain types of claims opposes the notion of justice that 
prescribes the maximization of the satisfaction of desires that views all desires equally. 
On the other hand, Rawls‘s concept of justice as fairness in its very spirit depicts the 
types of claims that are in accordance with justice. This is because this concept of justice 
supports the idea that a practice should not be comprised of any rules or principles that 
would not be freely accepted as fair by all parties involved. In light of this notion of 
justice determined from the perspective of the original position, it becomes clear that 
claims that violate principles of justice are rejected. This reveals the basis of my 
preference for Rawls‘s notion of justice as fairness over the classical utilitarian 
alternative.   
Sorting out the Principles 
  In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops two distinct principles of 
justice (as cited in Richardson, 2005). Richardson describes how in order to formulate 
these principles Rawls employs the perspective of the original position that was briefly 
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mentioned earlier where the decision-maker is void of any knowledge about his or her 
sex, creed, ethnicity or any other factor on which one might base discrimination. Rawls 
assumes this position based on his claim that from it, a rational person would only agree 
to what is fair because that person would not know whether an unfair term would be to 
his or her disadvantage. For this reason, Rawls is convinced that society ought to be 
structured upon principles that would be accepted from this position. Indeed, Rawls 
argues that what we would come up with from the original position are the principles of 
justice he advocates. Thus, a practice is just or morally fair if it is in accordance with 
these two principles.  
The first principle has been referred to as the Liberty Principle (Richardson, 
2005). It requires that society must assure equality among all citizens where basic rights 
and liberties are concerned. Each person thus has an equal right to the most amount of 
freedom that can be privileged to all.  
 The second principle has two main components (Richardson, 2005). The first part 
of this principle is known as the Fair Opportunity Principle (FOP). According to this 
principle, social structures must be constructed so that stations that provide benefits to the 
individuals who fill them thereby giving rise to inequalities must be fairly available to all 
members of society. Thus, if one applies this principle to positions of public office, it 
suggests the implementation of publicly funded elections such that these positions are 
equally obtainable to non-wealthy and wealthy citizens. This signifies the idea that two 
individuals similar in terms of natural ability should have equal opportunities.  
The second aspect of this principle – the Difference Principle (DP) – concerns 
inequalities between members of society in terms of social or economic factors such as 
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goods people need in order to survive or live well (Richardson, 2005). While 
utilitarianism focuses on the general happiness resulting from the distribution of burdens 
and benefits, the concept of justice as fairness is concerned with the distribution of 
primary goods, which could include income and wealth. These primary goods also might 
include individual rights including those basic rights that pertain to all persons alike and 
non-basic rights that are attached to particular positions or roles in society. An example 
of a basic right is the freedom of expression and an example of a non-basic right is a 
police officer‘s right to place a criminal under arrest. The DP holds that if inequalities in 
the allocation of these goods are to be accepted, they must be to the benefit (or must 
improve the situation) of members of society that are the least advantaged. In this 
fashion, the example of the police officer‘s right to place a criminal under arrest can be 
shown to be to the betterment of society members including those whom are the least 
advantaged.  
Furthermore, the DP would not allow one to benefit from his or her own 
intelligence or some talent unless the least advantaged people in society benefit from it in 
one way or other (Richardson, 2005). From this, it follows that greater than average 
salaries for certain lines of work can be justified. For example, high physician salaries are 
accepted if doing so provides incentive for more people to go through the intensive 
training involved in medical education and specialization and thereby prevents a decline 
in physicians and therefore the quality of healthcare for all including the least advantaged 
groups in society.  
Rawls (1958) explains that the circumstances that call for the Difference Principle 
can be recognized through the Principle of Redress (PR). The PR asserts the need for 
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society to address or respond to those conditions or capacities that are imposed on 
individuals and result in them being in the least advantaged group in society. According 
to the principle, these conditions or capacities must be responded to only when people 
cannot be viewed as deserving of them such as being born intellectually challenged. 
These circumstances call for the application of the DP.                                   
 To elaborate, the FOP seems to endorse a society in which resources are provided 
to individuals compensating for people‘s circumstances that have made them 
disadvantaged. This is based on the notion that two equally ambitious, hardworking, 
perseverant and talented persons should have a roughly equivalent chance of successfully 
incurring a position that they both desire that give rise to benefits (Arneson, 2002). The 
ideal society is one where youth are not advantaged relative to other youth because of 
factors besides genetic inheritance and socialization. It is not that the benefits are taken 
away from those fortunate individuals that hold them; rather, unlucky individuals are 
provided with channels that cancel out the benefits of the lucky ones. To exemplify this, 
an athlete who at an early age was adopted and coached by Tiger Woods would surely 
benefit from the knowledge and skill that Tiger could pass on. However, the advantages 
of being adopted and coached by Tiger could be cancelled out if children reared by 
parents with no athletic ability or knowledge could pay for coaching services from elite 
players like Tiger Woods if they can afford them. Similarly, governmentally funded 
programs could be developed so that even impoverished children could be provided with 
financial assistance or free coaching services taught by someone at the same level.                                                                                                                              
 This example exhibits the idea that ambition, work ethic and natural talent are 
factors that should dictate success in particular pursuits. Of course, one should note that 
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intense ambition might lead some people to employ unethical means such as cheating to 
obtain achievements. In addition, people‘s ambitions might target unethical ends. This 
highlights the need to recognize that ambition is morally ambiguous but insofar as it leads 
to ethically acceptable consequences such as winning a race while acting fairly it seems 
to be valued by Rawls. In any case, this might be based on the premise that these factors 
are unique from others such as socio-economic status of one‘s parents in that they are not 
imposed through the circumstances inherited by individuals and thus people can be held 
accountable for them (Arneson, 2002). The FOP suggests that either a circumstance or 
factor is categorized as being the responsibility of the individual or else that of society. It 
is only in the latter case that inequalities stemming from the feature should be rectified or 
compensated for through social structures and practices. However, do our experiences in 
the real world support the validity of the claim that ambition, work ethic and talent are 
incurred irrespective of one‘s socialization?       
 For one, desire to acquire success in a certain endeavour might itself be subject to 
socialization and the unchangeable circumstances in which one is born (Arneson, 2002). 
A good example that depicts this point is how in particular states within the U.S. such as 
Texas, young boys are taught to engage and pursue football while social norms 
discourage female participation in the sport. In this case, it seems unreasonable to hold 
young boys fully accountable for their desire to participate and excel in football and hold 
girls entirely responsible for their lack of desire to do the same.    
 A distinguishing feature of principles of justice such as the FOP is that they take 
precedence above other competing values (Arneson, 2002). Of course, it might be argued 
that implementing compensatory measures to enforce the FOP or the DP could require 
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excessive governmental interference into our lives (Fishkin, 1983). This objection does 
not require fully rejecting these principles. Instead, it might just call for caution in failing 
to consider other values including privacy, autonomy and liberty that could potentially 
conflict with the enforcement of this particular principle of fairness (Arneson, 2002). This 
notion is undeniably supported through pragmatism. It is also important to remind the 
reader that the FOP is not the only principle that has been argued is a requirement for 
justice or fairness.                               
 One conception of the FOP can be described as ―leveling out the playing field‖ in 
the sense that it advocates for the removal of inequalities that result from unchosen 
circumstances but not those that result from individuals‘ decisions presupposing that 
initial conditions are equal and that social systems allow for fair interactions among 
individuals (Arneson, 2002). To elaborate, Arneson describes an environment that is 
conducive to fair interactions as one where everyone starts out at an equal starting 
position and where the conditions allow individuals to enter joint agreements with 
voluntarily agreed upon terms. Moreover, in a fair environment, contracts are enforced 
and persons are not permitted to intentially hurt others such as through coercion, stealing, 
fraud or physical harm. Additionally, such an environment must either prohibit 
inidviduals from pressing costs of their own engagements on people who have not 
consented to their involvement or else penalize these individuals by forcing them to 
compensate for the harm they have caused.                                                                            
 On the other hand, inequalities originating from circumstances beyond people‘s 
control are to be eradicated (Arneson, 2002). The upshot of this is that after creating 
equal starting conditions, outcomes should be dictated by the consequences of choices 
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made by the individuals involved. In essence, each individual can then rightly be held 
responsible for the position they end up in within the social hierarchy. This consequence 
appears intuitively agreeable since we cannot hold people accountable for things they 
have had no control over or are unable to significantly alter. Thus, it is first necessary to 
figure out which circumstances are chosen and which are simply inherited or imposed on 
individuals. Some unchosen circumstances cited by Arneson include socialization, 
rearing conditions and genetic factors.     
 Obviously, the fact that genetic factors were not self-chosen circumstances at the 
time Rawls and his contemporaries wrote about justice and fairness does not mean that 
this will always be the case. Principles of justice and fairness including the FOP have 
been formulated in a context in which genetic features are fixed. As will be more fully 
discussed in my next chapter, this underlying assumption is questioned in a world where 
gene doping technology is possible as it would provide means through which individuals 
can choose to significantly modify their own genetic makeup. As cited in Arneson 
(2002), Buchanan describes how genetic intervention used to reduce the incidence of 
genetic diseases or disorders can be used to ―level out the playing field‖ allowing more 
people to live longer and healthier lives. However, there is no doubt that the application 
of genetic technology in this sense has aims, uses and implications that are different than 
gene doping. In any case, respecting the autonomy of persons seems to be a prerequisite 
for the fair treatment of others. This is highly evident in sport where a failure to view 
athletes as autonomous rational persons can be viewed as giving rise to various unfair 
practices dictated by sport governing bodies such as the effects of measures that are 
deemed to be necessary for the effective enforcement of anti-doping policies.    
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Autonomy 
The Etymology of Autonomy 
  The etymology of autonomy is a helpful starting point for understanding the 
meaning of autonomy. As explained by Elliot (2001), the Greeks are credited with 
coining the term. Autonomy comes from the Greek word that consists of two subparts – 
autos and nomos – which together refer to self-rule or self-determination. Archaic uses of 
this term are distinct from the more recent philosophical ideas of John Stuart Mill and 
Immanuel Kant on autonomy in that the former usage of the term was for describing a 
feature of the state rather than persons. Autonomy was used to describe independence of 
Greek states from external control. On the other hand, the individualistic notion of 
autonomy esteems the freedom of persons to determine their own futures and respects 
personal values in determining what is in people‘s own best interests. Autonomy has been 
understood in a number of different ways. Most often though the contemporary 
conception of autonomy concerns the power of persons to rationally carry out decisions 
that impact their futures 
A General Account of Autonomy  
As stated by John Christman (2003), a general sense of autonomy that can simply 
be understood as acting in accordance with one‘s authentic self as opposed to external 
influences is hardly contestable. However ambigious this definition of autonomy might 
be, it seems to support the promotion of empowerment of individuals under oppressive 
forces. Most people would agree that this is a normatively desirable objective. 
Divergence can arise however when philosophers attempt to profess the particular criteria 
that must be met in order to claim that a person is acting autonomously as well as the 
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degree of importance that ought to be designated to autonomy and how this value should 
guide our practices if at all. For this reason, many accounts of autonomy exist that differ 
in their views regarding what it is about autonomy that leads to its apparent normative 
significance (Piper, 2010).     
While there is a wide range of accounts of autonomy, most of the current 
conceptions primarily focus on the procedure involved in deciding on the course of action 
in question (Dryden, 2010). In other words, for a person‘s action to be considered 
autonomous, the action must emerge through a process characterized by critical 
reflection. This common notion of autonomy centres on the decision-making procedure 
rather than the actions decided upon as a result of that process in determining whether an 
autonomous decision has been made. According to Dryden, disagreement exists on the 
degree of rationality that the individual performing the act must exhibit if the action is to 
be considered autonomous. Questions also remain concerning whether autonomy simply 
requires an absence of interference that impinges on autonomy such as coercion or 
whether it further entails positive acts of autonomy through reflective self-regulation by 
the individual.  
Autonomy and Freedom According to Immanuel Kant 
The notion of individual autonomy stands at the core of Immanuel Kant‘s views 
of moral philosophy. Because for Kant autonomy is inextricably tied to morality, his 
notion of autonomy has been referred to as moral autonomy (Christman, 2003). In his 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant discusses freedom as the autonomy of 
the will (Christman, 2003). He argues that the reason we ought to constrain our actions so 
that they are in accordance with what is moral is based on what he perceives to represent 
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freedom at the highest level. In this context, freedom refers to liberty from sources of 
influences that are outside of a certain aspect of the person‘s mind. For example, if a 
person‘s actions are influenced by a desire for money, pleasing others, revenge or any 
other external object, this person is constrained by these sources and thus cannot be 
considered free. Kant calls the state in which a person lacks freedom in this sense 
heteronomy. To be free, Kant says that a person must act according to his or her own will 
and not out of his or her own volition or wishes as in the commonsense understanding of 
freedom. The good will according to Kant is the moral compass that seeks out morally 
good actions that are based on moral laws. When a person‘s will is free from external 
constraints, the person is free to act based on moral laws that are dictated by the agent‘s 
will rather than impositions created by other sources. Only in this manner can the will 
legitimately be described as being autonomous. 
 This account of freedom is vulnerable to confusion concerning what can be 
considered external to the will. In general, some influences can be external to the will yet 
internal to the person. If something is external to the mind and the person‘s rational 
thoughts, Kant classifies it as external to the will (Christman, 2003). For example, money 
is clearly external to the will but what if the desire of this external object is understood as 
greed? One can be sure that greed is internal to the individual possessing it. Nevertheless, 
Kant would still deem greed as external to the will although not external to the individual. 
Therefore, for Kant, actions that are motivated by greed are not considered free or 
autonomous acts.  
In contrast, common perceptions of freedom portray individuals acting without 
external pressures based on their own inclinations, emotions, preferences, desires and 
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values. This clearly differs with Kant‘s perception of autonomy that excludes such factors 
since they are seen as inhibiting what he believes to be the true source of autonomous 
decision-making: the will. For instance, Kant argues that acting out of anger or some 
other emotion is not the outcome of rational thought and thus cannot be described as 
exemplifying autonomy. Initially after being the subject of a racial slur, a person might be 
so angry that he or she wants to physically harm the individual who has made the 
offensive remark. But after emotions subside, the targeted person will come to his or her 
senses and determine that to retaliate in such a manner is to act contrary to his or her will 
and what is morally acceptable. Consistent with Kant‘s reasoning is the notion that if we 
do not let go of anger and maintain grudges towards people who have done us harm in 
life, we can become enslaved by our emotions which can cloud our thinking or, in Kant‘s 
words, prevent us from acting in accordance with our will. Perhaps this loss of rational 
thought that allows persons to act contrary to the will is what leads to back and forth 
vengeful acts of brutal violence by opposing groups in wars.    
In summary, Kant holds that if a person‘s choices and actions are governed by 
emotions and thus their will is not free, this means that he or she necessarily acts 
irrationally (Christman, 2003). If we are truly engaged in rational thought, Kant believes 
that this gives rise to moral actions or acts that are in accordance with what he refers to as 
moral laws. What exactly are moral laws? Kant believes that moral laws are universal 
principles that dictate right from wrong actions. Based on Kant‘s ideas of moral laws, he 
asserts that acts are never deemed right by assessing their outcomes. They are determined 
through pure practical reason. This sort of reason refers to that which only promotes 
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actions because they are good in and of themselves and not for any other purpose such as 
being elected town mayor. 
Can Kant’s Moral Autonomy be Sustained in Pragmatic Ethics?    
 My evaluation of gene doping is concerned with how autonomy would most 
likely be affected by gene doping. Presumably if one could argue that the application of 
genetic technologies for performance enhancement in sport in some way compromises an 
individual‘s ability to employ reason that is free from external aims or influences so that 
that person‘s will is no longer autonomous, then one could deduce that gene doping is 
indeed detrimental to autonomy in Kant‘s sense of the term.                             
 At first glance, this test of autonomy appears to be usable for my study of gene 
doping. Upon closer inspection however, this account of autonomy is fundamentally 
problematic with pragmatic ethics. In fact, if I decided to buy into Kant‘s moral 
understanding of autonomy, I would be required to denounce the pragmatic approach I 
have chosen and justified as a potentially valuable guide for evaluating the issue of gene 
doping in sport. This is because my version of pragmatic ethics in itself would be 
reproached by Kant‘s ideas concerning autonomy in his moral philosophy. As I have 
maintained, my pragmatic ethical evaluation will involve endorsing courses of actions 
that promote values that a desirable community would uphold. Recall that the purpose of 
my research will be to highlight the implications of gene doping athletes on the value of 
fairness, autonomy and the conception of what it means to be human. This analytical 
process of decision-making conflicts with Kant‘s moral view of autonomy that advocates 
only making decisions based on the good will or pure practical reason as opposed to 
values (Johnson, 2004). Thus, it would be nonsensical for me to base my assessment of 
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how gene doping would speculatively affect autonomy on Kant‘s definition of autonomy. 
This is because such a notion of autonomy would deride the process of decision-making 
involved in my analysis. After all, why would I use a definition of autonomy that 
indicates that the decision-making process should be based solely on pure practical 
reason when I am grounding it on autonomy and other values?   
Moreover, Kant uses his notion of autonomy to create a moral bedrock or 
foundation that he uses to explain why we ought to behave morally. Specifically, he 
argues that if the will is autonomous, we will act only in ways that are in accordance with 
the good will. As Johnson (2004) explains, Kant claims that acting based on the good will 
necessarily gives rise to adherence to what he calls the categorical imperative (CI). 
However it is important to note that Kant maps out three versions of his CI, one of which 
is that we should always treat human beings as ends and never merely as means. This 
enforces a respect for human dignity (DeSensi & Rosenberg, 2003). Another account of 
the CI states that we should act as both subjects and creators of laws that govern our 
conduct. This constructs a situation where we feel most compelled to abide by the rules 
since we formed them. A third version of the CI expresses the idea that we ought to act in 
ways such that any one employing pure practical reason so that their good will is void of 
any ulterior motives would accept our acts as universal laws or acts that would be 
performed every time any individual is presented with the same situation. It is this notion 
that is diametrically opposed to the contextual feature of pragmatism that refutes the role 
of absolute principles taking precedence in our decision-making.  
To be consistent with the pragmatic claims I have already presented as guides for 
my ethical analysis, moral laws or universal actions miss the point that the world we live 
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in is utterly complex meaning that we must be able to respond to it in ways that consider 
the unique considerations inherent in each situation. To be fair, Kant‘s CI may just be 
hypothetical and merely intended to provide humanity with a guide for moral behaviour. 
However, even if this is the case, it implies that some actions can be acceptable in all 
sufficiently similar situations. This is in discord with the account of pragmatism that I am 
endorsing.         
 Perhaps Kant‘s version of autonomy would be more applicable to my study if the 
sort of research question I was asking was whether an individual athlete would 
autonomously choose to participate in gene doping practices. In this case, a person 
contemplating the use of gene doping would be directed to employ pure practical reason 
– reason that is free from influences external to the will as described earlier (Johnson, 
2004) – to evaluate whether acting in this way could be a morally acceptable universal 
law. However, Kant‘s discussion on decision-making by individual agents avoids explicit 
reference to social decisions such as whether a particular technology should be sought out 
by researchers and made accessible to the public or banned. Therefore, the question 
becomes whether the use of pure practical reason and the process of rational thought that 
Kant advocates for deciding on private matters can be extended to issues that are of social 
concern.            
As already noted, my assessment of gene doping is inconsistent with Kant‘s CI as 
it incorporates particular values (fairness, autonomy and the concept of what it means to 
be human) in the decision-making process concerning the ban or acceptance of gene 
doping in sport. Clearly, Kant wants us to exclude all other aims such as values from 
entering the thought process of the rational agent except his or her will. In fact, the only 
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―morally right acts‖ according to Kant are ones we would choose to carry out because 
they are good in and of themselves and do not aim to achieve other ends such as 
increasing fairness or autonomy (Johnson, 2004). Acts that are good in and of themselves 
are ones we would accept as universal laws. Conversely, Kant would probably reproach 
the pragmatic evaluation process in which I am engaged as being entrenched in 
heteronomy – the term he uses to convey the condition of the will not being free.  
 Regardless, my ethical analysis of the gene doping ban is closer to social policy 
concerns than the private matters decided by individuals that Kant clearly targets in his 
moral philosophy. What I ultimately hope to inform through this pragmatic evaluation is 
the decision of sport governing bodies on whether they should welcome the arrival of 
gene doping or attempt to block its entry in sport. So for my purposes I should look for an 
understanding of autonomy that is more conducive to decision-making in the social 
policy context. 
The preceding paragraphs exhibit why I have chosen to forgo an appeal to Kant‘s 
understanding of autonomy. My reasoning is based on the fact that Kant‘s moral 
autonomy seems to conflict with my pragmatic theoretical approach that is grounded in 
contextualism and values-based decision-making and appears to be not entirely relevant 
to social policy concerns such as the ban against gene doping as opposed to private 
matters. DeSensi and Rosenberg (2003) describe how according to Kant, conduct is only 
ethical when it is derived from using reason to discern categorical or non-hypothetical 
duties such as Thou shall not kill. Reason allows us to envision whether categorical 
imperatives are self-contradictory in nature. If they are, then they are surely not moral 
imperatives by which we must consistently abide. DeSensi and Rosenberg cite Kant‘s 
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illustrative example, specifically that of breaking one‘s promises. If this were to be 
committed by all, promises would cease to hold any meaning because no one would trust 
that another person would keep his or her promise. Kant believes that acting based on 
desires, values or consequences can only give rise to hypothetical imperatives such as if 
you value your children, you must provide them with the necessities of life. Kant 
stipulates that these commands are weak since one can simply deny the condition that the 
statement requires in order to avoid performing the action. For Kant, no such motivator 
for our actions besides reason can possibly give rise to what would properly be referred 
to as ethical conduct. Clearly, this strongly dismisses the central foundation of my ethical 
analysis, particularly the notion of a ―desirable community.‖  
Does this mean that I should give up my pragmatic approach or conversely deny 
the effectiveness of Kant‘s understanding of autonomy for the purpose of my ethical 
analysis? As I have already demonstrated, there is much value in the use of the pragmatic 
approach in this case. Furthermore, my perspective avoids one pitfall that DeSensi and 
Rosenberg (2003) state is attached to holding two acts as categorical imperatives – that is 
duties we must uphold in all situations – on occasions where it would be impossible to 
maintain accordance with both duties. The example that is construed by DeSensi and 
Rosenberg involves the command that we must aid others when they are in danger and 
tell the truth. If a murderer asks us to divulge the location of a person he or she is hunting 
down and we are aware of this person‘s whereabouts, we cannot tell the truth without 
possibly endangering the life of that person. If we rank these two commands to guide us 
in cases where they might conflict with one another, they would no longer represent 
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absolute or categorical imperatives. In this way, the value of appealing to absolute moral 
duties is constrained by practical challenges we necessarily face in the world.     
To conclude this section, I believe that due to the inconsistencies between the 
ideas behind my pragmatic approach to the issue of gene doping in sport and those 
inherent in Kant‘s moral vision of autonomy, I am justified in exploring alternative 
perceptions of autonomy that are more compatible with values-based decision-making. 
Western health care is one context that has clearly attempted to materialize ideas of 
autonomy in a practical setting. Perhaps this will aid our understanding of the term.        
Autonomy in Contemporary Western Healthcare 
Today, the notion of self-determination is clearly fundamental to Western culture 
and is tied to other Western values such as individual rights including liberty or freedom 
and privacy. The achievement-oriented society in Western countries emphasizes the 
individual‘s capacity to carve out his or her own future and the responsibility to utilize 
one‘s skills and abilities to do so. The embodiment of this value is made possible through 
a basic respect for autonomy. The Western health care system is one domain in which the 
principle of autonomy is particularly important. The prominent role of autonomy can be 
attributed to a concerted effort to protect patients from the paternalistic manner in which 
physicians have historically treated patients (Sherwin, 2000). The current autonomy 
conscious paradigm of Western medical care replaced one where the physician‘s special 
knowledge and role implied what was then a taken-for-granted exclusion of patients from 
decisions that affect their lives such as choices of care and treatment. Traditionally, the 
role of the physician was to do whatever he or she felt was in the patient‘s best interest 
while the patient was expected to accept the doctor‘s requests without question 
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(Levinsky, 1996). Inherent in this sort of patient-physician dynamic is the notion that the 
physician is the only person with sufficient experience and knowledge to issue courses of 
action regarding any aspect of the care or treatment of an individual. Also, this line of 
reasoning often led to doctors withholding the complete status of the person‘s health and 
even lying to their patients in an effort to maintain their optimism and hope (Deber, 
1994).  
Yet, decisions based on what is in the best interest of the patient judged from an 
external perspective could very well differ from a decision that accounts for the patient‘s 
unique set of preferences and beliefs. In addition, doctors might misjudge the preferences 
of their patients even if they attempt to consult their beliefs and sentiments in decision-
making. These are the general reasons behind integrating the notion of autonomy in the 
health care setting. If we only consider the general aims of incorporating the value of 
autonomy into physician practices, there seems to be nothing that is disagreeable about 
strictly rooting health care practices in autonomy of the patient. As such, autonomy is 
central to biomedical ethics in the United States. The 1997 Belmont Report that serves as 
a guide for studying human subjects instructs researchers to display respect for persons 
(Dryden, 2010). This overarching goal of the report is partly achieved by demanding 
autonomy for individuals through fully informed consent.  
Similarly, in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress (2001) 
advocate four principles of ethical decision-making in health care, one of which is respect 
for autonomy. In this seminal book on bioethics, the authors assert that patient autonomy 
should sometimes be respected through disclosure of information that allows for 
informed consent. The reason that some circumstances do not call for respect for 
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autonomy via full disclosure and direct involvement of the patient in decision-making is 
based on the fact that the importance attributed to autonomy in Western culture does not 
resonate globally today. This means that some patients choose to subscribe to religious or 
cultural conventions or norms that do not call for disclosure of information and 
physicians must respect their choices even if they do not agree with them in order to 
demonstrate respect for autonomy.                                                                                  
Autonomy in Relation to Multiculturalism                                                    
 Elliot (2001) purports that the vast majority of the world‘s population does not 
subscribe to individualism that is linked to Western culture. This can be clearly 
exemplified in cases where the values of patients who have immigrated to the Western 
world clash with the domestic values that guide health care practitioners. For example, 
the Chinese culture and Buddhist philosophy prioritize the community and family 
togetherness over the individual (Elliot, 2001). For this reason, Chinese immigrants in 
addition to others such as Mexican Americans often relinquish their individual authority 
to make important decisions. Instead, the power to decide on serious matters such as 
treatment for diseases and conditions, resuscitation and other life or death issues is often 
transferred to the family members of the individual. This stems from a cultural priority 
allotted to harmonious living with one another in family structures and community 
settings.  
The overriding of individual autonomy by family based decision-making has also 
been observed in studies performed in Spain, France, Japan and Eastern Europe (Elliot, 
2001). In these areas, family interdependence and individual roles within the family 
arrangement hold much more significance than self-determination and fully autonomous 
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decisions that require full disclosure of information to the patient. For instance, in 
cultures that uphold family interdependence over individual autonomy, patients that 
refuse their right to full disclosure of important information concerning their own health 
might be perceived as giving up their right to autonomy. Alternatively however, one 
might conceive this action as exercising one‘s own autonomy in that persons choose to 
rely on and trust in family members to make the best decisions on their behalf as they see 
fit. One might justify this choice if a sick patient views full disclosure as isolating or 
psychologically troubling as studies have demonstrated (Elliot, 2001).   
 Some patients might also believe that their own judgment is impaired by their 
health condition in which case others might be in better positions to decide on courses of 
action for them. In these situations, physicians might think they are acting laudably by 
ignoring patients‘ pleas to refrain from decision-making and providing full disclosure. 
However, pushing patients to decide for themselves by requiring that they make a 
decision impinges on their autonomy and as such can be viewed as disempowering. 
Interestingly, this outcome is the opposite of the intent behind autonomy as a guiding 
principle.          
 Furthermore, Elliot (2001) highlights that when groups uphold family 
interdependence and function over autonomy, we must consider their perceptions of 
autonomy when making decisions that are based on this value. More specifically, Elliot 
states that ―Deep respect for individuals is demonstrated not by faithful observance of 
what practitioners believe is best for the person but by consideration of what the patient 
requests and his or her perceptions of care‖ (p. 328).       
 An objection to the notion of respecting an individual‘s choice to pass on 
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exercising autonomy in decision-making concerning his or her own personal health can 
be made. The principle of autonomy assumes that each person desires to make decisions 
that impact their lives (Elliot, 2001). This assumption coupled with the fact that medical 
decisions greatly influence people‘s lives leads to the idea that all persons want to 
exercise their own authority over appropriate aspects of their health care. Schneider 
(1998) suggests that patients would not give up their autonomy in the manner described 
above if they experience and thereby get to appreciate what it is like to have authority 
over their own medical concerns.        
 Norris (as cited in Elliot, 2001) extends this argument when he advises that health 
care providers should ignore wishes of family members to withhold information and thus 
decision-making rights from the patient. His reasoning is based on the fact that the beliefs 
of the patient might differ from those of his or her family members. The patient might not 
share the beliefs of the cultural or religious group to which they are associated. Moreover, 
exercising autonomy in medical decision-making requires that the person is aware of the 
appropriate information surrounding their health and the decision. For example, Norris‘s 
reasoning might lead us to pronounce that autonomy is thrown out the window in a 
hypothetical situation where family members ask the physician to withhold information 
from the patient concerning his or her own medical decisions. Let us imagine a more 
detailed scenario where the decision to be made is whether or not a cancer patient should 
undergo chemotherapy when the probability of survival is very low. Now imagine that 
the family has requested that the patient not be told about the presence let alone severity 
and type of cancer because they think it would be too distressing for him or her. In turn, 
the patient never gets to decide whether he or she would like to seek treatment or simply 
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enjoy better quality of life for what will likely be his or her last days alive.   
 Elliot (2001) responds to Norris‘s counter-argument by qualifying opposition 
against family members deciding for the patient by making an important distinction. He 
distinguishes between cases where the family has requested waiving the policy of full 
disclosure to the patient from situations where the request has come directly from the 
patient. Elliot holds that one can accept bypassing a sound-minded patient in delivery of 
medical information to family members when directed to do so by the patient only. 
According to Elliot, just because a patient does not decide on his or her own health 
issues, he or she might still be practicing autonomy if it was indeed their choice not to do 
so. In Elliot‘s own words:        
 Through more profound linguistic and philosophic consideration, it can be 
 concluded that a person may practice autonomy but not make direct decisions 
 regarding their health care. The person is indeed autonomous in that he or she has 
 chosen to cede desire for information and decision making to another party, 
 whether it be family or provider. (p. 30)  
 What can and should be taken away from this exploration of the cultural 
variations in the perception of autonomy? Elliot (2001) urges us to avoid drawing 
conclusions regarding individuals because of the family, religion or cultural group to 
which they belong. When dissent occurs between physicians and patients where values 
are concerned, clear lines of communication between them are drastically important. 
Communication is crucial as it could serve to help disassemble stereotypes or 
generalizations that the physician might make about the patient in order to simplify and 
thereby more easily resolve the issue. So while one should be mindful of the cultural 
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values of others, it is just as vital to remember that beliefs and values differ within 
cultural groups and across health care professionals.  
This discourse in health care brings important lessons to the forefront in our 
examination of gene doping in sport where autonomy or our other guiding values for that 
matter are concerned. Elliot (2001) concludes by recognizing the need for ―more cross-
national investigation regarding the cultural relativity of ethics‖ (p.30). While his focus is 
on a health care context, an understanding of cultural differences that impact the 
significance placed on particular values is imperative in all aspects of our multicultural 
society where Western ethical principles preside. For this reason, as Elliot notes, 
investigating autonomy and other values we use as guides from alternative perspectives 
―is not only recommended but also necessary‖ (p. 30). Manifestly, unlike moral 
autonomy endorsed by Kant, the understanding of autonomy that is evident in the 
medical context supports values-based decision-making. Thus, I will refer to this 
contemporary application of autonomy in bioethics to provide a much more relevant and 
practical understanding of the term for the freestanding pragmatic approach I am 
employing in my ethical analysis.  
Autonomy: What Should Motivate our Actions? 
According to John Christman (2003), autonomy usually encapsulates two main 
ideas: self-rule and self-government. Self-rule is comprised by both the capability of the 
individual to govern him or herself and freedom of the individual‘s decision-making from 
the influence or coercion of others so that the act can be based on desires that are 
somehow authentic to the individual. Although different accounts of what is required for 
autonomy exist, the capacity to rule one‘s self usually requires the ability to engage in 
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rational thought and self-control. An autonomous person must be able to identify with his 
or her desires and values to see which actions they compel him or her to execute.  
This account of autonomy has been charged with being ambiguous with respect to 
the manner in which one must ―identify with‖ aspects of one‘s self (Christman, 2003). 
One might question in what way a person must identify with a desire for acting on it to be 
considered autonomous. For example, how are we to view a desire to satisfy a drug 
addiction? Clearly, Kant would reject such desires completely since they are external to 
the will. At least on one level, the drug addict wishes to give in to his or her urge so for 
another person to interfere, this could be seen as a violation of autonomy. Still, this is not 
an intervention that I find problematic because of the assertion that is backed by my 
pragmatic theoretical framework that autonomy is not the only value we should aim to 
promote. In some cases, modern society accepts interference with the autonomy of 
persons. Paternalistic interventions in the lives of individuals are sometimes justified as 
being in the individual‘s best interest. Typically, although not always, this involves 
persons that are in some way unable to judge or rationally assess their options. 
A Brief Note on Paternalism 
Paternalism refers to interference in the liberties of others and can be justifiable 
on the premise that some individuals do not have the capacity to decide for themselves on 
options that advance their own good. An example is helpful in illustrating a distinction 
between two classifications of paternalism, namely hard and soft paternalism. Dworkin 
(2010) describes a hypothetical situation originally thought up by John Stuart Mill where 
we are confronted with a person about to cross a damaged bridge which we know will 
result in his death or great harm. The situation is further complicated by the fact that we 
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do not speak the same language as the person and are unaware of whether or not he is 
aware of the state of the bridge and the risk involved in crossing it. A paternalist would 
advise us to make an effort to physically stop this person from crossing the bridge to 
evaluate whether he is aware of the danger involved in this course of action. If we find 
out that he is informed about the peril involved and still wants to use the bridge, a soft 
paternalist would argue that we must allow him to proceed. On the other hand, a hard 
paternalist would argue that at least in certain cases including voluntary suicide, we 
would be right to try and stop the individual who knows fully well the plausible 
consequences of his actions.  
I agree with the idea that in some instances where vulnerable populations such as 
young children are involved, some form of paternalism is warranted. This is based on the 
fact that relative to most adults, children are less able to rationally weigh their options 
when it comes to decision-making. For the most part however, Christman (2003) explains 
that if we choose to interfere in the lives of adults because we think their actions are 
contrary to their best interests and even if there are certain factors impeding their 
autonomy, we do not respect and treat them as autonomous persons. It is important to 
note that this does not mean that intervention is never justified in cases such as the 
example concerning the drug addict or perhaps with suicidal individuals.   
As Robert Simon ( 2004) explains in Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport, one major 
argument that is used to justify the ban on the use of performance-enhancing steroids in 
sport is that it is dangerous especially when taken in doses that are required to enhance 
performance. Even if it can be proven that performance-enhancing drugs yield noxious 
side effects to its users, Simon states that protection from harm may be inappropriately 
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paternalistic. To lend credence to his position, he highlights that in various instances in 
our society we feel that it is in our collective best interests to be left free to engage in 
activities such as smoking and consuming ―junk food‖ and alcohol all of which pose 
significant risks particularly when regularly carried out in excess. If a third party 
determines that it is in our best interests to be limited from choosing to partake in these 
dangerous options, this would involve a high degree of monitoring and regulating of our 
lives by external authorities. Also, interference by an external source ignores the 
possibility that we could very well have a perception of what is in our best interest that 
widely differs from that of the third party.  
Simon (2004) acknowledges that some limitations emerge concerning the 
argument that holds the ban against performance-enhancement drugs in sport 
unjustifiable on antipaternalistic grounds. First, we must be sure that athletes who choose 
to enhance their performance by using drugs are not coerced to do so and are competent 
rational agents. This represents the reasoning behind restricting children below the age of 
maturity from deciding whether or not they will use performance-enhancing drugs. If we 
reorient our focus on competent rational agents, individuals must be sufficiently aware of 
the risks involved in taking steroids or whichever form of enhancement is in question. If 
not, we cannot signify their decision as rational.  
It has been argued that coercion to use performance-enhancing drugs is at play 
particularly in the professional sports context where anything that falls short of an 
optimal performance can jeopordize the length and success of one‘s career. The argument 
claims that athletes are coerced into using performance-enhancing drugs because of their 
desires to be successful coupled with the great weight on them to constantly push their 
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limits and exude stellar performances. Simon (2004) thinks that this argument fails to 
convince us that a ban against these practices and substances is needed since a mere drive 
to succeed in one‘s profession, whether it is in athletics, business or any other area, does 
not remove the choice of which measures to take to ensure one‘s success from each 
individual. Barring special circumstances, professional or elite athletes can choose to 
retire. Simon contends that athletes, just as other professionals in competitive lines of 
work or even students in challenging educational programs, are free to make fully 
informed rational decisions regarding the practices they undertake in order to succeed. 
If we are to comprehensively examine coercion in this context, it is helpful to 
refer to Simon (2004) and his assessment of the argument that borrows Mill‘s Harm 
Principle which claims that we are only justified in constraining the liberty of competent 
rational persons when harm is posed to others rather than solely themselves. According to 
Simon, Mill claims that interfering with rational and informed agents who harm only 
themselves through their actions cannot be justified because doing so is inefficient. The 
property of inefficiency is asserted by Mill in this occasion because he believes that the 
biases and prejudices of others can often prevent them from knowing when, how and why 
they should interfere. After all, who are we to say what is in the best interest of others? 
Secondly, Simon describes Mill‘s second set of premises with which he uses to defend 
his Harm Principle. Mill claims that if we never make choices for ourselves, we fail to 
utilize and improve our mental faculties such as judgment and perception as they relate to 
decision-making. Simon describes the effects of constantly treating persons 
paternalistically and thus forbidding them from dictating how to live their own lives. He 
asserts that not only does this inhibit moral and intellectual growth but it also impedes 
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autonomy that serves to protect persons from being perceived as mere commodities in the 
calculation of the greater social good.  
From this perspective, it could be argued that athletes should be protected from 
circumstances that coerce them to use illegal substances in order to remain eligible to 
compete amongst contenders comprised at least partially of users. As mentioned above, 
Simon responds that this arguments involves a much too loose use of the term coercion as 
all other competitive environments can be construed as coercing individuals from freely 
choosing their actions. Simon then confronts the question of whether it is immoral for an 
athlete to use performance-enhancing drugs creating circumstances that force other 
competitors to decide between following suit or otherwise refraining from using and 
therefore becoming signficantly less or no longer competitive.  
Simon (2004) believes that we would not find it morally problematic for an 
athlete to train intensively and thereby put pressure on his or her competitors to train just 
as intently. The same is true of the earnest student that studies incessantly and thus sets 
the bar extremely high for his or her fellow classmates whom are all vying for a limited 
number of ―A‘s.‖ In these cases, even if others feel coerced to try harder, the student and 
athlete are perceived as doing nothing wrong. As Simon speculates, we would likely even 
encourage their actions because they result in superior performances.  
Therefore, Simon‘s (2004) consensus on the justification of the ban against 
performance-enhancing drugs is precisely that there is presently no clear argument either 
for or against permitting it that remains intact after critical analyses. However, Simon 
clearly tends to favour the ban largely because ―athletes who use steroids have no right to 
put other athletes in the position of either damaging their health or competing under a 
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significant disadvantage‖ (p. 78). The assumption made here is that unlike training or diet 
regimens for example which may be innocuous if appropriately created and carried out, 
ingesting or adminstering performance-enhancing drugs is harmful. He recognizes that 
this argument may be rejected upon further inspection perhaps with respect to the level of 
harm actually posed as a result of using performance-enhancing drugs but also highlights 
that it might also be strengthened in conjuction with other arguments possibly based on 
fairness. 
Criticism of the Focus on Procedural Autonomy 
Accounts of autonomy can be classified as focusing on procedural independence 
where the desires or values of persons are not judged. Conversely, other conceptions of 
autonomy focus on substantive independence that refers to notions of autonomy that are 
tied to normative assessments of the motivators or aims of persons‘ actions. As an 
example, a judge with a general procedural independence-based view of autonomy might 
conclude that the autonomy of a person is exercised where he or she rationally decides 
freely from external coercion to join and submit to a cult. While no judgment from this 
perspective is made with respect to the choice of the individual, an arbiter with a 
substantive view of independence would likely speculate that autonomy is absent based 
on the choice made by the person. Some scholars have emphasized that both procedural 
and substantive types of independence should be considered requirements for autonomy 
(Benson, 2005; Oshana 2006). Christman (2003) describes arguments that endorse 
making substantive independence part of the autonomy equation. These arguments are 
based on the idea that regardless of how a person has come to decide on a choice or act, if 
it is in accordance with constraints due to particular life circumstances, that decision 
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cannot be viewed as wholly autonomous (Christman, 2003). This is debatable and is 
reminiscent of the health care example explored earlier where patients redirect informed 
decision-making with respect to their medical concerns to family members. Such 
decisions can be traced back to people‘s values, beliefs and personalities all of which are 
attributable to upbringing and experiences.    
Criticism of the Individualistic Approach to Autonomy 
The sense of autonomy so far presented that emphasizes critical self-reflection 
requires that persons carry out rational assessments of their desires and values, for 
instance by checking whether they make sense to them in light of their other desires and 
values. This focus on ―rational appraisal‖ of desires has been criticized as a far cry from 
the modern shift toward a holistic view of human beings (Christman, 2003). Research 
seems to highlight that desires, wishes, personalities and inclinations are the products of 
the complex interplay between biological or genetic constituents and the environments 
and manners in which we have been socialized. In particular, the rational self-reflection 
account of autonomy has been charged with requiring that individuals detach themselves 
from their emotions and relations with others in society. However, due to constraints of 
human nature, it is argued that this is seen as impossible. Christman (2003) describes the 
apparent discrepancy between rational theories of autonomy and human capacity as being 
rooted in the idea that ―connections to values, desires, and personal traits are often 
grounded in emotional and affective responses, ones connected with care, commitment, 
and relations to others‖ (Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, para. 19). 
 In short, we cannot fully isolate ourselves from the features that comprise who 
we are or how we see ourselves as beings. Thus, the individualistic understanding of 
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autonomy as well as Kant‘s requirement that the will be free from external sources seem 
to lack correspondense with what appear to be intrinsic features of human beings that 
contribute to what drives us to carry out courses of action. For example, the career that a 
person decides to pursue is often influenced by his or her personality, emotional reactions 
to certain settings such as anxiety in high-pressure situations, environmental surroundings 
and interactions with others. To claim that autonomy requires critical self-reflection or 
rational thought free from emotional urges or responses is to ignore seemingly significant 
aspects of human character. 
Similarly, notions of autonomy that focus solely on acting in accordance with 
one‘s desires neglect other aspects with respect to which we can be seen as acting 
autonomously. Christman (2003) points to the fact that autonomy can be demonstrated by 
persons acting consistently not just with their desires but with aspects of their personality, 
physical traits, relation to others and values. However, the question remains whether 
features that impact indviduals‘ lives but that they are unable to change such as their 
cultural background should influence the extent to which a person is seen as living 
autonomously. Again, one can refer to cultural clashes that we see in health care with 
respect to autonomy and informed consent as issues that demonstrate the complexity that 
accompanies answering this question. 
Autonomy is also relevant to the issue of improving the treatment of vulnerable 
populations such as groups of persons with disabilities (Dryden, 2010). For example, the 
disability rights movement aims to empower and help ensure that people with disabilities 
are recognized as competent individuals so that they can be the primary agents in 
determining their own lives. For this purpose, an alternative take on autonomy has 
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entered the discourse on disability and healthcare ethics. As will be presented next, this 
approach to understanding autonomy criticizes traditional accounts for focusing on the 
individual while ignoring that we are apparently social beings. 
Relational Autonomy 
Individualistic understandings of autonomy such as Kant‘s moral autonomy focus 
on the critical thought process whereby persons govern themselves in terms of how they 
wish to live and behave. This entails assessing one‘s values and features that comprise 
the self as if these are all changeable features (Christman, 2003). As already mentioned, 
individualistic accounts of autonomy ignore apparent characteristics of human nature. In 
particular, these accounts of autonomy have been completely void of discussions on the 
environments in which persons are situated with respect to others, institutions or 
locations, for example. The problem with neglecting these considerations in conjuring up 
conceptions of autonomy lies in the fact that our social relations and cultural experiences 
have lasting repercussions on who we are and how we define ourselves (Christman, 
2003).           
 Sherwin (2000) recognizes that individualistic accounts of autonomy are inherent 
in the works on performance enhancement by sport philosophers including Tamburrini 
(2005) and van Hilvoorde (2005). For this reason, she suggests an alternative relational 
approach to understanding autonomy that recognizes that people form their values 
through dialogue and interactions with others. Sherwin demonstrates the superiority of 
this relational understanding of autonomy over an individualistic interpretation referring 
to the example of cosmetic surgery critiqued in feminist theory literature. From the 
individualistic interpretation of autonomy, females that alter their appearance for 
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aesthetic reasons appear to be acting autonomously. However, it seems naïve to assume 
that women can ignore the societal pressures that are on them to look a certain way while 
deciding whether or not they will seek out plastic surgery procedures to enhance their 
appearance. The prevalence of women undergoing cosmetic surgery becomes normalized 
in society. This in turn heightens the urgency for un-enhanced women to do the same and 
thereby undermines the autonomy of these women.   
 This example helps illuminate the depth of our immersion in social relations and 
cultural environments and how we cannot be defined without considering these factors. A 
second example can be used to further illustrate the everlasting imprints left by 
socialization. Christman (2003) views language as a form of social construction. Even 
introspective reflection which is prescribed by autonomous decision-making in the 
individualistic sense of the concept is limited by the expression of our thoughts through 
language and thus our socialiazation. In Christman‘s (2003) own words,   
 In any number of ways we are constituted by factors that lie beyond our reflective 
 control but which nonetheless structure our values, thoughts, and   
 motivations….To say that we are autonomous (and hence morally responsible, 
 bear moral rights, etc.) only when we can step back from all such connections 
 and critically appraise and possibly alter them flies in the face of these  
  psychological and metaphysical realities. (Autonomy in Moral and Political 
 Philosophy, para. 46)        
 I am of the belief that, even if it were possible, we should not completely 
disconnect ourselves from our values, desires and relations with others. I certainly do not 
think that this is necessary in order to be autonomous. A person can try to critically 
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evaluate their desires and values to see if he or she really approves of them. However, as 
I have already suggested in my previous chapter on pragmatic theory, I believe that not 
only are we unable to view external reality or ourselves for that matter impartially and 
objectively but doing so is not useful for our needs. Perhaps more obviously still, some 
things such as one‘s native language or ethnicity are simply not subject to being changed 
(Christman, 2003). But our not being able to alter such self-defining features does not 
make us heteronomous. On the other hand, Christman asserts that what might be more 
appropriately considered heteronomous is our inability to change parts of ourselves from 
which we feel ―deeply aliented.‖ A striking example of this is transgendered individuals 
who do not identify on a deep level with the gender that is associated with their physical 
features and who do not have the option of sexual reassignment surgery or procedures. 
These individuals might be described as being heteronomous with respect to the features 
they are unable to alter.                                                                                                                                   
 Dryden (2010) describes relational autonomy as accounting for the idea that an 
autonomous self necessarily exists in relation to others. Given the dynamic nature of the 
world in which we live, the autonomous individual must constantly respond to others 
making it impossible to define autonomy without these interactions. Because of this, 
Donchin (as cited in Dryden, 2010) argues that a relational sense of autonomy is most 
helpful when it comes to decision-making in health care.   
 The argument for a relational understanding of autonomy can be seen as the 
logical product that emerges out of two main premises (Christman, 2003). The first claim 
is that we are at least partially defined by our relations to others. Secondly, autonomy is 
said to be generally understood as self-government. Therefore, since an account of 
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autonomy requires a reference to the self and because the self necessitates a reference to 
our relations with others, then autonomy must be understood in a relational sense.  
 As a result, relational autonomy is able to avoid the traps of procedural accounts 
of autonomy that do not recognize how oppressive relationships or political forces can 
hamper an indivdiual‘s capacity to exercise skills that allow him or her to be an 
autonomous agent (Sherwin, 2000). For example, women who have been socialized in 
such a way that undermines their self worth because of their gender can internalize this 
belief and consider it to be legitimate when making decisions about their lives even when 
they critically evaluate it.         
 As Sherwin (2000) demonstrates, the traditional view of autonomy would likely 
claim that simply by providing these oppressed women with unbiased information and 
inhibiting interference from coercive forces such as family or community members, 
autonomy is regained by these women. But, for example, even if a woman is free in this 
manner to choose a career for herself she will likely find it extremely difficult to simply 
ignore traditional roles that guide the society in which she has been reared or shut off the 
belief imposed on her throughout her life that she is less competent than men. This might 
lead her to opt for a less demanding career than her husband and other men she knows. In 
this way, relational autonomy acknowledges that people‘s relationships and social 
circumstances bear heavily on either promoting or hindering their ability to engage in 
opportunities that allow them to see themselves as autonomous agents (Sherwin, 2000).
 Sherwin (2000) also uses relational autonomy to argue that decisions to embark 
on the research and development of certain medical technologies such as novel 
reproductive techniques should not be solely considered by researchers and medical 
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personnel but should also be publicly debated by all members of society. Individualistic 
conceptions of autonomy would endorse providing all patients with access to all the 
options in terms of medical services and allowing them to freely decide which ones they 
would like to seek out much like capatilistic styles of consumerism. In stark contrast, 
relational autonomy enlists the public to debate and decide on the social and political 
values they feel ought to be endorsed through research and the services that are made 
available as a result. However, it should be noted that solely appealing to widespread 
acceptance of certain technologies might undermine the minority‘s choice to withdraw 
from their use. For instance, prenatal genetic screening procedures might become so 
popular that new parents are restricted from refusing to conform to them. In this respect, 
the exercise of autonomy by some individuals might encroach on the autonomy of others. 
Lastly, Sherwin asserts that we ought to be extra careful when contemplating the 
introduction of emerging new services that could potentially reinforce oppressive forces 
on individuals.                 
My Understanding of Autonomy       
 To be clear, I would like to reiterate the notion of autonomy I will employ while 
working through and speculating on the consequences of gene doping in sport in my next 
chapter. My understanding of autonomy is one that is based on rational and competent 
persons making choices based on their knowledge of relevant information and all aspects 
of their being such as their personalities, inclinations, desires and values that combine to 
create the whole person. To this effect, individualistic or procedural notions of autonomy 
will surely inform my view of autonomy. However, I also purport that the person can 
only be fully understood in relation to the environment in which they are situated and this 
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includes their interaction with others. Interestingly, the acknowledgment of relational 
forces on the individual also happens to be more conducive to matters concerning social 
practices such as gene doping in sport. Thus, I will combine the understanding of 
autonomy I have gained from bioethics with a relational approach to provide a more 
holistic view of persons that meshes with my experiences as a person living in this world. 
I suspect that this understanding of personhood will help inform my exploration of 
concepts of what it means to be human living in a dynamic and ever-changing world. 
Human Value 
Campbell, Glass & Charland (1998) amalgamate literature from a wide array of 
disciplines including bioethics, philosophy, science, anthropology and psychology that 
discuss what it means to be human. In their paper, they argue that while each of the 
academic fields that is considered highlights a different aspect of humanness, not one of 
these perspectives is sufficient on its own. Therefore, in order to get closer to 
understanding the whole essence of our species, the authors stress that all these areas of 
research must be included. Accordingly, appealing to more than one source of values in 
ethical analysis is a form of eclecticism endorsed by the freestanding pragmatic approach 
that I am adopting.  
Prior to divulging the particular traits that the authors claim are necessary aspects 
of humanness, it must be noted that their list is neither complete nor in-depth and, as 
such, it is merely a useful place to begin our self-understanding. Not only is this assertion 
compatible with my pragmatic framework, but it also is acknowledged by the authors 
themselves when they state that, ―even though our selection of sources is by no means 
exhaustive, we believe that it should provide a good starting point to initiate a discussion 
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on this critical topic‖ (p. 416). Acknowledging the provisional status of this account of 
humanness clearly adheres to yet another aspect of freestanding pragmatism that rejects 
making absolutist claims in research.  
 To get started, Campbell, Glass and Charland (1998) evaluate four main facets 
that have been focused on in academic research as describing humanness. The features 
that they argue are universal to all humans and what sets us apart from other beings are 
cognition, biological or physiological constituents, social relations or interactions with 
each other and what they refer to as spirituality. I concur with the authors‘ views that 
these four factors of humanness should be perceived as interacting in a holistic and 
interdependent ―system.‖ For instance, if biological constituents such as genetic traits that 
are responsible for memory are enhanced, cognition would be affected as well as social 
interactions with others.  
Cognition 
 The first of four characteristics that describe humanity – cognition – is attached to 
a wide range of interpretations. For instance, cognition has been defined as being 
synonymous with intelligence, consciousness, rationality and autonomy (Campbell et al., 
1998). Each of these factors that might illustrate cognition have been argued by different 
scholars as representing what sets us apart from non-humans. I am not convinced that 
cognition as autonomy or rationality is a characteristic required for a creature to be 
considered human. Would we agree that a person who is oppressed due to slavery for 
example is less human because he or she is perceived as less autonomous? I think not as 
this seems incredibly counterintuitive. A slave might certainly be treated as though he or 
she is not a human being but we should be careful not to equivocate the treatment of 
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persons with their actual status as persons. Perhaps claiming that autonomy is a 
requirement of humanness is due to how we often feel compelled to protect and respect 
persons‘ autonomy over their own lives simply based on the fact that they are human. I 
am of the position that all humans, barring a few exceptions such as children and 
intellectually challenged persons, have the potential to be autonomous beings but that 
whether or not they are autonomous fails to alter their humanness. Indeed, children and 
intellectually challenged people are no less human than rational and fully autonomous 
adults.  
 A similar counter-attack can be directed at the understanding of cognition as 
consciousness. If we accept that cognition is an aspect that distinguishes human beings 
from others and if we claim that cognition means being conscious, then if I experience a 
trauma to the head, do I somehow stop being human while in a state of unconsciousness? 
Again appealing to intuition, one would likely find this question preposterous. However, 
we can respond to this challenge that opposes consciousness as a required feature of 
humanness by clarifying that it is not a state of consciousness that is required, but a 
capacity for such a state. Thus, I find this understanding of cognition to be more 
agreeable in the sense that people who are unconscious, dreaming or in a comatose state 
are still considered human. 
 The understanding of cognition listed above that has not yet been examined is in 
terms of intelligence. For instance, it might be argued that a minimal level of intelligence 
is required in order to determine whether a creature is human. In this sense, one might 
question whether or not genetically enhancing a person to be more intelligent than any 
human that heretofore existed would result in other persons viewing him or her not as 
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human. Campbell et al. (1998) state that if others view a genetically enhanced person as 
belonging to some separate species or subspecies of humans, they therefore perceive 
humanness to be affected.   
Biological Composition 
 In scientific literature, having a functioning human central nervous system, human 
anatomy and physiology as well as a human genome have all been proposed as 
representing biological requirements for being considered human (Campbell et al., 1998). 
For instance, if a person is genetically modified so that his or her behaviours, actions and 
appearances are more dog-like than human-like, it makes sense that humanness is altered, 
diminished or revoked all together. These features depicting humanness are fraught with 
difficulties however. Consider the case where the genome of a chimpanzee is 
manipulated to mirror that of a human. Would we then consider the chimpanzee to be 
human? These are the sorts of questions that the authors of the paper present as providing 
support for the belief that humanness is to some extent characterized by biology but that 
other factors must also be factored into the equation.  
Social Behaviours 
 Having the capability to develop relationships and communicate with others has 
been suggested as necessary to be human. At this junction, my relational understanding 
of autonomy can be retrieved to explore this aspect of humanness. Recall that my notion 
of autonomy is based on rational and competent persons making choices based on their 
knowledge of relevant information and all aspects of their being such as their 
personalities, inclinations, desires and values that combine to create the whole person. 
This is applicable to the two preceding aspects of human traits listed above – cognition 
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and biological composition. However, the second main aspect of autonomy that I have 
included in my understanding of the term was based on the fact that the person can only 
be fully understood in relation to the environment in which they are situated and this 
includes their interaction with others. To reiterate, the relational approach of 
understanding both persons and autonomy provides a holistic view of the humanity. 
Questions about the effects of genetic engineering on this aspect of humanness might 
include whether other humans might fail to identify with and relate to genetically altered 
athletes as fellow humans.  
Spirituality 
 Across the ages and globe, humans have expressed and practiced spirituality in 
different ways that made the most sense to them (Campbell et al., 1998). The authors 
argue that despite the stark differences between cultures both past and present in how 
they project spirituality, the common feature that humans seem to possess is a yearning to 
connect with some bigger, greater or more powerful force than themselves. Moreover, the 
authors contend that spirituality along with cognition, biology and social behaviours all 
work interdependently. This leads them to believe that genetic enhancement on a 
biological trait could quite possibly result in a change in one‘s spirituality. One example 
that they use to support the belief in a ―biopsychosocial‖ model of personhood is plastic 
surgery which alters one‘s aesthetic appearance but also has potential to enhance one‘s 
self-esteem thereby affecting the ability to have successful and meaningful relationships 
with others as well as social status. Conversely, others who claim a body-soul dichotomy 
where spirituality is strictly isolated from the body would not believe in the ability of the 
two entities to influence one another.    
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Utility of the Four Features of Humanness 
 I am going to conclude by asserting that while the abovementioned list of features 
of humanity is useful in providing us with the way humanness is holistic and 
interdependent, it is overly ambitious and not necessary to attempt to purport certain 
features that are intrinsic, unique and universal to human beings. Supporting my view are 
all of the limitations involved in describing humanness in detail using the four aspects 
highlighted above. As an alternative to a detailed portrayal of humanness, I will try to 
provide a more general account of human nature that can still serve as a reference aid for 
assessing the consequences that will likely be associated with genetically modifying 
athletes. The issue in which I am interested given my pragmatic theoretical approach is 
not so much whether gene doping makes someone less human but whether we would 
perceive this to be the case. The situation where people believe that genetically altered 
humans would comprise a subspecies could lead to consequences such as either enhanced 
or non-enhanced groups being ostracized. Thus, the segment of the paper by Campbell et 
al. (1998) that I find particularly useful and relevant for my purposes is the area of 
concluding remarks where they discuss a framework they claim will assist in 
distinguishing which specific types of genetic interventions should not be explored via 
research. Here, they contend that we need to ask two major questions; in their words: 
1. Will the intervention cause the being to possess physical or behavioural 
traits that readily distinguish it from what is usually perceived as 
―human‖? 
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2. Will the intervention cause the being to have an intellectual or physical 
capacity that is significantly superior or inferior to current human 
abilities? 
These questions will be explored in the portion of my next chapter on the effects 
of gene doping on what it means to be human. Of course, at present, only speculative or 
hypothetical remarks can be made in response to the abovementioned questions where 
gene doping is concerned. For the remainder of this chapter, I will critique alternative 
conceptions of human nature. 
As briefly outlined in my introductory chapter, Murray (2009) highlights three 
distinct conceptions of human nature in relation to sport. I will now evaluate each of them 
more closely while once again referring to how each would judge the viewpoint put 
forward by Jonsson (2007) in which he advocates the welcoming of cyborg or gender-
neutral athletes that may emerge out of gene doping applications.  
Human Nature as a Normative Guide 
The first conception of human nature in relation to sport that is addressed by 
Murray (2009) is as a normative guide that informs us on what is right and good. To 
utilize technology to transcend our humanly limits is to disvalue our individual efforts 
and talents. According to this view of human nature, we should exceed our own limits 
only in cases where human dignity is threatened, such as a surgeon using a cutting edge 
computerized system to perform an operation that is required for the survival of the 
patient.  
With respect to this conception of human nature, I would like to ask why utilizing 
technology to transcend our human limits would represent disvaluing our individual 
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effort and talents. Is it simply due to the fact that we would be showing dissatisfaction or 
a lack of appreciation with our abilities by enhancing them? If this is the case, then what 
prevents a person from accusing athletes of doing the same when they train, condition 
and practice to exploit their strengths and fix their weaknesses? This reasoning will not 
suffice since a significant aspect of competitive sport is about pursuing excellence and 
striving to perform at the best of one‘s potential. Conversely, perhaps genetic 
enhancement disvalues our individual efforts and talents because such procedures permit 
athletes to put in the same effort and perform better than they would without being 
enhanced. In this sense, it is possible that effort is disvalued since genetic enhancement 
can be construed as passively reducing the role of effort required for athletic performance 
while training and other practices require time, dedication, as well as effort to reap the 
benefits associated with improvements in performance. 
In addition, one might question what we mean here by ―exceeding our own 
limits.‖ Does this refer to each individual‘s limits or the limits of the human species? It 
seems to me that transcending limits in the context of discussing new technologies can be 
understood in both ways. Either way, once we have exceeded current limits, they no 
longer represent human limits. We are constantly reinventing particular aspects of our 
limits as can be seen with the effects of medical advancements like vaccines and 
antibiotics that have augmented average life expectancy at least in some societies. Since 
certain conditions that once limited longevity can be negated by these scientific 
innovations, we are able to live decades longer than our ancestors. I do not think it is 
presumptuous to assume that most rational people do not find this intervention to be 
immoral or unethical simply because it allows us to surpass our former human limits. It 
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might be argued that antibiotics are therapeutic and thus belong in the select few cases 
where interventions in human nature are acceptable. On the other hand, vaccines appear 
to cloud the so-called distinction between therapy and enhancement since they promote 
or enhance health by arming the body with immunity against viruses that may or may not 
be encountered by the individual.    
Moreover, the qualification that is made in this view of humanity can be critiqued 
as well. This criterion claims that we should exceed our own limits only in cases where 
human dignity is threatened. The example that is offered is a surgeon using a 
computerized system to perform an operation that is required for the survival of the 
patient. The case provided above might lead us to think that the way to protect human 
dignity from being endangered is to employ whatever measures can prevent the loss of 
the life. Conversely, perhaps protecting human dignity in some instances might constitute 
withholding artificial life resuscitation interventions. It might be argued that in certain 
case this would allow individuals who are suffering or in vegetative states to die with 
dignity. I will evade delving deeper into the issue of life extension as it goes beyond the 
scope of my thesis.  
Also, this perspective of humanity presumes that humans possess an intrinsic 
value of dignity. Given my pragmatic perspective, whether or not this is the case does not 
represent a concern of mine. I am more interested in whether or not we should act in such 
a way that is in accordance with a belief that human life necessarily has an inherent value 
of dignity. In other words, do we desire to live in a community where members act in the 
manner in which they would act if they believed in the existence of human dignity? 
Furthermore, does acting in accordance with human dignity mean anything more than 
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respect in other ways such as respecting autonomy? Some would say yes but Ruth 
Macklin (2003) responds negatively to this question by referring to the sources that most 
commonly cite notions of human dignity, namely human rights documents including the 
United Nations‘ universal declaration of human rights. Macklin claims that these sources 
refer to dignity in a sense that appears to account for nothing more than respect for 
persons in bioethics which demands autonomy, confidentiality and prohibiting unfair 
practices such as discrimination. I tend to disagree with Macklin that human dignity is a 
useless concept as she misses the point that attempting to protect human dignity provides 
us with theoretical support and a deeper sense of why humans deserve respect whether it 
is by promoting autonomy, privacy or justice.  
In any case, while accepting the first conception addressed by Murray (2009) 
would make the analysis here less contentious because it would strongly reject Jonsson‘s 
(2007) advocacy of cyborg athletes and genetic enhancement, it paints a black and white 
picture of human nature that fails to account for all of its complexities. I agree with 
Murray‘s recognition that since not everything that comes naturally to humans is good, 
the perspective of human nature as a moral guide often leads to awry conclusions and 
thus should not be used.   
Promethean Viewpoint of Human Nature 
Secondly, Murray (2009) discusses a notion of human nature that emerges from a 
heroic/Romantic/Promethean viewpoint of humanity. As already mentioned, such a 
viewpoint places the highest degree of importance in a human‘s capacity to indulge their 
creative will and ingenuity in tinkering with his or her own body. The body is seen as a 
canvass and can be used as an outlet for artistic expression or to transcend one‘s humanly 
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limits. If one assumes this viewpoint, determination and the capacity to advance 
technology that allows us to manipulate our own bodies must be accepted as the most 
important aspects of human nature. Moreover, human nature is constantly changing as it 
evolves with the limits of technology and human imagination.  
This understanding of human nature is similar in temperament to transhumanism. 
According to the World Transhumanist Association (WTA, 2003) – a non-governmental 
organization that aims to promote transhumanism in research and public policy – 
transhumanism refers to philosophical thinking that is future oriented and is founded on 
the idea that the current state of human species is merely a preliminary phase in the 
development of human nature. In a 2003 document, the WTA formally defines 
transhumanism as:   
(1) The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and 
desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied 
reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to 
eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and 
psychological capacities. 
(2) The study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of 
technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and 
the related study of the ethical matters involved in developing and using such 
technologies. (p. 4) 
Transhumanists are ardent defenders of individuals‘ personal choice and 
autonomy in deciding which technologies they wish to use on themselves and which 
capacities or limitations they would like to exceed. They value our aspirations and ideals 
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of how we would like to reconstruct ourselves over our current human form or nature. Of 
course, transhumanists claim that they advocate a society where it is acceptable to refrain 
from enhancing one‘s self but in their view progress is measured in terms of persons 
having greater control such as through technology to transform their lives as well as who 
and what they are based on their own deepest values.  
Clearly, adherence to this second, heroic/Romantic/Promethean viewpoint of 
humanity would support Jonnson‘s (2007) promotion of cyborg athletes. For example, a 
gene doping female athlete would be viewed as rightly challenging societal norms about 
what it means to be female and alleviating oppression by exercising her free will on her 
own body. Some however, might use the autonomy-based arguments of transhumanism 
in order to justify whatever (immoral) ends they wish to achieve by enhancing 
themselves. In our examination of the first conception of human nature that claims that 
whatever is of nature or human nature is good, we saw that it failed to account for 
necessary exceptions. One only needs to reflect on the genocides, murders, rape cases and 
countless other actions of human beings seriously harming one another to be sure that 
human nature has potential to serve as a horrific basis of normative judgment. Similarly, 
the transhumanist advocacy for progression and enhancing ourselves is also naïvely 
simplistic and dismisses important negative possibilities. While we must respect freedom 
of choice and the right of persons to modify their appearances, skills and abilities, 
limitations are justified – especially when harm to society or others is a likely outcome.  
For example, morally abhorrent ends could be pursued by virtue of genetic 
enhancement. A dictator might convince a group of his or her citizens to create an army 
of brute force and strength to conquer and combat other nations. Should we respect these 
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people‘s freedom to choose how they will apply technology to reconstruct and use their 
bodies in morally objectionable ways? In a similar fashion, some athletes might engage in 
gene doping in manners that end up destroying the foundation of sport and the 
experiences of their competitors. For instance, some athletes might exploit cutting edge 
aspects of genetic technology that provide them with significant advantages but are only 
available to those with socio-economic privileges. If these athletes also attempt to hide 
their use from competitors, they might outperform all athletes of lesser means making 
those athletes‘ experiences in sport humiliating. This might result in a high drop out rate 
among individuals of lower socio-economic standing.      
A Middle Ground Between Two Extreme Viewpoints of Human Nature 
Therefore, the third conceptualization of human nature that Murray (2009) 
addresses acknowledges that the preceding (heroic/Romantic/Promethean) perspective of 
human nature may yield poor choices on the capacities that individuals choose since it is 
left entirely up to each individual. As already explained, Murray depicts a third concept 
of human nature as a more realistic middle ground between the two previously illustrated 
extreme ways in which we can understand human nature. It views human nature as 
complex, multi-layered, to some extent limited and capable of moral and immoral 
consequences. Because of our potential to do both good and evil which can be evidenced 
by simply looking at people‘s actions, I am going to assess which technologies and 
interventions should be permitted and banned based on whether they promote ethical 
actions or at the very least do not encourage or predispose us to perform more unethical 
actions.  
  131 
This concept of human nature is also necessarily social as human flourishing is 
impossible without relationships with other human beings and the fact that such a great 
extent of our identity, aspirations and values are products of our relationships and 
socialization. As such, this concept of humanity is similar to the understanding of the self 
that has been used by philosophers embracing the relational sense of autonomy that has 
already been explained.  
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Chapter Four  
Evaluating the Probable Consequences of Gene Doping with Respect to the Three Values  
Fairness 
Would Gene Doping Enhance Fairness in Sport? 
In the sport philosophy literature, Tamburrini (2007) and McNamee (2007) have 
developed arguments pertaining to fairness in favour of and against transhuman athletes 
respectively. Upon evaluation of these arguments, I have noted several flaws in both 
positions that I assert must be addressed if cogency is to be granted to the arguments 
upon which each position stands.   
 The main thesis advanced by Tamburrini (2007) is that the situation where 
inequality will result from genetic technology used to create transhuman athletes is more 
desirable than one where no athletes get to reap the benefits associated with genetically 
induced transhumanism. Tamburrini (2007) evaluates the situation that would be created 
in elite sport by two distinct species – the transhuman athletes and their un-enhanced 
counterparts – participating alongside one another. Tamburrini attempts to assess whether 
this circumstance necessarily offends the ethos of elite sport which he describes using 
four criteria, namely:  
(1) to perform at one‘s top capacity; (2) to entertain the public; and (3) to 
transcend the limits of what hitherto was perceived as possible for humans to 
perform, physically and mentally…(4) sport contests should be characterized by 
fairness. (pp. 233-234)  
At this point, I will bypass discussions surrounding the first three criteria that 
according to Tamburrini (2007) are promoted by the production of transhuman athletes in 
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elite sport. This is because at this point I am more concerned with the fourth criterion. 
Here, Tamburrini claims that fairness will be increased by the integration of genetic 
enhancement in sport. This is based on the notion that the current distribution of athletic 
abilities through the normal genetic lottery results in an unfair situation for those who just 
happen to be born genetically disadvantaged with respect to athleticism. The fact remains 
that regardless of how much training is involved an individual who is not genetically 
predisposed for athletic success will not be able to compete let alone win at elite levels of 
sport. Based on this reasoning, Tamburrini concludes that to the extent that gene doping 
can provide a means for those individuals lacking innate athletic talent to catch up with 
others who happen to be blessed with superior athletic abilities, it will improve the 
fairness inherent in sport. Furthermore, since all athletes will be genetically identical with 
respect to physical capacities, this leaves other traits and capacities to determine the 
winners of competitions. According to Tamburrini, these other traits such as dedication 
and effort are virtues which actually justify the praise and credit that winners are granted 
since they are in some ways controlled by the individuals themselves.  
Tamburrini (2007) recognizes that this argument critically depends on a relevant 
assumption. Specifically, if gene doping will truly level out differences in genetic traits, 
athletes already born with genetic advantages must not use it to improve themselves, at 
least not to the extent that untalented athletes would. Otherwise, gene doping would 
simply raise the bar of performance levels rather than even out the discrepancy between 
the athleticism of individuals born with and those born without athletic advantages. In 
such circumstances, gene doping is clearly a futile practice. 
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Tamburrini however offers two conjectures in support of this assumption. For 
one, Tamburrini claims that despite a current lack of sufficiently supportive scientific 
evidence there are biological limits on the extent to which each physical capacity can be 
genetically enhanced. I would say that it is more than likely that this biological limit for 
each genetic attribute is highly variable across the human population. In other words, it 
seems overly naïve and simplistic to believe that a single natural limit exists for each 
physiological capacity in all human beings. The apparent complexity of the human body 
and the uniqueness of each individual seem to suggest that if there truly is a natural limit 
preset on the degree to which physiological capacities can be enhanced, it is rather 
plausible that it is not the same for each individual. Thus, I find it quite doubtful that if 
gene doping is equally accessible to and utilized by all athletes, then a leveled out playing 
field will result. In stark contrast to Tamburrini‘s claims, I think that inequality which 
presently favours those athletes born athletically talented will merely be shifted in favour 
of the athletes who have higher intrinsic limits preset for the most crucial genetic 
attributes for their sport.   
Tamburrini (2007) offers a second way that I think comes closer to convincing us 
that gene doping would indeed increase fairness in the way that he claims it will. In 
particular, he advocates regulations in sport that will allow physical capacities to be 
genetically enhanced only to a certain extent beyond which athletes would be 
disqualified. Let us think practically about this possibility. If we are going to accept 
regulated limits on gene doping in sport, we are going to have to determine a concrete 
upper limit for each relevant physiological capacity in each sport. In order to truly level 
out the playing field, this upper limit will minimally have to match that of the human 
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being that happens to be born with the best possible form of that genetic attribute for the 
purpose of a given sport. This is also necessary for the sake of fairness since it would 
prevent disqualifying individuals who just happen to be born with extremely optimal 
genetic traits.  
Even if we imagine for argument‘s sake that accounting for every individual in 
the world in formulating this figurative ―upper limit‖ is possible, it is still subject to 
change in the future with the emergence of new genetic mutations within the human 
population. Moreover, similar to my objection in the preceding paragraph, Tamburrini‘s 
assumption that a single natural limit exists for each physiological capacity in all human 
beings is critical once again as this option requires that each individual is capable of 
being enhanced to this limit. The upper limit for each physiological capacity relevant to a 
sport that will have to be set by regulatory agencies must consider whether all individuals 
are capable of meeting that upper limit. If not, this is an extremely unfair practice.  
Mehlman (2009) suggests an alternative route that could replace banning and 
testing procedures for genetic enhancement and all forms of enhancement for that matter. 
This alternative is based on a belief that talent or ―pure ability‖ is not morally valuable 
and thus should not play a role in deciding the winners of athletic competitions. Like 
Tamburrini (2007), Mehlman claims that other traits such as effort and dedication that are 
more worthy of moral credit should determine the winner. Thus, the solution that 
Mehlman recommends is to compensate for differences in the abilities and talents of 
competitors by testing athletes to determine their capacities and categorize or handicap 
them accordingly. The idea of categorization is already exhibited in boxing in the form of 
weight classes and other sports that segregate athletes by age. If a boxer is twice the size 
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of his or her opponent, the match up is deemed to be an unfair. However, Mehlman 
appears to endorse compensation or categorization for each single trait that may generate 
an advantage. Thus, if we compare the performance of two sprinters and after many trials 
determine that at maximal effort one is able to clear the starting blocks before a physical 
reaction is even initiated by the other but that otherwise they are similar in speed and 
racing ability, Mehlman might argue that we should provide the slow reactor with a 
slightly earlier starting time. The problem that emerges from this approach to sport is that 
capacities could not merely be determined by athletic tests since it would be impossible 
to validate whether or not the athlete was truly demonstrating maximal effort. Rather, 
some other assessment technique would have to be formulated such as an appraisal of 
both genotypic and phenotypic characteristics.  
Nevertheless, a major objection might be posed to Mehlman and Tamburrini‘s 
belief that traits such as effort and dedication can be attributed less to genetics and more 
to choice and will and so should dictate winners in sport. Specifically, it might be argued 
that genetic influences impact aspects of effort and other similar traits. To exemplify this, 
we might entertain the possibility that dedication or sacrifice could be influenced in some 
way by physiological differences giving rise to diverse subjective experiences of pain and 
thereby pain tolerance during training (Murray, 2009). Thus, a gymnast might be 
portrayed as a hard worker because he or she pushes him or herself to practice far more 
intensely and frequently and much longer than his or her competitors. Because of this, his 
or her success in the sport is perceived to be due to sheer commitment, effort and 
determination. In actuality, this gymnast might simply be able to engage in a magnitude 
of conditioning and training that gives rise to a level of pain that surpasses what others 
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are able to tolerate but falls short of his or her own threshold for pain. In this and perhaps 
other ways, perseverance, determination and work ethic can be affected greatly by 
genetic factors and thus are not necessarily more worthy of our reverence and respect 
than natural talents. Besides freedom from genetic influence, one must seek another 
reason to justify our perception that work ethic, effort and other similar characteristics are 
more laudable than natural talents.  
Furthermore, it is conceivable that a more direct link between genes and 
dedication, perseverance or other similar traits could exist. Research already shows 
important genetic influences on Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (Thapar, 
Holmes, Poulton & Harrington, 1999). In addition, a study that examined 123 pairs of 
identical twins and 127 pairs of fraternal twins estimates that 41%, 53%, 61%, 41% and 
44% of neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, 
respectively – five major aspects of personality – can be attributed to genetic variables 
(Jang, Livesley & Vernon, 2006). As explained in terms of holistic understandings of the 
self and autonomy, our desires, wishes, personalities and inclinations are typically 
understood as the products of the complex interplay between biological or genetic 
constituents and the environments and manners in which we have been socialized. 
Therefore, genetic factors and socialization most likely contribute to the development of 
ambition or perseverance and other personality traits perhaps to a similar degree that they 
affect athleticism. 
Therefore, as I insinuated in my introductory chapter, due to the current lack of 
scientific understanding on this matter, it seems overly naïve to assume at present that 
fairness will be enhanced in sport at least in the way that Tamburrini (2007) has claimed 
  138 
it will. In direct opposition to Tamburrini, I believe that gene doping will fail to level out 
discrepancies between potential athletes and that other traits that genetic enhancement 
will supposedly allow sport to exhibit more profoundly including dedication, work ethic 
and perseverance are not necessarily more morally worthy of veneration or any of the 
other rewards that emerge from winning and advancing one‘s athletic career. 
Consequently, I believe that to persuasively argue for the capacity of gene doping to 
increase fairness in sport, one must look elsewhere for support.   
Both Lenk (2007) and Loland (2009) assume a totally impartial position in principle 
which Rawls denotes as the ―original position‖ when attempting to explain why sport‘s 
current nature conflicts with certain practices of enhancement. According to Loland, the 
structural goal of sport competitions is to compare opponents with one another based on 
their performance of relevant skills while they adhere to the rules. Recall the Rawlsian 
notion described earlier that fairness could be characteristic of a practice or activity when 
the rules that constitute it and the allocations of benefits and burdens incurred through 
involvement in it are established and accepted by the participants themselves. Fairness 
requires that those rules that have been reasonably agreed upon as imposable on all 
involved without regard to one‘s position in the practice be upheld. It might be argued 
that athletes accept the terms and conditions that guide their practices with one another. 
In particular, by entering the sporting arena, athletes might be viewed as tacitly accepting 
the foundational principle that guides sport and thus should adhere to it. This is what 
Rawls refers to as fair play. But do athletes really get a say in how sport is governed? 
And, if no adequate platform exists for athletes to voice their concerns over rules and 
terms or perhaps a lack of a rule that penalizes overly aggressive violent acts between 
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players for instance, can we really characterize athletes as deeming the rules and terms as 
reasonable impositions on all participants?  
Deficiency of Athlete Representation in Sport Policy Decision-Making 
It should be noted that according to Rawls you must be able to complain about 
rules you do not perceive as fair. I do not think athletes are given opportunities to reflect 
on the principles upon which sports are based. They are given two options: accept and 
adapt to sport as it is or else do not participate. Rawls requires that participants try to 
eschew reaping the benefits gained through the practice if they do not intend to adhere to 
the rules. As noted in my introductory paragraph, Schneider (2009) agrees with Lenk 
(2007) and Loland (2009) on fairness as an essential sporting ideal. However, she firmly 
argues that sport practices currently treat athletes with undue paternalism thereby 
violating this ideal. Schneider supports this claim with specific examples. Of particular 
relevance, she claims that the issue of performance-enhancing drugs should be explored 
from the perspective of the athlete since they are the central actors affected by them. 
Schneider sees anti-doping organizations as futile as long as the decisions that are made 
regarding what should be considered doping and how doping bans are to be fairly 
enforced fail to consult athletes.                                                                 
 Specifically, Schneider (2009) emphasizes the need for doping regulatory policies 
in terms of the measures used for testing and the management of test results to adhere to 
principles of fairness and respect the privacy of athletes. The most effective type of 
enforcement is one that is randomly conducted with no advanced notice because this type 
of testing reduces the likelihood that athletes can evade detection. This requires that 
athletes inform anti-doping officials of their whereabouts at all times. Also, transparency 
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in decisions to target certain athletes is often absent; some athletes are targeted by anti-
doping agencies based solely on suspicion that may be generated merely by a rumour. In 
addition, some criminalized substances that lack evidence of performance-enhancing 
effects are also banned and tested for which irrationally makes athletes especially 
vulnerable to legal penalties. From a human rights framework, Schneider portrays this 
irrelevant testing as unfair and coercive since failure to consent to testing results in 
disqualification.  
Moreover, Schneider‘s (2009) critique of the ―strict liability‖ feature applied by 
doping-control agencies in sport has some implications for the debate on gene doping in 
sport. Strict liability refers to penalizing a doped athlete in the same manner regardless of 
whether or not that athlete intended to dope or had any knowledge of the presence of the 
banned substance within his or her body. Anti-doping agencies justify this principle 
based on the perspective of the doped athlete‘s competitors who would be equally 
disadvantaged due to the presence of an opponent who intentionally doped and one who 
was unaware that he or she was doping. Fairness would be particularly questioned if this 
principle would be enforced in the case of embryonic gene doping where the choice was 
made prior to the birth of the child or in early semiotic gene doping shortly thereafter.     
 Schneider (2009) blames the disrespect for the rights of athletes by the 
abovementioned ways in so far as those rights are threatened on the fact that current 
doping control programs are not athlete-centred. More specifically, Schneider argues that 
sport-governing bodies should focus on protecting the safety and development of athletes. 
Athletes should be thought of as persons with rights rather than replaceable commodities 
or actors perpetuating the institution of sport. This pattern of thinking seems to be 
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consistent with both Loland (2009) and Lenk (2007) as they both recognize the need to 
avoid performance-enhancement strategies that require a dependence on the expertise of 
others. They hold that as a result of a high degree of performance-enhancement measures, 
athletes lose a significant amount of control and authorship over their athletic 
performances. From this viewpoint, gene-doping athletes can start to resemble machines 
dictated by scientists who are motivated by a desire to apply their technological 
innovations. Thus, as mentioned in my first chapter, a Kantian foundation is clearly 
embedded in the arguments set forth by all three of these philosophers as they seem to 
agree that some performance-enhancement strategies reduce the respect for athletes as 
persons. However, rational adult athletes who freely elect genetic enhancement 
procedures might contrastingly be perceived as exercising greater rather than less control 
and authorship over their athletic performances. This view will be explored 
comprehensively in my section on the conception of humanness. For now, let us consider 
how fairness in sport might be adversely affected by genetically enhanced athletes. 
Would Gene Doping Reduce Fairness in Sport? 
From Rawls‘s perspective, principles or rules that are deemed as reasonable 
expectations for all participants to adhere to can be consulted in the case that the fairness 
associated with the practice is in question at any point. As Schneider (2009) points out, 
the culture of sport seems to exclude athletes from decision-making concerning issues 
that dramatically affect them the most. There is a lack of channels in sport that encourage 
athletes to be critical of the policies that guide sport. Perhaps the submissive and non-
critical temperament of athletes is shaped by their early experiences in sport. More than 
ever before, children today seldom play sports in neighbourhood parks and fields where 
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they are free to dictate their own rules amongst one other. More than ever, North 
American parents are enrolling their children in adult-organized sports leagues where 
child athletes get virtually no say in how their sports are run. With coaches and parents 
constantly in charge, child athletes grow up and enter adulthood accustomed to their 
passive roles in sport where coaches, trainers and sport governing bodies continue to set 
the tone for their involvement. So we cannot presume that merely because athletes 
participate, they perceive all of the rules enforced by sport governing bodies such as the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as fair for all. This begs the question: does an 
acceptance of gene doping athletes by governing bodies of sport fairly treat all 
individuals involved in sport? Or conversely as judged from the original position, would 
a rational individual identify an expectation to refrain from genetic enhancement for 
athletic purposes as acceptable?   
An argument raised against transhumanism that supports the ban on gene doping is 
the idea that it would represent yet another avenue through which the wealthy segments 
of the population will get to dominate their poor counterparts. Of course, only those who 
can afford the application of genetic technology will be able to reap the praise, credit and 
monetary rewards associated with commercialized elite sport (McNamee, 2007). To 
reaffirm, I agree with Tamburrini‘s (2007) critique of this particular argument in which 
he asserts that just because a technology is initially expensive and therefore only 
available to wealthy individuals, this fails to sufficiently rationalize the prohibition 
against it. He claims that eventually all participants of sport will be able to reap its 
benefits. Moreover, Tamburrini claims that like any other novel medical advancement the 
contemporary poor are the only individuals that will be disadvantaged due to the inability 
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to afford the likely expensive treatment. This is because over time all including the poor 
will likely have access to the technology. I confer that this technology will probably 
become increasingly accessible to greater portions of the population as it becomes less 
expensive but it is highly doubtful that the poorest individuals in the world who cannot 
even afford the basic necessities of life such as clean water and food will enjoy access to 
these procedures. Still, refusing the advent of genetic technology based on this idea 
seems hypocritical since this is the case for all luxuries in life. Therefore, McNamee‘s 
reasoning in this particular case fails to convince us to withhold this technology.    
If we imagine for argument‘s sake that no prohibition against gene doping exists in 
sport, does an athlete act unfairly toward his or her opponents by employing genetic 
enhancement to improve essential capacities needed for the sport? Again, acting unfairly 
according to Rawls could simply comprise acting in a way that opposes the intention of a 
practice. So by genetically enhancing themselves athletes reduce fairness in sports if this 
necessarily represents acting contrary to the purpose of the structural goal of sport 
competitions. As noted earlier, Loland (2009) describes the underlying objective of sport 
as comparing competitors with one another based on their performance of relevant skills 
such as speed in sprint running or horizontal jumping in long jump while they adhere to 
the rules. It seems appropriate to acknowledge the possibility that not everyone would 
find this to be an accurate portrayal of the structural goal of sporting competitions. I 
however see no major objection against accepting it as a fair characterization of the 
fundamental objective of contests in sport.  
Thus, we must question whether and how an athlete, by gene doping, interferes with 
sport‘s structural goal of comparing competitors based on their performance of relevant 
  144 
skills under the auspices of the rules. If gene doping is legalized in sport, it might still 
conflict with sport by replacing or clouding the relevant skills that it intends to test in 
order to compare competitors.       
Essential Skills of the Sport to Determine Acceptability of Innovations 
 Michael Sandel (2007) explains how effort is definitely not the only important 
thing when it comes to assessing athletic excellence. Indeed, the highest athletic ideal for 
which the public demonstrates admiration are not athletes who merely project maximal 
effort and dedication but exhibit average or worse levels of athletic performance. The 
purpose of sport competitions or contests according to Sandel is that they display 
people‘s abilities based on both cultivated and natural talents. Thus, a certain degree of 
natural talent is required to reach the levels of performance and achievement exemplified 
by top-notch athletes from Michael Jordan to Michael Phelps. So does this mean that 
genetic enhancement techniques can be valued as a form of developing one‘s natural 
capacities like training as opposed to a practice that merely makes a sport easier for an 
individual?  
 To answer this question, Sandel (2007) argues that there is a line that is 
sometimes difficult to identify between technological measures or innovations that 
cultivate and those that corrupt natural talents. He states that the acceptance of forms of 
enhancement such as diets, vitamins, performance-enhancement drugs or gene doping 
should depend on whether they perfect or cloud the essential skills that the sport in 
question is meant to test. Sandel contends that some technologies run the risk of turning a 
sport into a spectacle. So how can we determine which innovations corrupt the game 
rather than make it better? Sandel states that the nature of the sport in question must be 
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understood in terms of which skills are those that we mean to test in order to distinguish 
outstanding competitors from athletes that are very good or merely average. A 
technology can corrupt a sport if it lessens the degree to which those skills serve as 
deciding factors in the outcome of the game and improves a sport if it causes those skills 
to become more prominent and clearly decisive of contest results.  
To demonstrate, Sandel (2007) explains how the introduction of the shoe would 
have improved races because it reduces the chances that other factors not meant to play a 
role in determining the winner will prevent the actual best runner in the race from 
winning. For example, shoes protect runners from being slowed down by stepping on a 
sharp object and hurting their feet. Although the running shoe has progressed beyond a 
protective function clearly displayed by the performance-enhancing role it plays today, 
the focus here is on the shoe in its earliest form. Thus, the testing of speed or endurance 
or, depending on the distance of the race, some combination of both becomes more 
pronounced as the central ability on which competitors are compared. In contrast, Sandel 
offers wrestlers striking opponents with chairs in the World Wrestling Federation (WWF) 
as an innovation that corrupts sport in that it fails to take seriously those skills that 
wrestling contests intend to test. Since it could be argued that the WWF is not an 
authentic sport, a better example is the Speedo LZR swimsuit banned because it alters 
body shape greatly reducing race times of those who could afford the expensive suit. 
It must be noted that the cases illustrated above are relatively easy to determine. 
The innovation of wrestlers using chairs as weapons obviously hinders the role of 
essential skills in wrestling contests whereas shoes in the other example unambiguously 
downplays confounding factors thereby promoting the role of the skills that are meant to 
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be tested. The case is not as clear for more controversial technological innovations. An 
example outside of sport is used by Sandel (2007) to depict the difficulty in applying this 
principle for the purpose of discerning some innovations that corrupt rather than highlight 
the essential skills of a sport. This example is the use of beta-blockers by musicians to 
calm their nerves during performances. Is this a shortcut that disvalues key elements that 
are prerequisites for any musical performer to be considered excellent? One might answer 
this question in the affirmative if the musician never has to overcome his or her fear of 
performing in front of large audiences and if it is believed that a mastery of this fear is a 
crucial element to displaying excellence as a musical performer. The trouble lies in the 
fact that composure during performances as an essential feature of musical excellence is 
debatable. Athletes might also use beta-blockers for their competitions and its application 
in this context would still be contestable as it depends on what people consider to be 
essential elements of excellence in the sport under investigation.  
Likewise, Adderal – a commonly prescribed drug for treating Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) – enhances focus and as such is used to improve by 
athletes to improve performances in competitions and by college students facing 
academic pressure (Health News Digest, 2010). Because of this, the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) has recently banned its use by student-athletes other than 
those who are able to provide medical documentation of an ADHD diagnosis. Perhaps the 
ability to block out distractions from spectators heckling during important games or 
opponents in tennis grunting across the court is a significant part of athletic excellence 
that sets the consistent winners apart from the rest. If this is the case, merely ingesting a 
pill to acquire this ability might be seen as distorting the game and the mental aspects of 
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capacities that it at least partially intends to test. In relation to fairness, if athletes enter 
the sporting arena with an expectation and agreement to the set of central skills and traits 
that are supposed to determine the winners, contenders who utilize enhancement 
strategies that conflict with these factors treat their competitors unfairly. At this point, the 
reader might be questioning how we ought to go about deciding which skills or traits are 
or should be integral to athletic excellence in general as well as in the particular sport in 
question to decide the game‘s results. And, for that matter, who gets to decide on the 
essential skills of the sport? 
Public Opinion to Determine Acceptability of Innovations 
Morgan (2009) proposes an alternative conceptual understanding of treatment and 
enhancement where he claims that the line between these two concepts is socially 
constructed rather than based on a metaphysical distinction. As such, Morgan feels that if 
one is to determine which interventions should be categorized as acceptable forms of 
enhancement, it is necessary to consult public sentiment. In the context of sport, the 
general consensus of the athletic community that includes athletes, coaches, fans and 
sporting officials is especially important in pinpointing which practices and substances 
ought to fall under the category of enhancement and which are seen as acceptable and 
thus fair. Morgan claims that there has been a recent shift in the public‘s view of 
performance-enhancing drugs that, contrary to the view of official sport governing 
bodies, identifies at least some of them as acceptable.  
In an attempt to support such claims, Morgan (2009) refers to a contemporary 
acceptance of the increased use of drugs such as Ritalin to no longer merely treat known 
pathologies but to enhance the performance in a wide array of activities. He also claims 
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that fans support and want to see extraordinary athletic achievements no matter how they 
are achieved. As Morgan even recognizes, the evidence he uses to support these 
sweeping claims are merely several instances that depict this kind of public response 
within the realm of elite athletics. As a rebuttal to Morgan‘s contention that the public 
accepts the use of performance-enhancement drugs by professional athletes, I would 
point to Mark McGwire, Roger Clemens, Marion Jones and the long list of other scandals 
where athletes have been caught doping. Upon detection, the typical pattern of the 
public‘s response to these athletes‘ actions culminates in severely tainting the way the 
public views their achievements and extinguishes the reverence they once held in some 
cases possibly costing them inductions into the Hall of Fame. I believe these examples 
greatly contradict Morgan‘s claim. Thus, fans‘ reactions show that they do indeed care 
about how athletes come to achieve their extraordinary levels of performance.  
To be fair, it is quite possible that the source of these negative reactions is the fact 
that anti-doping policies currently mean that any athlete who dopes is thus cheating. 
Also, in Morgan‘s (2009) defense, he claims that the lack of apparent public advocacy 
against anti-doping campaigns is due to the fact that sport-governing bodies are highly 
undemocratic in nature. It is possible that athletes might not agree with the bans but still 
refrain from voicing their opinions for fear of being accused of using performance-
enhancing drugs and thus tarnishing their reputations.        
 In any case, Morgan (2009) seems to be arguing that a comprehension of 
enhancement versus treatment must acknowledge justified shifts in public views as the 
distinction is not merely a metaphysical or natural one. For Morgan, this approach that 
appeals to public consensus must translate into what we deem as acceptable practices in 
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sport. Of course, the views within the athletic community are diverse and thus might 
conflict on the acceptability of certain innovations. Thus, it might help to at least start by 
examining which essential skills the community surrounding each particular sport holds 
as most relevant and important to determining the outcomes within that sport as has been 
described in the earlier section. 
Conversely, Juengst (2009) claims that an interpretation of enhancement that refers 
to a distinction between the natural and unnatural is highly relevant to debates regarding 
gene doping in sport. This eventually allows Jeungst to contend that the central concern 
with the prospective introduction of gene doping into the world of sport is the worry that 
it threatens what is at the very heart of sport‘s celebration of human excellence, namely 
the hierarchial ranking of inherited talents. Jeungst‘s description of sport‘s central feature 
seems to be consistent with Morgan‘s (2009) illustration after all. After Morgan 
distinguishes between treatment and enhancement, he shifts his focus on discerning 
between two forms of enhancement, namely those that should be deemed acceptable in 
sport and those that should be prohibited. Clearly, Morgan does not think that appealing 
to a distinction between enhancement and treatment gets us very far in contemplating 
which practices in sport should be permitted or banned. More specifically, the kind of 
enhancement that Morgan thinks should be banned from sporting practices is that which 
improves certain innate features that are crucial to performance in the competition as 
would likely be the case in gene doping. To exemplify this distinction, Morgan refers to 
anxiety-reducing drugs which he claims are just as guilty of meddling with human 
qualities that are supposed to be at the heart of athletic tests as genetically engineering 
athletes. Contrastingly, Jeungst sees the key normative theme that is unique to sport – that 
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genetic variation ought to shape human hierarchies – as morally repugnant. In fact, he 
claims that if genetically based hierarchies were central to any other domain, they would 
be perceived as discriminatory or intolerant. So, while one scholar feels that this key 
feature of sport (genetically-based hierarchies) is despicable, the other feels that it ought 
to be preserved and thus could act as an alternative test to the traditional treatment-
enhancement distinction for determining which substances or practices should be 
abolished from sport. 
To extend this line of thought, it should be recognized that from a Rawlsian 
perspective of justice as fairness, if a practice is to be considered fair, the rules that 
govern it must be compatible with justice. As was explained in my preceding chapter, the 
claim that in order for a practice to be fair, even unjust rules that constitute the practice 
that have been deemed to be acceptable by the participants must be adhered to makes no 
sense at all from the viewpoint of justice as fairness. For this reason, we must inquire 
whether the structural goal of sporting competitions, namely comparing competitors with 
one another based on their performance of relevant skills while they adhere to the rules is 
fair. We have already examined major limitations of Tamburrini‘s argument that gene 
doping would enhance fairness in sport. In the following section, I will refer to Rawls‘s 
principles of fairness in order to assess the most crucial assumption involved in 
Tamburrini‘s position. This assumption is that the foundation of sport competitions that 
seeks to celebrate and reward competitors based on skills and talents for which they 
cannot entirely take credit since they inherit them at birth is unfair. On the one hand, if 
the structural purpose of sport is indeed unfair, radically altering the institution of sport 
via gene doping may promote fairness in ways not yet considered by Tamburrini. 
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However, if sport‘s purpose is found to be compatible with fairness, gene-doping athletes 
would likely conflict with sport‘s purpose thereby opposing fairness.  
Is the Structural Purpose of Sport Unfair? 
As explained in my preceding chapter, the Fair Opportunity Principle (FOP) 
advocates the removal of or compensation for those inequalities that influence sporting 
outcomes but for which individuals cannot be held liable since such inequalities are not 
significantly malleable. According to this principle, social structures must be constructed 
so that stations that provide benefits to the individuals who fill them thereby giving rise 
to inequalities must be fairly available to all members of society. This conception of the 
FOP can be described as ―leveling out the playing field‖ in the sense that it advocates the 
removal of inequalities originating from sources for which we cannot hold people 
accountable. The principle that two individuals similar in terms of natural ability should 
have equal opportunities was exemplified in the previous chapter with a practice that 
such a principle would suggest. The example provided was publicly funded elections that 
would allow positions of public office to be equally obtainable to non-wealthy and 
wealthy citizens.  
 In sport, this principle is evident in various ways such as the compensation for 
variations in external conditions including weather as well as the compensation for 
inequalities that are associated with individual differences such as age, sex and in some 
sports weight. It can be argued that while some forms of compensation are evident in 
sport some sporting practices fail to fully adhere to the FOP as can be seen with the clear 
influence of comparative wealth and resources of nations in relation to the distribution of 
Olympic medals. Seemingly based on the FOP, both Lenk (2007) and Loland (2009) 
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articulate the need for wealth, equipment and technology to be equally accessible to all 
competitors or at least standardized through practices. Lenk demonstrates that a necessary 
but insufficient condition for fairness in sport is to ensure that all athletes perform under 
the same conditions and have equal access to technology.  
Without explicitly acknowledging a link to the FOP, Lenk (2007) seems to provide 
some sort of rationale for the relevance of this principle to sport as we know it. 
Specifically, Lenk describes this normative value of sport as based on the idea that 
winners of competitions ought to earn their victory in virtue of their own merit rather 
than some other factor over which they have no control.  
So does this mean that we should categorize individuals by their genetic traits 
relating to success in their sport? Or, should we offer athletes lacking these genetic traits 
pertaining to athleticism access to genetic enhancement technologies? Perhaps we would 
be inclined to agree with one of these two options if we were to ignore the other 
principles that should be considered in understanding the notion of fairness that Rawls 
explicates.   
To reiterate, the FOP represents just one of two subparts comprising a single 
principle. Both Loland (2009) and Lenk (2007) refer to the work of Rawls on justice and 
fairness in order to endorse their own differing positions regarding gene doping in sport. 
However, it is of grave importance that a reference be based on an accurate portrayal of 
Rawls‘s position on fairness in order to extrapolate its message in support of one‘s 
position. The account that has been described by both Loland and Lenk has been 
critiqued and displayed as misconstruing Rawls‘s message as an appropriate rationale. 
Murray (2009) attempts to clarify the misconception that has been perpetuated by Loland 
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and other philosophers regarding Rawls‘s position on justice and fairness. Murray 
explains how Loland appeals to Rawls to support his notion of a FOP. According to the 
FOP, fixed essential inequalities that exist among us for which individuals cannot be held 
accountable should be compensated for or eradicated. In truth however, this notion is 
what Rawls refers to as the Principle of Redress (PR). As has already been outlined, some 
sport philosophers including Loland and Lenk refer to the ideas inherent in the FOP or 
the Principle of Redress to infer that fairness would be superior in a genetically enhanced 
future for sport. Yet, Murray explains how, in actuality, this principle clearly runs counter 
to the position that is endorsed by Rawls.  
While Rawls (as cited in Murray, 2009) agrees that individuals do not deserve 
their innate capacities just as they do not deserve the socio-economic status in which they 
are reared, he believes that this fact fails to justify the normative rule that inequalities in 
natural talents should be compensated for or eliminated in society. Rawls recognizes an 
important difference between inequalities in natural talents and starting social positions. 
Specifically, the former unlike the latter can be manipulated so that the special strengths 
and talents of individuals can serve the interests of all down to the very least talented or 
the most disadvantaged individuals of society. Rawls argues that this basic structure of 
society would be advocated if one is deciding behind a veil of ignorance which is void of 
particular knowledge about one‘s self including ethnicity, gender or socio-economic 
status. The Principle of Redress asserts the need for society to address or respond to those 
conditions or capacities that are imposed on individuals but for which they cannot be 
viewed as being responsible such as being born intellectually challenged that places them 
in the least advantaged group in society. But Rawls also believes in adhering to a 
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fundamental principle of justice that he identifies as the Difference Principle (DP). 
According to this principle, individuals are to be permitted, nay encouraged, to exercise 
and develop their talents in ways that benefit the public good. Thus, Rawls supports a 
refocused attention on improving fairness in basic institutions by ensuring that the current 
strengths and talents serve the interests of all and it is certainly not the case, as Loland 
(2009) or Mehlman (2009) would have us believe, that Rawls advocates the crippling or 
leveling out of individual talents as through genetic technology for instance.  
To elaborate, the second aspect of Rawls‘s principle of justice as fairness, known 
as the DP, concerns inequalities between members of society in terms of goods people 
need in order to survive or live well including wealth and basic and non-basic rights 
(Richardson, 2005).  The DP holds that inequalities in the allocation of such goods are 
acceptable if they better members of society that are the least advantaged. For example, a 
police officer‘s right to place a criminal under arrest is acceptable because it leads to the 
betterment of society whose members include the least advantaged.  
From this, it follows that we can benefit from our own intelligence or some 
natural talent only if the least advantaged people in society benefit from it in one way or 
other (Richardson, 2005). Thus, in the third chapter I explained why high physician 
salaries are accepted because they provide incentive for more people to go through the 
intensive training involved in medical education and specialization and serve to maintain 
a certain quality of healthcare for all including the least advantaged groups in society. 
Using this as an analogy, it is possible to argue that providing rewards for winners of 
sport contests particularly at the highest levels gives athletes incentives to strive for 
excellence and devote their lives to their sport of choice. As a result, allowing individuals 
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to display their athletic talents might inspire others in society including the least 
advantaged youth who look up to athletes. Seeing the praise, admiration and credit with 
which we bestow our top athletes might encourage others to work hard and practice to 
perfect their skills and talents whatever they may be. This could in turn promote a sense 
of ambition and a drive for excellence in all domains including the workplace and 
education. Overall, this could promote dissatisfaction with mere mediocrity leading to a 
more productive society. Teachers, scientists, engineers, researchers and others may be 
inspired to cultivate their talents and perform their work to the best of their abilities. This 
in turn will benefit all in society including the least advantaged. In this way, the structural 
goal of sport can be depicted as adhering to Rawls‘s account of fairness.  
Murray (2009) refers to an additional contribution made by Rawls in an attempt to 
determine how human nature can be understood in a way that the demonstration of 
natural talents in sport is morally acceptable. According to Rawls (as cited in Murray), as 
human beings we possess the capacity to create and pursue our own conception of the 
good life. Rawls seems to value the right of citizens to flourish by pursuing ends that they 
deem are valuable to human life. Murray relates this to sport by illustrating how the 
demonstration of athletic talents through sport competitions can be a part of an 
individual‘s conception of the good life in the same way that artistic or other kinds of 
talent can be perceived as life-enriching channels. Athletes and fans of sport can thus 
respond to allegations that sport is nothing more than a trivial endeavour and justify it as 
a worthwhile pursuit based on the fact that they value the experience of physical 
embodiment and the pursuit of excellence. Therefore, such individuals can effectively 
argue that summarizing sport merely as a vehicle used to establish genetic hierarchies 
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ignores the valuable intrinsic rewards that athletes gain from the insightful process and 
rich experience of testing one‘s self in terms of physical and intellectual limits as well as 
limits of character that can occur alongside other athletes who are striving for the same 
goal.                                                                                               
 Thus, Murray‘s (2009) reference to the DP in conjunction with his second 
reference to Rawls for a successful dismantling of the argument that criticizes sport for its 
supposed fundamental objective of celebrating genetic hierarchies provides a solid 
foundation upon which a favourable opinion of sport and its social value can be 
redeemed. It also leads to Murray‘s optimistic forecast for sport as it continues in its 
evolution. Clearly backed by the ideas of Rawls and Murray, I believe that we have 
successfully refuted the need to implement in sport some sort of practice such as gene 
doping in order to establish equality in genetic traits. With that said however, Murray also 
does not affirm an objection – either explicitly or implicitly – against performance 
enhancement techniques in sport or the emergence of gene doping in future sport. Such 
practices do not seem to conflict with Murray‘s notions of a just society or the values of 
embodied excellence and human flourishing through the moral capacity of individuals to 
determine their own conception about what is good in human life.    
Is Sport’s Alleged Unfair Structural Goal Unique?   
In light of the wide array of talents that exist, every individual can find at least 
one thing that they can do reasonably well. There is no need to submit one‘s self to gene 
doping in order to compete with top athletes. Excluding less athletically inclined 
individuals from participating in and incurring the rewards associated with elite sport 
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might be construed as a discriminatory practice but leagues exist for all levels of athletic 
ability. Thus, people can still be involved in sport by joining less competitive leagues.  
Additionally, if we accuse elite sport in particular of being inherently unfair, why 
stop there? It seems unfair and inconsistent to exclusively accuse sport of selectively 
awarding and excluding individuals to some extent based on genetic or pure abilities 
when so many other social practices such as hiring practices are equally guilty of doing 
the same (Murray, 2009). For example, other domains of society such as business and the 
entertainment industry credit talent just as much as athletics. I do not complain that I was 
born lacking any acting or vocal talent or that I am unable to compete with the Picassos, 
van Goghs, Renoirs and other visual artistic geniuses of the world. If we hold that it is 
unfair to those born athletically disadvantaged to praise and reward top athletes, we 
should apply this allegation to all other channels of acquiring success and recognition 
based on one‘s talent. For instance, the Oscar awards is an annual ceremony that 
celebrates and rewards the best performances of actors, directors and others involved in 
the production of films. Like the Olympics or the World Cup, an individual must be born 
with a phenomenal degree of natural talent in order to qualify let alone win such an 
award. In this way, the argument that sport competitions are unfair would also have to be 
extended to nearly every aspect of society including employee-hiring practices and 
university enrolment procedures.  
Of course the fact that Tamburrini focuses specifically on the unfairness of sport 
while his argument seems to ignore the fact that the same can be said about mostly all 
other societal practices does not redeem sport of its unfairness charges. Indeed, it is 
possible that nearly all our social practices are based on an unfair underlying foundation 
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supporting the cliché expression that ―life is not fair.‖ What I am trying to accentuate is 
that Tamburrini could still be right to think that sports are inherently unfair just not due to 
the reasons he provides as described earlier. Therefore, let us consult the perspective that 
Rawls advocates, namely the veil of ignorance to more deeply evaluate Tamburrini‘s 
contention. 
What Would An Athlete Determine from Behind the Veil of Ignorance? 
 Simon (2004) adheres to the approach fostered by Rawls for decision-making 
from behind a figurative ―veil of ignorance‖ of which I have previously referred to as the 
original position to inform us on whether the ban on performance-enhancing drugs is 
justifiable or fair. According to Rawls, fair practices can be determined through 
consideration of which actions could be regarded as acceptable universal principles or 
practices. Simon argues that an impartial and rational athlete would judge a failure to 
prohibit the use of performance-enhancing drugs as irrational since they impose a 
significant risk of serious health complications to all users but in the absence of a ban, 
nearly everyone would likely use them so that most athletes would no longer gain 
advantages from their use. This is because incurring significant competitive advantages 
through performance-enhancing measures relies on some athletes not using them.  
Therefore, a small proportion of competitors at most might gain minimal 
advantages from (gene) doping but the veil of ignorance perspective requires that the 
athlete considering lifting the ban does not know if he or she falls in the category of 
athletes who would benefit from doing so. This is because the ―veil‖ hides the athlete‘s 
personal information such as the level of his or her athletic abilities and skills without use 
of performance-enhancing drugs and how well relative to others his or her body would 
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respond and improve due to performance-enhancing agents. On the other hand, what the 
impartial athlete could be sure of is that he or she will face a risk of endangering his or 
her own health since the potential adverse consequences indiscriminately affect all 
athletes who use performance-enhancing drugs or gene doping for that matter. Thus, 
using performance-enhancing drugs or gene doping would not be accepted as a universal 
practice from a rational and impartial position as the risks involved might only be 
justified if one knows that he or she would gain considerable benefits. So, because 
rational impartial athletes would not support everyone doping, athletes who choose to use 
performance-enhancement drugs exempt themselves and treat their competitors unfairly.    
Simon (2004) mentions potential criticisms that opponents would likely direct at the 
conclusion just drawn. First, benefits produced by universal usage of performance-
enhancing drugs beyond the advantages gained by individual athletes might be 
considered from behind the veil of ignorance. For instance, Simon describes the 
possibility that an impartial athlete values the higher competition levels and overall better 
performances in sport that would accompany widespread doping among athletes. The 
degree to which amplified performance levels across the board so to speak is valued 
would surely affect the cost-benefit analysis described earlier as this could conceivably 
surmount the costs associated with the potential health risks of doping. This demonstrates 
the shortcomings of Rawls‘s veil of ignorance that stems from potential areas of 
disagreement concerning values. However, Simon remains confident about his viewpoint 
based on the presumption that because sport-governing bodies are authorized to decide on 
doping and similar matters, it is reasonable for them to focus on that with which they are 
normally and appropriately concerned. Namely, competitive advantages that exclude 
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atypical values athletes might hold such as enhancements in muscular strength over and 
above safety and health. Of course, this presumption seems reasonable but could very 
well be critiqued as well.  
Lenk (2007) explicitly states that simply allowing practices of enhancement in sport 
such as gene doping would not only fail to guarantee equality of opportunities but would 
also reduce the authorship that athletes have for their own performance as the 
significance of training and effort is as a result reduced. A deeper assessment of the 
fairness principles might indicate the Kantian notion that athletes should always be 
treated as ends rather than merely as means. This implies that gene doping along with all 
other potentially harmful performance-enhancing technologies that require athletes to 
rely on the expertise of scientists should be banned. Similarly, Lenk argues that if doping 
is permitted, the health risks for athletes may be heightened as many would repeatedly 
seek evermore effective means of enhancement that are potentially more invasive and 
harmful. In an effort to protect athletes from potential coercion or harm, Lenk feels that it 
is in the best interest of all athletes if enhancement practices are minimized. Furthermore, 
he argues that doing so allows the sporting world to get closer to a state of equal 
opportunities.                                                                                                               
Autonomy 
Harm, Autonomy & Hard Paternalism 
 In his address on gene doping and sport at the 2002 Banbury Workshop, Dick 
Pound, former vice-president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and 
president of WADA (as cited in Schneider & Friedmann, 2006), can be accused of 
attempting to impose the rules of sport regarding prohibited practices and substances onto 
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physicians by masking it as a medical obligation. Pound realizes that the only way to 
rationally convince medical practitioners of their own responsibility to help enforce the 
ban on performance-enhancing drugs in sport is to demonstrate that to condone or 
prescribe those banned substances conflicts with their own profession‘s ethical principles. 
Thereby, Pound claims that a physician who prescribes banned substances to athletes or 
who simply allows them to use banned substances violates the Hippocratic oath that 
requires of them to ―do no harm.‖ The assumption that is embedded in this accusatory 
claim is that all the substances that are banned by WADA yield harm to the user. 
However, not all of WADA‘s banned substances are harmful if administered in particular 
doses. Also, in his address, Pound acknowledges a response from physicians on the 
matter which reasons that if athletes are going to use banned substances anyway, it is 
safer if they are medically monitored. In other words, it is likely more harmful to the 
patient seeking access to a banned form of performance-enhancement if a physician turns 
him or her away.  
Pound dismisses this reasoning and does not explain why he sees no merit in it as 
an argument against his viewpoint. On this matter, it appears as though Pound does not 
fully understand the common practices of physicians in employing the lesser of two evils. 
To exemplify this conventional norm, one might consider that physicians commonly 
prescribe methadone – an otherwise illegal drug – to treat heroine addicts despite its 
many harmful effects. This treatment is justifiable as the alternative course of action – 
standing idly by while addicts attempt to face their addictions all on their own – is 
relatively more dangerous for the patient. Another example that demonstrates this 
strategy used by physicians is morphine that is associated with health risks and addictive 
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properties but is often prescribed to patients experiencing short bouts of intense pain such 
as just after surgery.                                                             
 In fact, given the infancy of scientific understanding and research behind gene 
doping, we cannot rule out the possibility of a future in which such procedures can be 
safely administered with no serious side effects. It is interesting to note that despite what 
might be implied by Pound‘s address at the Banbury Conference, this would not change 
WADA‘s stance against gene doping as it has gone on record stating that ―the use of 
genetic transfer technology…should be prohibited as it is contrary to the spirit of sport 
even if it is not harmful‖ (WADA, 2003, my emphasis). Furthermore, Pound explicitly 
states that one purpose of the conference was to inform all relevant parties of the 
appropriateness and level of urgency in doing their part to combat gene doping for 
sporting purposes. Yet, his argument that physicians should withhold gene-doping 
techniques from athletes is solely dependent on potential harm that could easily be 
rejected if research allows it to evolve into a reasonably safe practice.                                                                                  
 Moreover, Pound (as cited in Schneider & Friedmann, 2006) claims that gene 
doping is much more serious than erythropoietin (EPO) and anabolic steroids; yet, he 
fails to explain which features make it more serious and why this is necessarily the case. 
What is evident in WADA‘s position advocated by Pound is a hard paternalistic stance 
that endorses intervening in the actions of fully informed and rational agents with respect 
to adult athletes that is justified partly by a perceived potential danger in addition to the 
protection of the spirit of sport.  
From the perspective of hard paternalism, to merely educate and inform 
participants of the dangers they assume when taking performance-enhancing drugs is 
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inadequate. Policies are thus in place and enforced against users upon detection. Anti-
doping policies may coerce some athletes into refraining from performance-enhancing 
drug usage. Rational and competent individuals who are informed about the risks and still 
want to use them are coerced against doing so. From this perspective, some advocates of 
autonomy might object to a ban on performance-enhancing drugs and gene doping on the 
grounds that autonomy requires unconstrained individual choice. Yet, the ban could be 
justified as a measure to reduce the pressure on those who would rather not use 
performance-enhancing drugs to act contrary to their inclinations and judgment just to be 
able to compete. Below is an depth illustration of this rationale that is used by Sherwin 
(2007) and other advocates of relational autonomy.   
Adults & Relational Autonomy 
Sherwin (2007) raises the issue of autonomy and paternalism with respect to 
genetic enhancement that would be performed by competent adults as opposed to 
children. Her viewpoint challenges the free choice argument that advocates the 
autonomous choice of fully informed and rational adults to employ genetic enhancement. 
The only exception in which this perspective would recommend restraining choice is if 
enhancement procedures entail an excessive degree of danger to the individual. Sherwin‘s 
response to this argument is that it rests on a traditional interpretation of autonomy that 
simplifies it into individualistic terms. This understanding of autonomy suggests a 
perception of individuals as completely unaffected by their societal surroundings when 
making decisions. For this reason, Sherwin proposes a relational approach to 
understanding autonomy which I have already described as being based on a recognition 
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that people form their values through dialogue and interactions with others in numerous 
contexts.  
Sherwin (2007) demonstrates the superiority of this relational understanding of 
autonomy over an individualistic interpretation referring to the example of cosmetic 
surgery critiqued in feminist theory literature. From the individualistic interpretation of 
autonomy, females that alter their appearance for aesthetic reasons appear to be acting 
autonomously. However, it seems naïve to ignore the societal pressures that are on 
women to look a certain way. The prevalence of women undergoing cosmetic surgery 
heightens the urgency for un-enhanced women to do the same and thereby undermines 
the autonomy of these women.   
This analogy aids us in using the perspective of relational autonomy to explain the 
probability that only the very first athletes who decide to utilize genetic enhancement 
techniques will be exercising their freedom of choice or autonomy. As already described 
above, athletes who subsequently follow the lead of these initial users will likely be 
giving into the pressure to genetically dope in order to remain competitive in a 
genetically enhanced world of elite sport. Thus, Sherwin (2007) argues that the 
prevalence of gene doping will reduce autonomy overall and widespread use due to this 
coercive environment could lead to serious negative consequences for the collective and 
long-term interests of athletes.  
This reflects the relational approach to autonomy used by Sherwin (2007) to 
assert that we ought to be extra careful when contemplating the introduction of emerging 
new services that could potentially enforce oppressive forces on individuals. In this 
manner, autonomy of the first group of athletes who want to engage in doping appears to 
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be restrained so that the autonomy of the second group composed of athletes not wanting 
to enhance their performance using drugs is protected. On the other hand, if the ban was 
lifted, the autonomy of the first group of individuals who would choose to engage in 
doping but only in the absence of a prohibition appears to be endorsed at the expense of 
the autonomy of the second group of athletes not wanting to use performance-enhancing 
drugs. Thus, it seems that with a ban or without one, the autonomy of at least one set of 
athletes is compromised while that of another is safeguarded.     
 Yet, prioritizing the autonomy of the second group above that of the first group 
might be justfied as the choices of the former unlike the latter do not likely lead to 
significant health risks. It is possible that some critics will be unmoved by my reasoning 
behind valuing autonomy of one group over another because the actions and choices of 
the former but not the latter endanger their health and that of their competitors. 
Furthermore, opponents might assert that autonomy is no less worthy of being valued and 
upheld because we do not agree with the choices that emerge from protecting it.  
Moreover, a critic might also refute the very premise that we should be concerned 
with gene doping athletes since they place pressure on other athletes to employ the same 
measures in order to remain competitive. As described in the third chapter, Simon (2004) 
confronts the question of whether it is immoral for an athlete to use performance-
enhancing drugs creating circumstances that force other competitors to decide between 
following suit or otherwise refraining from using and therefore becoming signficantly 
less or no longer competitive. Recall from my preceding chapter Simon‘s point that we 
do not find it morally problematic for athletes to train intensively and thereby put 
pressure on their competitors to train just as intently or for eager students to study 
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incessantly setting the bar extremely high for their fellow classmates on an exam where 
the bottom 20% fail for example. Even if others feel coerced to engage in more effort, 
eager and hard-working students and athletes alike are perceived as doing nothing even 
remotely wrong. As evidence, such behaviours and actions are often encouraged because 
they generally result in superior performances.  
As a response to the possible objections described above, I feel the need to depict 
an alternative account that might come closer to winning over the type of critic described 
in the two preceding paragraphs. First, I find it reasonable to contend that valuing 
autonomy does not necessarily mean granting free choice to engage in any practice any 
one should choose. From this viewpoint, the prohibition against gene doping could be 
framed paternalistically as being in the best interests of all athletes. It is also possible to 
argue that long-term autonomy is actually promoted in the first group of athletes who 
desire to engage in gene doping as well in the sense that they might be dissuaded from 
employing these practices due to the existence of a ban. Indeed, by protecting the health 
of these athletes, the ban could be perceived as a force that promotes their autonomy. 
This is based on the premise that if athletes suffer from severe health complications 
initiated by gene doping, it might become impossible for them to live fully 
autonomously. For example, coercing adults from using recreational drugs such as 
cocaine and heroin through illegalization and enforcement can be seen as valuing 
autonomy since users can become severely dysfunctional and thus less able to care for 
themselves and live their lives in the ways in which they rationally would desire. Drug 
use might also lead to death in which case speaking of the person‘s autonomy ceases to 
even make sense. A similar example of restricting people‘s autonomy in order to protect 
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their autonomy in the future includes restricting the public from swimming in certain 
areas of open water perhaps due to dangerously high tides or pollution.  
With that said, I am fully aware that this argument is not free of any weaknesses 
or limitations. For instance, the strength of the analogy of illegal high risk recreational 
drugs used to justify the ban on gene doping is weakened if one considers that society  
accepts the choice to use cars as transportation devices despite the risks of paraplegia, 
quadriplegia or death associated with motor vehicle collisions resulting in significant 
losses in autonomy. Undoubtedly, to be stripped of one‘s permission to drive represents a 
considerable restraint on autonomy. That is not to say that in some cases such as with 
blind or intoxicated drivers it is not permissible to revoke their licences. This exception 
highlights the fact that we typically justify impeding one‘s autonomy when a high risk of 
harming others exists. This is what John Stuart Mill, a noted 19
th
 century philosopher, 
depicts in his Harm Principle which claims that we are only justified in constraining the 
liberty of competent rational persons when harm is posed to others rather than solely 
themselves (as cited in Simon, 2004). Thus, it is conceivable that recreational drugs are 
illegal specifically because of the harm users can inflict onto others when they are under 
the influence of these substances. Similarly, we might base the ban against gene doping 
on the fact that it is harmful to the user but more importantly to others in that it coerces 
them to do the same in order to compete. 
Of course, as described earlier, Simon (2004) finds that this argument involves a 
much too loose use of the term coercion as all other competitive environments can be 
construed as coercing individuals from freely choosing their actions. But, Simon still 
supports the ban at this time despite the abovementioned possible objections. His 
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reasoning is based on the fact that no athlete should be allowed to create conditions in 
sport that push competitors to use performance-enhancing drugs like steroids since they 
are linked to potential health risks unlike training or diet regimens for example which 
may be innocuous if appropriately formulated and carried out. I agree with Simon that 
this argument may perhaps be rejected upon further inspection with respect to the level of 
harm actually posed as a result of using performance-enhancing drugs. Yet, due to 
insufficient scientific evidence available at present, we must approach this genetic 
technology with forethought and not be foolhardy in welcoming its use by athletes. 
Consequently, while it may be an imperfect solution, the presence of a ban against gene 
doping at least until we can add more relavent pieces to the puzzle of our scientific 
understanding of the dangers that might come out of it is indeed justifiable. In conjuction 
with other arguments supporting the ban from the perspective of either fairness or human 
nature, we must remain vigilant with respect to protecting the environment of sport for 
competitors that want to compete but do not want to engage in potentially dangerous 
practices. 
A More Comprehensive Evaluation of Potential Harm  
In addition to his evaluation of fairness in sport, Tamburrini (2005) also assesses 
how paternalism and autonomy are implicated through germ-line genetic modifications of 
embryos. First, he argues that prior to the initiation of genetic engineering for athletic 
enhancement purposes it will be developed for medical therapy applications and so it will 
most likely adhere to reasonable levels of safety. Tamburrini foresees it as being no more 
harmful than contemporary elite sports training measures. Of course, genetic 
enhancement of athletes might find its way into sport prior to scientists figuring out how 
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to make genetic engineering reasonably safe. In fact, WADA acknowledges past trends 
where drugs that are still in the experimental phases of research often manage to enter the 
athletic world and this is why it has already devoted funds to developing gene doping 
detection methods (Haisma & de Hon, 2006).  
One such medical advancement that was not completely safe but still entered the 
realm of sport is the genetically engineered synthetic version of erythropoietin that is 
commonly known as EPO (Mayes, 2010). Although EPO was developed for the medical 
purpose of producing red blood cells in order to improve the oxygen carrying capacity of 
anemic and cancer patients, it still can lead to strokes or heart attacks due to excessive 
production of red blood cells that thickens the blood (Mayes, 2010). This apparent risk 
however is justified in medical settings where physicians and/or nurses can minimize the 
risks through proper regulative monitoring. Like blood doping that was described in my 
introductory chapter, some runners use EPO to enhance their endurance despite the risks 
involved particularly if not administered by a physician. Medical procedures that are 
performed by individuals lacking medical training as would likely be the case for athletes 
seeking out greater advantages over their opponents run higher risks to the subjects‘ 
health. This might simply lead critics to assert that all this argument does is highlight the 
need to lift the ban and thereby reduce the prevalence of athletes reverting to ―black 
market‖ procedures. Yet, whether there is a gene doping ban or not, athletes will likely 
pursue unprecedented applications of these techniques that go well beyond medically 
regulated recommendations. Thus, even if genetic enhancement is reasonably safe in a 
medical setting, it might not be so in an athletic context where athletes, coaches and 
trainers are eager to push the boundaries of safety. 
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  Moreover, since genetic engineering is a fledgling medical technology, it is very 
difficult to predict the long-term and unanticipated consequences associated with 
inhibiting, replacing or introducing genes. For instance, gene therapists were able to 
completely alleviate a severe immune deficiency in some children by inserting a normal 
gene while three other children in the study ended up developing leukemia as a result of 
the introduction of the foreign gene (as cited in Bishop, 2005). As it turns out, insertion 
of the normal gene set off silent tumor genes in these individuals. So while we might be 
able to modify a single phenotypic trait by genetic alteration in ways that could enhance 
athletic performance, we simply cannot forecast the way bodies will react to such a 
change. Perhaps other phenotypic changes will result directly from the genetic change or 
indirectly by way of awakening or inhibiting other genes as in the above example.    
Natural selection is a phenomenon that is based on the idea that a population of a 
species over generations will be increasingly comprised of individuals with certain traits. 
These traits are selected on the basis that they aid their carrier‘s survival in the face of 
forces such as viruses and living conditions that were present in past generations or traits 
that made it more likely that one would conceive children and that their offspring would 
survive. For example, human populations living in tropical regions of Africa have 
consistently been exposed to the Malaria virus resulting in a high frequency of the HbS 
allele – a mutated variation of the Hemoglobin gene – in the population of the world 
descending from these populations (Kwiatkowski, 2005). The reason that this allele has 
been naturally selected in this particular population is that inheriting one allele of this 
genetic mutation from either parent results in greater tolerance to Malaria. However, the 
downfall for its carrier is that it might be passed on to his or her children and if the other 
  171 
parent also passes on the mutated allele, this gives rise to a condition commonly referred 
to as Sickle cell anemia. This disease is associated with serious health complications and 
can be fatal. This lesson from nature reminds us of the potential dangers involved in 
picking and choosing genetic traits. After all, we are in no better position than the forces 
that spark our population‘s evolutionary development in determining which genetic traits 
are desirable and will not be accompanied by adverse effects. It is true that we may be 
able to pick out traits that could aid our survival or successes in certain endeavours such 
as athletics but who is to say that we will not simultaneously invite defects and make 
ourselves, and for that matter, our offspring in the case of germ-line genetic engineering, 
susceptible to noxious effects? Autonomy is undoubtedly restrained in children who are 
impeded by health difficulties arising from either somatic or germ-line genetic 
engineering.    
What I am trying to accomplish through the past few paragraphs is to convince 
the reader that Tamburrini unjustifiably brushes off the plausibility and severity of health 
consequences that could accompany gene doping and what this implies for the value of 
autonomy. However, I am not at all denying that over time our understanding through 
genetic research might permit us to forge ahead with genetic engineering while avoiding 
or at least minimizing health dangers potentially associated with these alterations. 
Children & the Right to an Open Future  
 Assuming that it is true that gene doping will not yield serious side effects, let us 
examine Tamburrini‘s (2005) argument that the autonomy of gene doped children will 
not be impinged in the sense that it will reduce the individual‘s range of possible actions. 
Tamburrini argues that gene doping will not necessarily hinder people‘s autonomy by 
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depriving them of control over their own lives and future. A parent is already allowed to 
make choices that for better or worse impact his or her child‘s future directions. 
 Tamburrini claims that for the same reason that we do not disagree with education 
in general simply because a bad education could reduce a child‘s horizons, we should not 
object to gene doping because parents could use it to coerce their child into a future of 
elite sport. Furthermore, Tamburrini states that it would be hypocritical to set higher 
standards for genetic enhancement. In summary, making a child predisposed to a life of 
athletics does not necessarily entail a denial of that child‘s personal autonomy. In fact, 
Tamburrini claims that if children are made aware of the fact that they have been 
genetically pre-programmed to excel in a sport, this knowledge will empower their 
decision-making with respect to their future. Also, if a child knows that he or she has the 
strengths necessary to become an elite athlete, this could relieve him or her of anxiety 
that may come with uncertainty about one‘s future. Thus, Tamburrini concludes that 
genetically engineering a child‘s athletic ability will only add to the set of skills and 
capacities that the child has to work with and could open up an opportunity without 
necessarily eliminating others. 
As described in my first chapter, van Hilvoorde (2005) agrees with Tamburrini 
(2005) on the notion that genetic enhancement is associated with a risk of threatening an 
individual‘s autonomy rather than necessarily implicating an essential reduction in 
autonomy. However, discord between the two authors arises on the matter of the severity 
of that risk. Specifically, van Hilvoorde claims that Tamburrini inaccurately perceives the 
risk as reasonably low because he fails to recognize the enormous influential power that 
genetic engineering a child will have on directing that child‘s choice of future. According 
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to van Hilvoorde, this special influential power associated with genetic engineering is 
rooted in the fact that its changes are more fixed than the imprints left by education as it 
is relatively much easier to re-educate one‘s self than it is to reverse germ-line 
modifications that were performed at the embryonic stage of life.  
Whether this is the case or not is up for debate. It is difficult to speculate on the 
level of difficulty or whether it would even be possible to modify certain traits post-birth. 
However, I find it conceivable that characteristics that are only or only significantly 
shaped during particular developmental phases of fetuses, infants and children are 
features that are not changeable or at least not radically so later on in life. To exemplify, 
consider the following example. Humans normally have 23 pairs of chromosomes – 
structures in our cells that are made up of DNA and protein. Down Syndrome is a 
condition that results from having an extra (third) copy of the twenty-first chromosome. 
One‘s cognitive and physical development is greatly affected due to this genetic 
abnormality. Let us suppose that upon reaching adulthood, a man with Down Syndrome 
decides that he would like to alleviate himself of this condition. Assuming that it is 
theoretically and practically possible in the lifespan of this individual (or ever for that 
matter) to use genetic technology to remove the extra copy of the 21
st
 chromosome, the 
imprints left on the individual by this defect are most likely irreversible. Perhaps the only 
way to cancel out or modify the effects of Down Syndrome would be to turn back the 
hands of time and excise the third 21
st
 chromosome shortly after this person‘s conception 
if this were possible.  
Similarly, the environment and conditions in which one is reared in early years 
has an enormous impact on development such that a person with the genetic makeup for 
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tallness can still be short in adulthood if he or she was poorly nourished throughout 
childhood. This example illustrates some cases in which changes made early on are fixed. 
However, although education represents an environmental condition, as does 
nourishment, it is different from nourishment because our height only increases during a 
certain period in our lives whereas we can almost always supplement and re-educate 
ourselves. In other words, in the same way that a plant cannot be revived if it was not 
adequately watered and nourished during the early stages of development, if I start to 
consume a healthy and nutritious diet at the age of twenty-three, this cannot make up for 
a poor diet all through the years that are pivotal for height growth and make me taller. 
Thus, it is likely that effects due to changes made by our parents, whether during 
embryonic or early childhood development, cannot be altered to a significant degree by 
genetic modification.  
Additionally, the risk of reducing the range of opportunities available to 
individuals is compounded by the fact that dramatic germ-line changes could be mal-
adjusted to future conditions since they would be made without information regarding 
conditions of and thus demands on future generations.   
Also, van Hilvoorde (2005) agrees with Tamburrini (2005) regarding the 
resemblance described above between genetically engineering good athletes and early 
selection or sport specialization that occurs in elite youth athletics. However, due to 
evidence supporting the potentially harmful effects associated with the latter, van 
Hilvoorde does not identify it as an acceptable practice and thus dismisses the similarity 
as a reason to accept the genetic pre-programming of children into ideal athletes.  
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However, van Hilvoorde (2005) does not divulge the details of the types of harm 
associated with early specialization in sport for the purpose of intensive training and 
development at elite levels. Thus, there is room to go into further discussion on how early 
specialization in youth sport can be seen as an undesirable state of affairs. This will in 
turn strengthen the claim that because early specialization is analogous to gene doping in 
youth sport, this is actually a reason to reject gene doping for child athletes rather than 
excuse it from moral scrutiny.  
To elaborate, many youngsters today are essentially forced to specialize in one 
sport to which they devote all of their time and effort. This trend is likely responsible for 
the amplification in burnout experienced by child athletes. Roger Grillo, Brown 
University‘s former hockey coach and current regional manager for USA Hockey‘s 
developmental program, claims that ―burnout‖ is the root cause for drops in minor 
hockey participation (Burge, 2010). Furthermore, he partially blames overzealous parents 
who rationalize the costs associated with highly intense participation by the potential 
long-term extrinsic rewards of the sport such as securing financial beneifts through 
professional careers or college scholarships. This logic often serves as the driving force 
behind pushing a child to concentrate exclusively on one particular sport all year round.  
In addition to mental health concerns, early and intensive specialization in one 
sport without sufficient rest periods or off-seasons bears physical health consequences for 
young athletes. Permanent damage can occur when children are pushed too hard to over-
train and win while their bodies are still rapidly growing. Empirical evidence supports 
this premise as drastically high rates of musculoskeletal injuries and various other 
physical injuries are found in high performance youth sport (World Health Organization, 
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1998).                                                                              
 Considering the staggering statistics that are available, it is unsurprising that 
competitive sport is one of only a few domains remaining that have not yet implemented 
the international child rights standards and norms (David, 2005). But, as I alluded to 
earlier, the fact that all of the abovementioned adverse consequences associated with 
early specialization are implicitly condoned does not mean that we should permit all 
other similarly noxious practices in youth athletics. If anything, early specialization in 
youth sport illuminates the need to prohibit gene doping of children for performance-
enhancement purposes.  
To demonstrate further, many parents spend a fortune rearranging their lives 
geographically and economically in order to support their children‘s specialized ―careers‖ 
in sports. Young players might begin to feel an immense degree of pressure once they 
realize the emotional and financial investments that their parents make in their athletic 
endeavours. This realization might result in young players competing merely to satisfy 
their parents‘ desires for success and return for their investment. If the child has an 
unsuccessful sport‘s career, loses a particular game or even fails to carry out a single play 
to the satisfaction of the parent, this could yield deep feelings of guilt (Cumming & 
Ewing, 2002).  
Now imagine a context in which parents also invest in gene doping for their 
children. Undoubtedly, it is possible that this will result in some parents and coaches 
feeling more justified in blaming their kids for their failures. Even if parents and coaches 
do not blame children for failing to excel, gene doped children might feel excessive 
pressure to perform given that any weakness in their performance would likely be 
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attributed to a lack of effort or laziness. This could very well create anxiety problems and 
the feeling that it is virtually impossible to live up to the extremely high expectations set 
by parents, coaches, fans and teammates given that they have been genetically designed 
to succeed in sport. The child is bound to feel an enormous amount of pressure and stress 
that can be highly damaging to one‘s well being. The negative effects of these high levels 
of stress are compounded by the fact that children may very well possess insufficient 
mechanisms for coping. If one stops to consider the child‘s perspective in such high 
stress-evoking circumstances it is difficult to conceive the plausibility of a genuine joy 
for the game or self-fulfillment and other phenomenal intrinsic values that sport has to 
offer its participants.   
Still, parents might justify pushing their children into a life of elite athletics based 
on the belief that it represents an avenue through which a child can develop various 
virtues including ambition and resilience. It might also be argued that these help ensure 
productive adult living. Additionally, elite sport can promote a long-term habit of 
physical fitness. Thus, it can be argued that since a healthy lifestyle reduces one‘s risk of 
adverse health effects, which would limit participation in many activities, the right of 
children to an open future is actually enhanced by this kind of intense participation in 
sport (Russell, 2007). To achieve these benefits attached to elite levels of sport, early and 
intensive specialization in addition to genetic enhancement can be used to ensure that the 
child maintains competitiveness.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 A somewhat obvious counter-attack to the list of benefits associated with pushing 
a child to pursue success in sport is that the extent of harm imposed by pushing children 
may be inappropriate with respect to the ages of these athletes. The degree of risk could 
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exceed what is required to obtain the virtues that the abovementioned counterargument 
esteems. In addition, the habit of leading a healthy lifestyle can be gained just as well 
through intermediate or recreational levels of sport (Dixon, 2007). Additionally, at all 
levels of sport one can work on skills such as character development, stress management, 
team cooperation, problem-solving and communication skills (Martin, Dale & Jackson, 
2001; Walker, 1993). Thus, the positive skills and virtues that may be fostered through 
sport can be mastered in types of participation that do not yield negative effects 
associated with an overemphasis on winning and career advancement. So if enhancing 
the genotype of children to make them better athletes is not worth the risks of harm 
involved, are any applications of genetic enhancement defensible? Conversely, are there 
any traits of which genetic enhancement might be justified? 
Does it Matter Which Traits are Enhanced? 
Brown (2009) briefly suggests an alternative to the treatment-enhancement 
distinction that he claims can shed some light on future applications of genetic 
technology where benefits might outweigh the costs of unequal access. Brown states that 
the pursuit of enhancing general-purpose capacities that assist individuals in obtaining 
primary goods of human life could represent justified applications of the technology. 
Brown bases his argument that one cannot justify enhancing narrowly defined traits such 
as particular athletic capacities on his speculation that such practices will become futile in 
terms of generating athletic positional advantages when they become routinely practiced. 
Also in contrast to Tamburrini (2005), van Hilvoorde (2005) selectively supports 
the practice of genetically enhancing traits such as intelligence, memory or health, which 
can be identified as serving a general-purpose but opposes specific-purpose forms of 
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enhancement such as pre-programming a child to excel in sport. The difference between 
these two types of enhancement is that, as the name suggests, specific-purpose forms of 
enhancement are intrinsically linked to a clear and distinct goal. This division between 
general- and specific-purpose forms of enhancement allows van Hilvoorde to further 
illustrate the failure of Tamburrini‘s education analogy since, while education opens the 
range of options available to a child, genetic enhancement for specific athletic purposes 
more clearly threatens a child‘s right to an open future. To conclude, I agree with van 
Hilvoorde who regards pre-programming a child to excel in sport as resembling 
indoctrination more closely than education. The distinction between general- and 
specific-purpose forms of enhancement emphasizes the importance of determining the 
intention that precedes the choice of genetically engineering a child.  
Accordingly, from the perspective of autonomy, the innovation of genetic 
enhancement is morally ambiguous. However, its application and the motivations behind 
it can be profoundly worrisome. For example, an advocate of autonomy would likely 
invite the prospect of employing genetic technology for therapeutic uses such as 
alleviating Down Syndrome but would oppose governments creating super-armies to 
obliterate and oppress other nations. In sport, we already see state-run athletic programs 
in China and other nations of communist regimes that select their elite athletes at very 
young ages if they have ideal body types for a particular sport. These children are then 
separated from their families where they are cut off from the world outside of sport. 
Coaches govern their entire lives such that they are not allowed to pursue outside 
interests as all of their time is devoted to intensive training. After their athletic careers are 
over, many Chinese Olympians are required to remain at the camps to train the next 
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generation of China‘s top athletes. Without a ban against gene doping for children and 
perhaps even despite one, it is not implausible that China and other countries with similar 
state-run programs would employ these technologies in order to dominate the Olympics 
and other international sport competitions in the name of national patriotism. 
This style of coercive training is comparable to that of excessively ambitious and 
ruthless parents described earlier. To conclude, we should be concerned with permitting 
gene doping for youngsters because if overzealous parents or other authority figures are 
granted access to genetic enhancement procedures they will most likely misuse the 
technology and use it in ways that further infringe on children‘s autonomy and their right 
to an open future. This line of reasoning that I am employing adheres to Murray‘s (2009) 
third conceptualization of human nature which I endorse that views human nature as 
complex, multi-layered, to some extent limited and capable of moral and immoral 
consequences. Acknowledging our potential to do both good and evil results in assessing 
which technologies and interventions should be permitted based on whether they promote 
ethical actions or at the very least do not encourage or predispose us to perform unethical 
actions. In the ways explained above, the nature of gene doping makes it exceptionally 
likely to be used to augment the coercive practices of governments, parents and any one 
else who is in a position of authority. 
Many parents can attest to a feeling that the achievements and failures of their 
children are reflections of their own parenting abilities and skills (Hirschhorn & 
Loughead, 2000). In turn, many parents push their children to succeed so that they can 
feel better about themselves. If the child fails in an endeavour, the parent might feel like 
they have also failed as a parent. For this reason and possibly to vicariously achieve their 
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own dreams, parents might coerce their children into excessive training for a sport. This 
represents treatment of children solely as means through which they can attain their own 
personal satisfaction or pride rather than purely as ends in themselves. From a Kantian 
ethics perspective, coercing a child into early specialization in sport is unethical whether 
the sole motivation of the parent is to gain financial wealth or to achieve personal 
satisfaction in light of the child becoming a superstar athlete. Granting certain parents 
with access to genetic enhancement to be used as they see fit is immensely troubling. 
This is particularly true in the case of sport where many parents fail to acknowledge and 
dismiss a child‘s desire to terminate or diminish their degree of participation. Why 
bestow these kinds of parents with more ammunition to fuel their coercive parenting 
style? 
While parents should be able to exercise liberty when raising their children, in 
certain cases, restricting this liberty is not only acceptable but also seems to represent a 
social responsibility. This is the principle that underlies the variety of child protection 
laws in Canada and the U.S. that aim to ensure that children are nurtured in a healthy and 
abuse-free environment. Due to the abovementioned ways children‘s autonomy is 
potentially threatened by gene doping, this legal framework would likely advocate a ban 
against it in the context of youth athletics. Now that we have refuted the desirability of 
genetically designing child athletes based on coercion and autonomy, we will need to 
shift our attention to further assess the degree that autonomy is at risk if gene doping is 
used by informed and rational adult athletes. This appears to be a form of gene doping 
that would be more easily accepted by society but let us refrain from prematurely 
drawing any decisive conclusions.   
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The Case Against Perfection 
 Michael Sandel (2007) stresses the unease or resistive sentiments that many 
people feel towards human cloning or other types of biotechnology including genetic 
engineering where a child‘s characteristics can be selected by his or her parents. In his 
book, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering, Sandel 
takes on the arduous task of attempting to articulate why we are often troubled by the 
thought of genetic engineering for enhancement of our capacities and traits such as 
athleticism. This permits us to discern whether these apprehensions are justified. Sandel 
begins by addressing the argument I have supported above against these technological 
applications that stipulates that the autonomy of genetically altered children is violated. 
Inherent in this argument is a suspicion that the changes made to these ―designer babies‖ 
channel them into particular directions in life versus other pathways and therefore 
interfere with their right to an open future.  
Sandel contests this view by pointing out two major problems with it. The first is 
based on the realization that in the event that we are left genetically unaltered, as is 
presently the case, our life decisions are still subject to biases due to our ―natural‖ genetic 
endowments. For example, a boy who is born with a tremendous propensity and ability to 
work with his hands might feel compelled to take up work in an area that capitalizes on 
this strength such as carpentry or dental surgery. I do not find this to weigh heavily on the 
argument I advocated above because I find there to be a difference between our strengths 
and weaknesses being dictated by nature and by some other person such as a parent. As 
explained earlier, a parent‘s decision to genetically enhance a child‘s athleticism can be 
attached to coercive intentions and motivations that not only would be accompanied by 
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insisting that the child pursues elite levels of the sport but also that he or she succeeds 
and excels in it. If genetically enhanced children fail to live up to their parents‘ 
expectations, this can only lead to self-directed blame and guilt in children since there are 
technically no physiological barriers preventing their success. In this way, the notion of 
―wasted talents‖ takes on a whole new meaning. 
The second issue that Sandel takes up with respect to our fear of genetic 
engineering and other biotechnologies related to violations of autonomy is the fact that 
many people still would be concerned with adults employing these gene-altering 
technologies on themselves. Although it might be true that the disquiet we feel regarding 
the prospect of these technologies is less if we consider circumstances where only adults 
are able to employ them on their own somatic (non-hereditary) cells, our uneasiness does 
not vanish altogether. Sandel claims that what follows logically from this premise points 
to the fact that infringements on autonomy cannot fully explain the unrest we feel 
towards the potential advent of genetically engineering humans for performance-
enhancement in sport or other purposes. Sandel (2007) claims that the trepidation with 
which we feel we should approach these human practices stems from sources that are 
deeper than notions of fairness, autonomy and human rights, which I still believe are 
clearly at play in this issue. In contrast to Sandel, I contend that even in adult use of gene 
doping, autonomy can be restrained as some competitors might feel coerced to engage in 
potentially dangerous practices just to remain competitive.  
However, there are certainly weaknesses in this argument that proscribe us from 
claiming that it represents sufficient grounds for a ban on gene doping. For one, an 
abundance of cases currently exist where pressure to succeed by using potentially 
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harmful means does not evoke feelings that we need to instate general prohibitions on 
these practices. Consider how cosmetic surgery for aesthetic reasons is legal for adults. 
There is no doubt that physical appearance plays a significant role in the likelihood of 
one‘s success in many areas of work including modeling, acting and musical careers. In 
addition, employers within other lines of work such as sales value external appearance 
although less obviously. So when some individuals take up these procedures to enhance 
their appearance, this could result in a coercive environment that pressures others to do 
the same in order to remain competitive in their fields or industries. However, although 
cosmetic surgery is tied to health risks, it remains an option that is open to competent 
rational adults. Furthermore, at least to my knowledge, there is not a huge demand to 
remove it from the range of practices available to adults. Thus, I believe that this example 
supports Sandel‘s claim that infringements on autonomy cannot fully explain the unrest 
the public feels towards the potential advent of genetically engineering humans for 
performance-enhancement in sport.   
  Sandel also alleges that the unprecedented rate at which science and technology 
is advancing exceeds the current progress in our moral understanding. He believes that:  
To grapple with the ethics of enhancement, we need to confront questions largely 
lost from view in the modern world – questions about the moral status of nature, 
and about the proper stance of human beings toward the given world. Since these 
questions verge on theology, modern philosophers and political theorists tend to 
shrink from them. But our new powers of biotechnology make them unavoidable. 
(pp. 9-10)  
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Perhaps this pinpoints the difficulty that faces us in attempting to rationalize our 
feelings that gene doping is somehow against our better judgment. More plainly, Sandel 
argues that we must ask certain types of questions to locate the underlying issue present 
in genetic enhancement. Specifically, such questions might include whether altering our 
genes through scientific techniques makes us perceive ourselves as less ―human.‖ A 
response to this question would require inferring which aspects of humanity we feel are 
threatened by these technologies and what sorts of consequences are yielded by these 
shifts in our self-understanding. These are the sorts of challenging moral questions I will 
be exploring in my following subsection on what it means to be human. 
Human Value 
Does Gene Doping Bolster or Reduce Human Agency? 
In the conclusion of Pound‘s speech at the Banbury Workshop (as cited in 
Schneider & Friedmann, 2006), he boldly implies that a risk of dehumanizing sport is 
associated with gene doping and those who would employ genetic engineering for the 
sport-specific purpose of performance-enhancement can be charged with perverting the 
human condition. However, Pound does not corroborate these allegations with any 
reasoning on the matter in his speech. To support the claim that gene-doping athletes 
corrupt the human condition, he might have referred to a conceptualization of humanity 
that would raise objections to genetically tinkering with our athletic capacities. This is 
precisely what we will be concerned with in the third dimension of this analysis of gene 
doping that deals with potential consequential changes to the self-understanding of the 
human race. In this regard, Sandel‘s (2007) arguments are highly relevant and provide 
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valuable insight about the implications of how gene doping might affect humanness for 
us to consider and analyze.  
 Sandel (2007) evaluates authorship for our own actions whether they bring us 
praise or condemnation and control over the way we are as aspects of humanity that 
might be threatened by genetic enhancement. As he describes, due to technological 
enhancement procedures, we might feel detached or less inclined to take responsibility 
for our capacities, skills, actions and achievements. If this is the case, admiration of 
athletes might also be affected since admiration and responsibility go hand in hand. For 
example, we are much more impressed by successful business tycoons if they have 
emerged out of poverty by earning their wealth due to their own ingenuity and choices 
than if they started out with family money and wealthy parents with connections that 
advantaged them in ways crucial to their success. Specifically, if genetic enhancement 
allows an athlete to reach the same level without as much effort, the admiration that we 
feel towards that same athlete appreciably diminishes and is possibly displaced to the 
practitioner that performs the procedure or the scientist that devises it. In this sense, what 
we find troubling about gene doping may be that an aspect of humanity is lost, namely 
human agency over our own achievements. Such a concept of humanity seems to also 
conflict with notions of moral responsibility in the sense that it might become less 
applicable to our actions in such a reduced human agency context.  
 But Sandel (2007) does not rest any of his arguments against genetic enhancement 
on human agency being lost or that effort becomes less important for us to excel in our 
pursuits. I believe that Sandel‘s choice to steer clear of this conventional argument used 
to support the ban on gene doping and traditional performance-enhancement practices is a 
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wise move because one cannot reasonably assert that gene doping will substitute for or 
even reduce the amount of effort required by athletes if nearly every athlete has access to 
this technology. As I explained in my critique of Tamburrini‘s (2007) main argument in 
favor of gene doping, it is much more likely that genetic enhancement will simply 
augment the performance level of all users making such practices futile in terms of 
generating athletic positional advantages when they become routinely practiced. This 
seems to be the case for genetically enhancing any specific-purpose traits to incur relative 
competitive advantages in particular endeavours where these measures are prevalently 
used. It is certainly not the case that after undergoing genetic enhancement, an athlete can 
simply stop or even reduce the amount of practicing and training or effort exerted during 
games or contests. If all the other cyclists, runners or swimmers are genetically enhanced, 
athletes in these sports essentially add genetic enhancement to their repertoires and 
continue to do whatever they can to continue to improve and preserve their 
competitiveness.  
This is analogous to the job market where each generation seems to require 
evermore education increasing the average level of education attained. Today, new 
graduates of undergraduate studies are unable to secure jobs that their parents or 
grandparents were able to obtain with nothing more than a high school diploma. 
Moreover, being highly educated is no longer necessarily a dependable path to a highly 
regarded or sought after job. Just as the cyclists, runners and swimmers described above 
would undergo genetic enhancement along with doing everything else they can to 
improve their skills and abilities, young people must still obtain an education while 
enhancing their resumes with work experience, unique skills and extracurricular as well 
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as volunteer activities. Would we say that human agency over or effort required in one‘s 
future performance in a job is reduced when one obtains a university education? 
Similarly, are graduates less deserving of admiration in the workplace or should some of 
that admiration be displaced to the professors, university presidents, deans and others that 
helped the students cultivate their skills, abilities and knowledge base? These rhetorical 
questions are meant to expose the absurdity of claiming that a certain degree of human 
agency is lost when scientists and genetic therapists tinker with our genotypes if genetic 
enhancement becomes an integral component to athletics. Perhaps some dissimilarity 
between education and genetic enhancement can be highlighted that weakens this 
analogy but even so I do not think that any such critique can convince us that human 
agency over one‘s athletic performance is reduced in any way at least in a context of 
sport where genetic enhancement has become standard.   
In fact, Sandel (2007) feels that the major issue with genetic enhancement is that 
we in turn would have too much control over reshaping our nature to serve our desired 
ends. McNamee (2007) defends his position against transhumanism based on the same 
belief, namely that it would result in humans having an excessively high degree of 
control over humanity based on preferences regarding the traits that should be modified. 
Furthermore, he asserts that these preferences would be inescapably linked to normative 
judgments. To reiterate, McNamee insists that having the genetic basis of life at our 
disposal through biotechnology will initiate a new notion of what it means to be human. 
However, beyond the fact that we would understand the new human nature less than the 
present one as it would be less familiar perhaps, he fails to explain why we would be 
worse off in a world with this new kind of human nature. Thus, we must ask why the new 
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concept of humanity resulting from hyper-control should be viewed as morally suspect or 
something humanity ought to try and avoid. 
What is Wrong with Hyper-control? The Abolishment of Life’s Giftedness 
 Sandel (2007) foresees that this amplified degree of control may very well result 
in a depreciation of the ―gifted character of human powers and achievements‖ (p. 45). 
This means that we would fail to appreciate something about humanity that Sandel claims 
is worth protecting: the fact that our lives are gifts and that all of our strengths and 
capacities even if we dedicate our lives to training and developing them are never fully 
ours. In addition, appreciating that life is a gift restricts us from having everything at our 
disposal to be sculpted and reshaped to suit our own desires and preferences. 
Critics might claim that viewing life as a gift requires an assumption that there is 
a giver which appears to presuppose a belief in God. The gifted quality of life appears to 
possess a religious connotation but Sandel persuasively argues that it is still seen as 
significant and meaningful through a secular lens. Sandel‘s response is based on the idea 
that the source of ―the gift of life‖ need not be God. This is exemplified through the 
proverbial descriptions of people‘s musical, athletic or other kinds of talents as ―gifts.‖ 
This term is used and understood by non-believers and believers in God alike because 
while the source of the gift could be God, it could also be conceived to be nature or 
simply fortune. No matter the source, recognition of the gifted quality of life demands a 
view of the world and all creatures within it including ourselves as more than just 
instruments to be exploited for our purposes. For instance, a sense of life‘s giftedness 
being lost in the case of adults choosing their own genotypes might lead to the notion that 
because a person is ―self-made,‖ he or she does not owe anything to any one. A purely 
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instrumental view of other people and creatures shows disrespect for life in the world in 
which we dwell.   
 The gifted character of human life, powers and achievements can also be 
described from the perspective of parents in the context of embryonic or early genetic 
enhancement. Currently, parents must accept that their children are born with 
unpredictable and largely unalterable features. Sandel (2007) asserts that with this comes 
the recognition that children are not merely ―products of our will‖ or ―instruments of our 
ambition‖ (p. 45). If parents start engineering their children to enhance their athletic 
prowess or other traits, Sandel argues that this will change the way parents view their 
children. A parent who designs his or her own child assumes a different role in the child‘s 
life that predisposes him or her to an attitude that makes unconditional love and 
acceptance for the child as he or she is outdated or irrelevant. Additionally, in an 
environment of bioengineering children, parents take on greater responsibility over their 
children such that they might be blamed and derided for not doing all they can to aid their 
children‘s future success. The failure to see children as gifts disarms parents of humility 
and promotes an excessive drive for mastery and control. Thus, both parents and children 
will play different roles in each other‘s lives that in turn create a shift in the relationship 
between children and their parents.  
 Although Sandel (2007) admits that a certain degree of directing one‘s child is an 
obligation that accompanies parenting, he notes that patterns of ―hyper-parenting‖ in 
modern society are highly evident and morally problematic. As is evident by my 
discussion on early specialization and intensive training in the context of autonomy and 
the child‘s right to an open future, I whole-heartedly agree with that statement. Even if it 
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is potentially harmful or outlawed, the idea that some parents will still use enhancement 
procedures on their children is not at all far-fetched. A case that has recently captured the 
headlines highlights this unfortunate fact all too clearly. Child Protective Services 
removed an eight-year old girl in California from her mother‘s custody after the mother 
admitted to injecting her daughter‘s face with Botox to enhance her appearance for 
beauty pageants (Stanley, 2011). When the young girl was interviewed along with her 
mother, she stated that she has gotten accustomed to the pain resulting from the injections 
and that she did not know why she was having them. But, apparently after being coaxed 
by her mother during the interview, she claimed that she has wrinkles that she does not 
think are nice. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration advises against Botox injections 
for any one under the age of 18 and even then requires a doctor‘s prescription and 
supervision under California state law (Stanley, 2011). I believe that Sandel is right to 
stress that failing to view life as a gift leads to practices such as this which are overly 
dominating and mastery-oriented. Let us more thoroughly consider the probable 
consequences of failing to recognize life as a gift.  
What is Wrong with the Abolishment of Recognizing Life as a Gift? 
 Sandel (2007) holds that three main features of human morality are affected by 
the failure to recognize life as a gift. These features are humility, responsibility and 
solidarity. Right now, sympathy for others is prevalent in many cases because we know 
that some of our features are unalterable. We have a greater propensity to feel sorry for 
others when circumstances they do not choose leads to their suffering. For example, we 
feel more sympathetic to a person who‘s entire house and belongings are swallowed up 
and destroyed by flames if the fire was caused by a forest fire or an airplane crashing into 
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it than if the person was juggling with flaming batons with no prior practice or training. 
Sympathy would be diminished by genetically engineering children because the parents 
could then simply modify undesirable traits that may disadvantage children in their lives 
and future. Therefore the world would become less sympathetic, hospitable and tolerant 
of or open to people‘s weaknesses. In addition, humility or humbling one‘s self also 
decreases in adults practicing genetic self-improvement because they would come to feel 
more power over their own natures and thus less indebted to some other source whether it 
is nature, fortune or God.  
Thus, being granted more control over our genetic traits is accompanied by a 
corresponding rise in responsibility that we necessarily assume over these features, our 
actions, achievements and failures (Sandel, 2007). The reduction in the role that we 
perceive is played by God, nature or luck in this life means that we become much more 
liable not only for our strengths but also for our weaknesses. For instance, Sandel states 
that a coach can now legitimately be upset with a basketball player for being out of 
position but when genetic engineering is made accessible, the player or his or her parents 
might be blamed for the player‘s failure to be sufficiently tall or have the leg jumping 
power to reach a ball early enough to successfully retrieve and make a rebound. If we 
look around us, people seem to act in ways that display an implicit link between the 
degree of control or the extent that an individual can change an aspect of themselves or 
their children and the amount of responsibility or blame that we think we are entitled to 
attributing to that person. To this effect, teammates in Major League Baseball (MLB) 
already blame each other for not using amphetamines or other stimulants during games 
(Sandel, 2007). Furthermore, because a fetus carrying Down syndrome can now be 
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detected during pregnancy and aborted, parents of babies now born with the condition 
often face the wrath of judgment and disparagement from others imposing their own 
normative opinions on what should have been done.  
The third feature of humanity that Sandel (2007) claims will be altered by the 
presence of genetic engineering our traits is solidarity. Because we will have greater 
control and thus responsibility over our fates, Sandel argues that we will also feel less 
inclined to act in solidarity with those who are less fortunate than us. To illustrate, he 
explains how the reason that people feel the need to purchase insurance is the 
unpredictable nature of our lives. In order to profit, insurance companies depend on 
people who will never submit a costly claim. Very healthy people continue to insure 
themselves because of the element of chance that always leaves them vulnerable to a 
deteriorating state of health. For this reason, the healthy segments of the population end 
up voluntarily grouping their resources with the comparatively unhealthy people. In this 
respect, solidarity is promoted not out of obligation to help the less fortunate but to 
heighten one‘s own security. In a world where people can genetically enhance themselves 
such that their risk factors for diseases are greatly minimized, people will feel less 
vulnerable and in control of their fates. Sandel holds that these groups of healthy 
individuals will probably opt out of insurance causing premiums to explode for the 
genetically weak. In my opinion, this example is one of Sandel‘s weaker ones as motor 
vehicle or other kinds of accidents and natural disasters would likely still maintain a 
certain degree of insecurity about one‘s health and future albeit a lesser amount of 
uncertainty would resound. 
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More deeply still, with the option of genetically modifying ourselves, empathy 
and other moral feelings that are required for solidarity to exist in society will be much 
more difficult to garner (Sandel, 2007). When we see each other and ourselves as the 
authors or designers of our own genetic features and traits we will likely feel less 
compelled to help the least advantaged groups of society. On the other hand, when our 
natural talents are perceived at least partially to be due to God or nature, there is more of 
a communitarian sentiment that motivates us to help or minimally sympathize with those 
who at no fault of their own happen to be granted the ―short end of the stick‖ or ―losing 
deck of cards in the game of life.‖ This is because people born with advantages typically 
recognize that they could have just as easily inherited characteristics or underprivileged 
circumstances that would act as barriers to their success and acquisition of a good life.  
The Connection Between Human Nature & Fairness 
In Sandel‘s (2007) own words,  
Here, then, is the connection between solidarity and giftedness: A lively sense of 
the contingency of our gifts – an awareness that none of us is wholly responsible 
for his or her success – saves a meritocratic society from sliding into the smug 
assumption that success is the crown of virtue, that the rich are rich because they 
are more deserving than the poor. (p. 91)   
At first glance, it seems that the value of fairness and our understanding of human 
nature have very little in common. Nonetheless, herein lies the connection that I find 
particularly striking between Rawls‘s Difference Principle and Sandel‘s (2007) argument 
that gene doping relinquishes our recognition of life as a gift. As Sandel describes, we 
currently do not view our talents as entirely ours and due to our own doing to be 
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exploited solely for our whims and desires. Yet, this perception would change if we were 
all to acquire the ability to alter our innate capacities. If we lose the notion of life as a 
gift, we will feel less compelled to act in accordance with Rawls‘s DP that professes that 
it is only fair to benefit from our own natural talents such as intelligence if the least 
advantaged of society also benefit in some way as well. After all, if genetic technology is 
accessible to all persons regardless of socio-economic or other demographic traits besides 
being below the age of maturity, we will attribute people‘s genotypic ―weaknesses‖ as 
features for which they can be rightfully blamed since they have chosen not to ameliorate 
these shortcomings. In a world where fortune and prosperity are no longer drastically 
influenced by the genetic lottery due to genetic modification, the urgency to adhere to the 
DP is extinguished. More broadly, the notion of every person for him or herself is 
promoted at the expense of solidarity that unites communities.      
Furthermore, the notion of empathy allows us to draw a link between fairness and 
the conception of what it means to be human in terms of what is at danger due to genetic 
enhancement. Recall from the previous chapter‘s section on fairness, Rawls‘s (1958) 
affirmation that acting fairly by constraining one‘s actions is a kind of conduct that shows 
empathy or an individual‘s acknowledgment of others as persons sharing similar feelings 
and interests. Similarly, the duty of fair play revolves around the mutual acknowledgment 
of the aims and interests of others involved in the practice and ultimately displays 
recognition of other individuals as persons. Based on this reasoning, Rawls asserts that, in 
general, recognizing prima facie duties including fair play as well as accepting principles 
of justice depicts one‘s treatment of others as persons with similar interests, capacities 
and feelings. For example, one might abide by the rules of a game because of recognition 
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that others want the same thing he or she does, namely that fellow contestants follow the 
rules.  
Thus, a loss of the gifted sense of life might lead to a failure to relate to or feel 
less empathetic toward others. This would likely lead to a view of others either as 
impediments or tools we can use for our success which would probably eliminate a great 
deal of cooperation that is currently in practice. In turn, this could also produce a decline 
in acts of sympathy, compassion and instances of acting fairly toward others such as our 
opponents in sport or any other domain. This relies on an assumption, which I do not find 
contentious, that the manner in which persons treats others often reveals how they view 
them since the manner in which persons view others affects the way they treat them. So, 
where genetically engineering our traits is possible it could lead to people perceiving 
others less so as fellow persons with similar feelings and more so as obstacles that stand 
in the way of acquiring their own desires. Hence, if I view others in this way and also 
believe that I am self-made and thus do not owe anything to anyone, I will likely fail to 
cooperate with others and treat them unfairly.  
This treatment and view of persons that is promoted by genetic enhancement is 
greatly at variance with the central objective of decision-making in pragmatic ethics that 
Schermer and Keulartz (2003) affirm is the promotion of what leads to peaceful and 
cooperative living and working together. This objective is valued in pragmatic ethics 
because these conditions foster productivity in society. To be consistent with the version 
of pragmatic ethics I am applying, an outcome that conflicts with our harmonious living 
and working together should alarm us as we consider the implications and social 
problems associated with the evolution of society with technology.  
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A Critique of Sandel’s Case Against Perfection 
Dov Fox (2008) reviews The Case Against Perfection (2007) and points out main 
areas in Sandel‘s arguments that he believes are worthy of further inspection. First, Fox 
notes that Sandel clearly advocates the use of technological interventions in therapeutic 
cases where pain is reduced or a disease or condition is fixed. Thus, all of his concerns 
with genetic technology are selectively targeted at genetic enhancement uses. For 
instance, he would not hold the use of genetic therapy to repair the genetic source of a 
disease to be morally problematic. But Fox highlights several cases such as extreme life 
extension, aborting fetuses possessing Down Syndrome genes and repairing genes that 
give rise to healthy yet abnormal traits including cleft palate and extreme shyness on 
which Sandel leaves the reader unable to predict his stance. Fox holds that Sandel fails to 
provide us with his thoughts on which if any innovations that would enhance individuals 
beyond a status of ―normal health‖ should be permitted, let alone a procedural principle 
that we can follow to make our own evaluations. Fox ends his critique of this aspect of 
Sandel‘s book by asserting that this is a point of strength rather than weakness. Because 
the enhancement technologies with which Sandel is most concerned are not currently 
available, Fox accepts Sandel‘s ambiguity in this area because of constraints on making 
claims that surpass hypotheses. However, one can assume another angle to this critique 
and infer that the reason that Sandel‘s position fails to prescribe whether some concrete 
cases are acceptable or not is that it requires an ability to discern the line between 
enhancement and therapy but he fails to acknowledge the difficulty in drawing the line 
between these two concepts and does not explain why enhancement but not therapy 
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destroys our current self-understanding, solidarity, humility or heightens our perceived 
responsibility.  
Jeungst (2009) and other scholars attempt to articulate a conceptual difference 
between ―treatment‖ and ―enhancement.‖ I have already briefly outlined literature on this 
distinction in my justification of a delimitation of my thesis that excludes the strict use of 
bioethics values from my ethical analysis. However, in an attempt to critique the effects 
of Sandel‘s glossing over this distinction, I will review and assess more extensively 
Jeungst‘s exploration of the line between treatment and enhancement 
To reiterate, Jeungst (2009) outlines three main orientations of understanding the 
distinction between enhancement and therapy that might be used for the purpose of 
deliberating the acceptability of gene doping. Depending on which of these views Sandel 
holds, particular practices he deems acceptable through his advocacy of therapeutic uses 
of biotechnology could be very different and might even include genetic ―enhancement‖ 
upon further inspection. 
Jeungst (2009) begins by exploring the enhancement versus treatment distinction 
from a biomedical ethics perspective. This theoretical lens defines enhancement as the 
improvement of functions beyond which is required to maintain or restore good health. 
The first orientation draws the line in terms of the appropriate scope of medical practice 
as described by the professional standard of care as alleviating suffering. According to 
this view, ―treatment‖ would refer to any intervention that falls within the medical 
profession‘s domain whereas enhancement does not. Genetically engineering athletes 
elevates capacities well above that which is required to assuage suffering. The problem 
here is that some might argue that the psychological suffering of certain athletes who 
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otherwise might never be able to attain their dreams of competing at the elite level can be 
alleviated through genetic enhancement. This argument mirrors the line of reasoning used 
by those responding to the claim that cosmetic surgery in so far as it is performed for 
aesthetic as opposed to corrective or restorative reasons is beyond the scope of medicine. 
It can be argued that cosmetic surgery is within the medical profession‘s domain because 
it alleviates psychological suffering associated with one‘s physical appearance failing to 
live up to societal standards of attractiveness. So if we are to accept aesthetic cosmetic 
surgery as a legitimate branch of medicine for this reason, why not accept genetic 
enhancement as well?  
Perhaps one might reject this argument for both these practices by demanding that 
it is more suitable from a medical perspective to have a psychiatrist treat the underlying 
psychological issues. Otherwise, where do we draw the line? Is it appropriate for a family 
doctor to prescribe a makeover to a patient who is dissatisfied with his or her appearance? 
This seems ridiculous but what difference if any exists between the purpose of a 
makeover and a cosmetic surgery operation for aesthetic reasons? Physicians certainly 
can still counsel patients who are suffering from distress and low self-esteem due to their 
failures to measure up to either aesthetic or athletic standards just not by simply masking 
their insecurities with technical procedures that use up valuable medical resources. This 
might explain why health insurance does not cover cosmetic surgery for non-corrective 
purposes.   
On the other hand, Jeungst‘s (2009) second account of the treatment-enhancement 
distinction draws upon the level of medical care needed to maintain a ―normal‖ range of 
opportunities that are available to an individual based on the typical capacities associated 
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with that individual‘s demographic. In this regard, augmenting an individual‘s functional 
capacities above that person‘s normal range could be deemed as enhancement and thus 
medically unnecessary. This can be demonstrated in the case of gene doping that serves 
athletes with functional capacities that are already in the optimal range.  
But what about if we live in a world where genetic enhancement is already widely 
practiced? Let us assume that we still decide to stick with this rule of thumb to determine 
which interventions represent forms of therapy versus enhancement. Given that the 
normal range of capacities for a person‘s demographic would be subject to elevation, 
gene doping for some individuals below this new and higher average level of athletic 
prowess could be considered to be therapy. 
Alternatively, the third manner in which Jeungst (2009) considers the delineation 
of enhancement from treatment describes the former as interventions where no 
pathologies are present. An objection could be raised against the utility of this as well the 
two abovementioned approaches to understanding the treatment-enhancement distinction 
for the purpose of delegating which practices ought to be condoned in sport. Specifically, 
it can be argued that the necessary goal of medicine is not merely the relief of suffering 
but is actually the promotion of health in which case augmenting an individual‘s 
functional capacities above that person‘s normal range, sports medicine practices and 
interventions occurring where no pathology is present can all be considered within the 
scope of medicine and as it follows forms of treatment. On a similar note, gene doping in 
sport could be depicted as treatment if it is framed as a form of prevention for elite 
athletes reverting back to the normal range of functional capacities.  
  201 
I agree with Edwards and McNamee (2006) when they address this objection and 
dismiss it as too permissive because accepting it would require the re-categorization of 
many practices as ―medical‖ such as tutors who could serve to enhance the capacity of 
their pupils to materialize their own desired ends but clearly not to alleviate suffering in a 
medical sense.  
Similarly, Morgan (2009) initially considers Jeungst‘s (2009) third understanding 
of the treatment-enhancement distinction and agrees with the claim made earlier by 
Jeungst as well as Edwards and McNamee (2006) that such an interpretation of this 
distinction is undesirable because it would result in too many practices being deemed as 
forms of treatment. In my introductory chapter, I stated that it appears to make the most 
sense to categorize the particular practices of sports medicine that fail to aim to alleviate 
suffering, which in the future could include gene doping, as types of enhancement as 
opposed to treatment. But does locating the difference between treatment and 
enhancement even allow us to determine which medical technologies are acceptable in 
sport? 
I believe that appealing to a distinction between acceptable and non-acceptable 
forms of enhancement is more appropriate than merely claiming that any practice giving 
rise to enhancement is unacceptable. From this perspective, I think that we can justify 
accepting genetic engineering of general-purpose traits outside of sport and innovations 
in sport that highlight rather than obfuscate the essential skills that the game tests as 
described earlier in my section on fairness. As will be explained in the succeeding 
paragraph, Brown would be supportive of my views. 
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Brown (2009) speculates whether the costs of unequal access outweigh the 
potential benefits that may be associated with enhancement of certain human capacities. 
On the surface, it seems much easier to justify advancing genetic technology for the 
purpose of treatment as opposed to enhancement. Brown challenges this assumption 
when he briefly illuminates how difficult it truly is to establish a basic state of health 
beyond which efforts to advance one‘s condition could be deemed as forms of 
enhancement. He also interjects that, even if we could establish this baseline, there seems 
to be no convincing argument against working to raise this basic level of health. 
Secondly, some modern medical practices do not clearly fall into forms of treatment. For 
example, vaccinations work by enhancing human capacities that serve to prevent disease 
and suffering. This function hugs the line between treatment and enhancement. 
Moreover, virtually all advancements in equipment or new forms of training or 
techniques in sport are intended to enhance the performance of athletes. Thus, at least 
some forms of enhancement must be acceptable in sport. For this reason, a cogent 
argument for or against a technological innovation in sport must be based on more than a 
mere treatment-enhancement distinction.     
I do not believe that we should avoid speculating on the probable consequences 
because they merely lead to hypothetical statements concerning how to regulate or 
approach prospective technologies and apparently Sandel agrees as well. Fox is too hasty 
to assert that Sandel does not explicate which if any innovations that enhance individuals 
beyond normal health ought to be accepted or how we can go about determining this. 
What Fox misses in his assessment of Sandel‘s arguments is the segment in which Sandel 
targets sport and distinguishes between acceptable and corruptive technological 
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implications. Sandel bases the method that he advocates for determining acceptable 
innovations on how they impact the essential features of the sport in question. This is the 
same approach that I advocated previously (see p. 144).  
While I agree with this technique to identify acceptable forms of enhancement, I 
believe it can also be supplemented by the already explained distinction between general 
versus specific-purpose traits. Brown (2009) suggests an alternate to the treatment-
enhancement distinction that he claims can shed some light on future applications of 
genetic technology where benefits might outweigh the costs of unequal access. As 
explained in my first chapter, Brown recognizes the pursuit of enhancing general-purpose 
capacities that assist individuals in obtaining primary goods of human life as justified 
applications of the technology.  
 Brown (2009) concludes by asserting that the essence of sport is performance 
enhancement and thereby cautions against discontinuing all struggles to improve the 
ranges of human capabilities if they adhere to reasonable standards of safety. Brown 
emphasizes that uncertainty in the future means that there is no clear case for undertaking 
or evading the pursuit of perfection. He claims that a genetically enhanced future could 
hold the key to alleviating many current biological and social conditions at least as easily 
as it could give way to endangering our sense of community due to biotechnological 
transformations of human nature. Brown recognizes that it is impossible to know exactly 
which abilities and traits will be beneficial to our descendents and what risks of harm 
they may involve but he refuses to let our uncertainties and fears paralyze us from 
attempting to better our selves and our children. With that said however, unlike Murray 
(2009), Brown urges us to try and avoid both somatic and germ-line forms of genetic 
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enhancement in sport. His warning against both types of genetic enhancement is based on 
the previously described future futility in enhancing narrowly defined or ―specific-
purpose‖ traits. His specific case against enhancing germ-line features is based on the 
high risk of harm that is potentially linked to genetic technologies for athletic purposes 
due to our meddling with the future of our children and possibly the future of their 
successors despite the fact that we are not omniscient beings.   
Brown (2009) foresees new ranges of talent and capacities amongst athletes and 
in turn a need to adapt sports such that they sufficiently challenge the capacities of 
participants. He also predicts changes in our admiration of the feats of athletes. Despite 
these changes that Brown predicts, he maintains that sport will continue to preserve its 
ability to showcase the best aspects of our developing natures and might even 
demonstrate better occasions of competition due to more fairly distributed talents and 
capacities relative to the current genetic lottery. Thus, just like Murray (2009), he 
optimistically anticipates the future of sport.  
Specifically, Murray (2009) signifies sport as an ideal avenue through which 
humanness can be publicly expressed. In particular, athletes can strive for peak 
performances that demonstrate their own upper human limits in terms of moral virtues 
such as dedication and cooperation as well as their natural physical capacities that are 
sharpened through training and practice.  
Enhanced & Un-enhanced Human Beings Living Together   
My pragmatic theoretical approach focuses on the implications of the public 
perceiving gene-doping athletes as less human whether or not gene-doping athletes are 
actually less human than their un-enhanced counterparts. Similarly, it is important to 
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question whether genetically enhanced humans will view themselves as superior in 
relation to the un-enhanced population of humans or vice versa. As has been argued, the 
products of genetic enhancement might be so different than the current human race that 
they appear to comprise an entirely new subspecies of human beings. It is feared that this 
will create conditions that make un-enhanced persons vulnerable to domination and 
oppression by the ―superhumans‖ initiated by gene doping. While perceived supremacy is 
undoubtedly worrisome, there are ways that we can deter the disastrous outcomes that 
can result from such perceptions initiated by genetic engineering.   
Thus, I do not agree that the subspecies argument successfully dissuades us 
against genetic enhancement. There is and always will be a wide array of characteristics 
based on which humans categorize themselves including ethnicity, race, geographical 
region, nationality, levels of fitness, profession and phenotypic traits that are influenced 
by one‘s genotype. The chance always exists that one or a combination of these 
characteristics can be used as a basis for promoting the supremacy of one group and 
consequently the inferiority of others. In fact, events in history can serve as testaments to 
the fact that the human mind can be infiltrated by the belief that we are better or worse 
than others because we possess one trait or another. Here, it seems appropriate to point to 
disgraceful events that stain humanity‘s past including but not limited to the advocacy of 
the Aryan race by the Nazi political regime, slavery of persons of African descent, the 
apartheid regime in South Africa, and racial segregation and discriminatory laws in the 
United States. These examples originating from perceptions of supremacy are not 
confined to our past; genocides and oppression of ethnic groups as well as the failure to 
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recognize females as persons who deserve full rights still exist in modernity in certain 
places around the world.    
Nevertheless, laws and institutions that do not require sameness in people‘s 
abilities and characteristics have been developed in order to negate these morally 
abhorrent inclinations of certain groups oppressing others (Bostrom, 2003). Modern 
society consists of people possessing a wide range of physical and cognitive capacities 
and individuals on the higher end of the spectrum of abilities are able to live 
harmoniously with those on the lower end. Merely because the upper-end of this 
spectrum will be higher due to genetic enhancement does not imply a greater likelihood 
that one group will be made submissive to persons with highly enhanced capacities. 
Regardless of the presence of genetic enhancement, it is the mentality that is cultivated 
within society regarding the perceived superiority of one group of persons that 
determines whether that group will decide to suppress others. For the same reason that a 
certain region in the world should not aim to obstruct immigration of individuals 
belonging to certain ethnic groups because they are perceived as drastically different than 
the current locals on the premise that this could spur clashes with the native population, 
we should not aim to preclude the development or enhancement of traits. It is certainly a 
possibility that one group will unite with one another and enslave or attempt to suppress 
the other based on their differences but we should focus on bolstering understanding and 
knowledge among each other instead of striving for conformity and homogeny.   
Of course, less extreme social issues than genocide or slavery such as 
stigmatization might emerge from genetically enhanced persons in sport or other 
domains. To prevent these concerns from materializing, Bostrom (2003) suggests 
  207 
preventative measures such as nurturing a more tolerant and accepting society and 
strengthening institutions at international levels that aim to protect human rights instead 
of an outright prohibition against genetic enhancement. Furthermore, Bostrom briefly 
describes avenues through which the abovementioned institutions can be fortified, 
namely enforcing solid democratic constitutions and international laws.  
Thus, principles of justice can be maintained since, as is presently the case, they 
assist cooperation so that we can live with one another. Society has been characterized by 
Rawls (as cited in Lindsay, 2005) as being founded on a condition of moderate scarcity in 
that we need to work with others in order to maximally benefit from resources. 
According to Lindsay (2005), enforcing principles of justice is necessary because people 
do not always act in accordance to fairness or pass up goods to those who are more 
deserving than themselves. On the other hand, the fact that justice is an effective tool 
used by society reveals that most people feel at least some empathy.    
To conclude, while I cannot emphatically deny the possibility that genetically 
enhanced ―superhuman‖ athletes will collude with one another and suppress un-enhanced 
persons or that stigmatization of enhanced or un-enhanced persons might occur, these 
risks are unsatisfactory reasons for banning genetic means of performance-enhancement. 
My rationale is that uniform and virtually identical human populations are obviously not 
necessary for harmonious societies in contrast to tolerance, empathy and acceptance. I 
would like to reiterate the notion that empathy – the force that ultimately compels us to 
promote acts of fairness and justice – is diminished in a world where biotechnology is at 
every one‘s disposal to ameliorate strengths and repair our perceived weaknesses. 
Perhaps this genetically enhanced society of the future will decide that principles of 
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fairness and justice are no longer applicable to humanity in terms of our conduct and 
behaviour with one another. I believe this contributes to an explanation of my 
interpretation of Sandel‘s (2007) warning that I quoted at the start of my subsection that 
connects fairness to our understanding of human nature. As I conclude this chapter, it 
seems appropriate to recount this passage in which Sandel states that,    
an awareness that none of us is wholly responsibly for his or her success – saves a 
meritocratic society from sliding into the smug assumption that success is the 
crown of virtue, that the rich are rich because they are more deserving than the 
poor. (p. 91)   
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Chapter Five 
Summary, Discussion and Conclusion 
Does Widespread Use of Gene Doping Promote the Desirable Community? 
The utility of a particular course of action – one of the most important features 
that define pragmatic ethics – is assessed on the grounds that that particular action is 
useful in promoting a desirable community. The kind of community I first proposed 
would be most useful, when considering the ethical issues that may ensue with the 
prospect of gene doping athletes in sport, is one that upholds the value of fairness, 
autonomy and the concept of what it means to be human. As promised in my introductory 
chapter, the possible consequences of gene doping and transhuman athletes in sport will 
be assessed by cogitating whether each consequence promotes, conflicts or is congruent 
with one or more of the three values in order to deduce what this implies for the 
permissibility or desirability of gene doping in sport. If we have rightly predicted the 
consequences that would arise with widespread use of gene doping, the use of genetic 
technology by athletes conflicts with each of the three values I have identified as lying at 
the heart of the issue through my review of literature. The position that logically follows 
this pragmatic ethical analysis is one which strongly opposes the introduction and use of 
gene doping technologies in sport. A critique of the usefulness of each value for the 
purpose of investigating the ethical permissibility of gene doping will be included in this 
chapter. I will proceed with a summary of the chief consequences that my analytical 
evaluations have established will be most likely to arise if gene doping were to be 
integrated into the world of sport as a form of performance-enhancement. These effects 
will once again be categorized by their relevance to one of the three values.  
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Fairness 
I introduced my analysis of predicted consequences by adducing that the argument 
that gene doping will improve fairness in sport by leveling out discrepancies in genetic 
athleticism between potential athletes is untenable. I subsequently oriented my analysis 
on the incompatibility between Rawls‘s account of fairness and the effects of gene 
doping. To reiterate, I cede that being a new technology gene doping will be expensive at 
first and therefore only available to wealthy individuals. However, this period of drastic 
inequality in access to genetic technologies might be relatively ephemeral as this 
innovation becomes increasingly affordable. Regardless, although those below the 
poverty line will probably never enjoy access to these procedures even well after they are 
introduced into society, refusing the advent of genetic technology based on this idea 
seems hypocritical since this is the case for all luxuries in life. Nonetheless, perhaps I was 
too quick to grant the acceptability of this as reasoning to dismiss the claim that the initial 
exclusivity of this technology based on wealth is unfair making the integration of gene 
doping in sport objectionable. Let me be clear. I agree that it is extremely unfair that 
persons are born into abysmal poverty-stricken circumstances such that they cannot even 
afford the basic necessities of life. But their plight does not justify halting all 
advancements in science and technology or emerging products into society that 
exclusively improve the situation of those who can purchase them because they widen 
gaps across living conditions.  
The atrocious living conditions that currently exist in the world reinforce allocating 
more research and resources into efforts to alleviate social problems such as poverty, 
hunger, disease and pollution to improve the lives of poor segments of the population. 
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However, this does not imply that the rest of society should circumvent benefiting from 
improvements in technology. In support of this notion, if genetic enhancement were to be 
practiced, it would not necessarily consume valuable resources that could improve these 
social problems as its inception would be derived from the development of genetic 
therapy that would hopefully improve global health.  
Let us not kid ourselves that international or national forces will provide 
complimentary genetic enhancement procedures for those who cannot afford them when 
we cannot even guarantee that every person in the world has adequate food, shelter and 
water. Providing poor people with gratuitous genetic enhancement when they cannot 
afford life‘s basic necessities is almost as ludicrous as giving every homeless woman a 
non-refundable or sellable pair of Louis Vuitton shoes and each homeless man a Rolex. It 
is possible that my pessimism on the prospect of universally accessible genetic 
enhancement is due to the present appalling conditions that might be obliterated by the 
time that gene doping is realized. Yet to aver that the aforementioned social problems 
will be archaic at the time of gene doping seems to converge on unrealistic utopianism. 
Conversely, I find it more reasonable to expect that genetic enhancement would be 
available only to persons who can pay for it on their own or countries that will provide 
the technology to a select few.  
Moreover, a slightly different issue can be used to help elucidate why the onerous 
conditions in which some people live do not imply that the rest of society should not be 
allowed to benefit from technological improvements. In this example, a person has two 
sons – the first is born with intellectual and physical challenges while the second inherits 
optimal traits in all respects that would open countless opportunities for his future. 
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Should the parent discourage or obstruct the younger boy from enjoying opportunities 
that would cultivate his skills and talents simply because this would widen the gap 
between the boys‘ quality of life as the elder son could not gain from these opportunities 
as well? I believe not as this would involve exorbitant amounts of undue constraint that 
would be unfair to the younger son. I believe that although this is a less than perfect 
analogy it highlights the undesirability of demanding that if one group or person in the 
world faces harsh realities, that we must all suffer or renounce enjoying life‘s rewards or 
opportunities. This explains my reasoning that we cannot prohibit gene doping on the 
premise that some people in the world will not have the chance to relish in its benefits. 
 Still, I have assented to the notion that gene doping would reduce fairness even if it 
were to be legalized in sport. By definition, gene doping refers to applications of genetic 
enhancement procedures that specifically target traits that give rise to athletic advantages 
useful for performance in a particular sport or sports in general. This represents a 
reduction in fairness in sport because it interferes with sport‘s structural goal of 
comparing competitors based on their performance of relevant skills deriving from both 
cultivated and natural traits under the auspices of the rules. Technology corrupts a sport if 
it lessens the degree to which those skills serve as deciding factors in the outcome of the 
game and improves a sport if it causes those skills to become more pronounced and 
decisive of contest outcomes.  
Recall that unlike gene doping, the introduction of the shoe improved races because 
they reduced the chances that other factors that are not meant to play a role in 
determining the winner could prevent the actual best runner in the race from winning. In 
contrast, more clearly than the use of anxiety-reducing drugs in sport competitions for 
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example, genetically enhancing certain traits such as explosive speed in sprint running 
shifts the basis for comparing athletes from the relevant skills derived from cultivated and 
innate traits to the degree that those skills have been most effectively genetically 
modified. Thus, this type of enhancement is guilty of meddling with human qualities that 
are supposed to be at the heart of athletic tests or the relevant skills that the game in 
question intends to test in order to differentiate the performances of competitors. Athletes 
enter the sporting arena with an expectation and agreement to the set of central skills and 
traits that are supposed to determine the winners. If athletes use technology to manipulate 
these factors in drastic and radical ways, as would be the case with gene doping, they 
treat their competitors unfairly by prevaricating from practices characterized as fair play.  
A necessary step prior to asserting that gene doping treats competitors unfairly in 
the way I reiterated above is a defense of the goal of sport from allegations that it is 
inherently unfair. Rawls‘s Difference Principle (DP) holds that inequalities are acceptable 
if they are to the betterment of members of society that are the least advantaged. In my 
previous chapter, I highlighted one realistic way that allowing individuals to display their 
athletic talents and cultivated skills on the basis of which they are rewarded benefits 
members of society who are the most disadvantaged. Specifically, I argue that 
outstanding athletes might inspire others in society including the least advantaged youth 
who look up to athletes. This could very well motivate ambition, a drive for excellence in 
all domains including the workplace and good work ethic creating a more productive 
society overall. This undoubtedly is beneficial to the least advantaged people in the 
community. For example, government employees responsible for formulating and 
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implementing policies could be motivated to use their creativity to engineer clever and 
effective methods of addressing social problems such as poverty. 
  In addition, I believe that one more approach to considering how fairness is 
implicated by gene doping is useful. First, a failure to prohibit the use of performance-
enhancing drugs or gene doping is irrational as judged from behind Rawls‘s veil of 
ignorance because they impose a significant risk of serious health complications to all 
users but in the absence of a ban, nearly everyone would likely use them thereby 
canceling out any positional advantages gained by most athletes. For this reason, a 
rational and impartial person would judge performance-enhancing drugs or gene doping 
as unacceptable universal practices. In other words, one would not support everyone 
(gene) doping. The only way one can justify the risks involved in genetic enhancement 
would be if one knows that they would be offset by its benefits. Thus, athletes who 
choose to use these modes of enhancement exempt themselves and treat their competitors 
unfairly.    
Autonomy 
Given that the technology behind gene doping will likely hatch out of gene 
therapy, which is still in the developmental phase of research, I acknowledge that we are 
restricted from forecasting the future safety level associated with these practices with a 
great deal of certainty. For this reason, we cannot rule out the possibility of a future in 
which such procedures can be safely administered with no serious side effects. If gene 
doping were reasonably safe at the time it is introduced to society, this would put to rest 
accusations that gene doping would necessarily hamper the health of individuals 
undergoing the procedures or that of their offspring in the case of germ-line 
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enhancement. Thus, in the future, effects of gene doping might not undermine autonomy 
by limiting the future choices of persons due to endangerments to their health.  
Yet, due to insufficient scientific evidence available at present coupled with the 
likely fixed nature and far-reaching consequences, I argue that we must approach this 
application of genetic technology with a great deal of caution. So, while it may be an 
imperfect solution, the presence of a ban against gene doping for the time being seems 
defensible from the perspective of autonomy and non-maleficence. In my assessment of 
the potential consequences of gene doping on children‘s right to an open future, the 
similarity between genetically engineering athletes and early selection or sport 
specialization that occurs in elite youth athletics highlighted the potential harmful effects 
and uses that this technology has the propensity to promote. It is likely that effects due to 
changes made by our parents, whether during embryonic or early childhood development, 
cannot be altered to a significant degree by genetic modification.    
I believe that enhancement of general-purpose capacities such as intelligence, 
memory or health that assist individuals in obtaining primary goods of human life do not 
appear to impede autonomy. However, a specific-purpose form of enhancement is 
intrinsically linked to a clear and distinct goal such as pre-programming a child to excel 
in sport which clearly threatens a child‘s right to an open future. Thus, based on 
autonomy, the application and motivations behind genetic enhancement can be deeply 
troubling. We should be concerned with permitting gene doping for youngsters because if 
overzealous parents or other authority figures are granted access to genetic enhancement 
procedures they will most likely misuse the technology and use it in ways that infringe on 
children‘s autonomy and their right to an open future. The nature of gene doping makes it 
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exceptionally likely to be used to augment the coercive practices of governments, parents 
and any one else who is in a position of authority. 
Therefore, I agree that for vulnerable populations such as young children, a 
paternalistic ban on gene doping is warranted. This is based on the fact that relative to 
most adults, children are less able to rationally weigh their options when it comes to 
decision-making. Also, hyper-parenting is a definite threat on children‘s right to an open 
future which is reason enough to exclude enhancement of specific-purpose traits from an 
ethical perspective. Thus, my refutation of the desirability of gene doping in the context 
of youth athletes is strongly supported by the high risk of infringing on the right of 
children to an open future. 
Concerning adult use of gene doping, I have assessed the argument that once 
athletes begin to utilize genetic enhancement techniques, those who subsequently follow 
the lead of these initial users will likely be giving into the pressure to genetically dope in 
order to remain competitive in a genetically enhanced world of elite sport. This can be 
viewed as reducing autonomy overall. This coercive environment could lead to serious 
negative consequences for the collective and long-term interests of athletes due to the 
potentially high risks of harm cited above. 
While we accept many instances in society where rational and informed adults are 
free to engage in dangerous practices, in some cases such as with intoxicated drivers, it is 
permissible to impede the autonomy of persons. I believe that the ban against gene 
doping can be at least partially justified on the fact that it is harmful to the user but more 
importantly to others who are coerced to also engage in gene doping to remain 
competitive.  
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While the protection of others is a noble purpose, as pointed out in my previous 
chapter, significant limitations exist regarding the forcefulness of this argument against 
gene doping. For one, all other competitive environments can be construed as coercing 
individuals from freely choosing their actions. A mere drive to succeed in one‘s 
profession or an activity, whether it is in athletics, business or any other area, does not 
remove the choice of which measures to employ to ensure one‘s success from each 
individual. Also, an athlete can always withdraw from participating entirely. With that 
said, it seems that the most fair situation in sport is one in which no athlete is allowed to 
create conditions that pressure competitors to use gene doping technology if it is linked to 
potential health risks.  
Human Value  
When it comes to effects on our self-understanding as humans, genetic 
enhancement technologies will amplify the actual and perceived degree of control that we 
possess over our own nature. It seems quite likely that this will result in a depreciation of 
the gifted quality of human powers and achievements. This means that with gene doping, 
we will fail to appreciate as we do now that our lives are gifts and that all of our strengths 
and capacities even if we dedicate our lives to training and developing them are never 
fully ours. The worrisome consequence of this is virtually no restraint in sculpting and 
reshaping ourselves and our children, if genetic enhancement of children is an accepted 
practice, to suit our own desires and preferences. If parents are able to genetically 
enhance or design their children, this will likely interfere with the unconditional love and 
acceptance that they feel towards their children, radically alter the relationship between 
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parents and their children, heighten parental responsibility and promote an excessive 
drive for mastery and control.  
Also, failure to recognize life as a gift will likely yield changes to our humility, 
responsibility and solidarity. Sympathy would be diminished by genetically engineering 
children because parents could then simply modify undesirable traits that may 
disadvantage children in their lives and future. The world would become less sympathetic 
and hospitable to people‘s weaknesses. Being granted more control over our genetic traits 
would be accompanied by a feeling that we are much more powerful over our own 
natures and thus less indebted to some other source whether it is nature, fortune or God. 
This corresponds to a reduction in feelings of humility and a rise in responsibility that we 
necessarily assume over these features, our actions, achievements and failures. The 
proportional reduction in the role that we perceive is played by God, nature or luck in this 
life means that we become much more liable not only for our strengths but also for our 
weaknesses. By appealing to real-life examples, I argued earlier that we typically act in 
ways that corresponds to a perceived link between the degree of control or the extent that 
an individual can change an aspect of themselves or their children and the amount of 
responsibility or blame that we think we are entitled to attribute to that person. When we 
have access to genetic technologies, we will likely situate greater blame and impose our 
judgment or normative opinions on others‘ decisions regarding genetic enhancement of 
themselves or their children.  
Also, knowing that we have greater control and thus responsibility over our fates, 
we will also likely feel less inclined to act in solidarity with those who are less fortunate 
than us. In this context of heightened mastery and hyper-control, empathy and other 
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moral feelings that are required for solidarity to exist in society will be much more 
difficult to garner. When we see each other and ourselves as the authors or designers of 
our own genetic features and traits we will likely feel less compelled to help the least 
advantaged groups of society. On the other hand, when our natural talents are perceived 
at least partially to be due to God or nature, there is more of a communitarian sentiment 
that motivates us to help or minimally sympathize with those who are haplessly 
underprivileged. Recognizing and appreciating one‘s fortunate circumstances due to God, 
luck or chance compels us to act in accordance with Rawls‘s DP that professes that it is 
only fair to benefit from our own natural talents such as intelligence if the least 
advantaged of society also benefit in some way as well. Otherwise, we will likely blame 
people for their genetic ―weaknesses‖ in their choice not to ameliorate these 
shortcomings. To conclude, the notion of every person for him or herself is promoted at 
the expense of solidarity that unites communities.     
As I concluded the section of my thesis that maps out potential changes in human 
nature, I explained that the chance always exists that one or a combination of these 
characteristics can be used as a basis for promoting the supremacy of one group and 
inferiority of others. Merely because the upper-end of physical and cognitive capacities 
will be higher in society due to genetic enhancement does not imply a greater likelihood 
that one group will be made submissive to persons with highly enhanced capacities. 
Perceptions of supremacy can always give way to acts of violence and oppression but all 
this calls for are laws and institutions that do not require sameness in people‘s abilities 
and characteristics. Regardless of the presence of genetic enhancement, it is the mentality 
that is cultivated within society regarding the perceived superiority of one group of 
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persons that determines whether that group will decide to suppress others. Even though 
some people in the world today still strongly perceive homosexuality as deviating from 
what is normal, natural or right, we recognize that the way to prevent homosexuals from 
being subjugated or harmed is to foster tolerance rather than try to suppress people‘s 
homosexuality. Similarly, prodigies in athletics, just as in science, art or any other social 
practice should not be seen as outcasts merely because they are anomalies with 
extraordinary capacities. Thus, we ought to focus on strengthening understanding among 
each other instead of striving for conformity and homogeny. This, along with other 
measures such as strengthening institutions that protect human rights can prevent 
stigmatization or other concerns associated with genetically enhanced persons in sport or 
other domains. This suggests that preventing large differences between enhanced and un-
enhanced humans is an unsustainable reason to ban gene doping. 
Assessment of the Utility of Each Value For Our Purposes 
In my introductory chapter, I projected that one of the most challenging aspects of 
the pragmatic method I chose would be to compromise and find an adequate balance and 
prioritization among competing values. Because one of the main pragmatist commitments 
holds that ethical values and principles do not have absolute status, when confronted with 
dilemmas involving competing values, one should be able to justify the prioritization of 
one value over the other. Thus, I will now use the likely consequences of transhumanism 
and gene doping in sport as a reference as I critique each of the moral values that I have 
elected in terms of three specific issue-related criteria, namely scope, relevance and 
relative strength as compared to competing moral values. This will allow me to comment 
on the usefulness of this particular list of values in examining gene doping and 
  221 
transhumanism in sport. I will also provide a comparison of each of these values with one 
another based on the abovementioned criteria. This can be used to inform future 
pragmatic ethical inquiries on gene doping or related technologies. 
 Despite the fact that Brendel and Miller (2008) designate these three criteria as 
encompassing a suitable checklist for assessing the utility of values in pragmatic policy 
inquiries or research ethics, they fail to explain their precise meaning in this specific 
context. Therefore, I need to clarify my interpretation of each of these criteria prior to 
outlining how I believe each value generally scores on these factors for my research 
questions. By scope, I will refer to how far-reaching the consequences are with which the 
value in question is concerned in terms of groups that are affected. For instance, are 
consequences restricted to youth, adults or the entire sports community? Are only certain 
athletes affected or is the entire institution of sport affected? And for that matter, are 
effects troubling for people outside the sports community? In contrast, the apparent 
relevance to the issue will portray how effective the value is at capturing the most 
troubling aspects or repercussions associated with the issue of gene doping. The final 
criterion, namely relative strength is perhaps the most axiomatic in meaning and will 
denote the forcefulness with which the value seems to agree or dissent to the practice of 
gene doping in sport.  
As has been shown, the relative strength or forcefulness of the human nature 
value seems to be very strong and perhaps can be signified as the strongest of the three 
chosen values on our list. In capturing the seemingly most troubling aspects or moral 
repercussions associated with the issue of gene doping, it seems to tie together the other 
relevant values by locating a deep source of how gene doping can result in both 
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reductions in autonomy and fairness. To reiterate, the lost sense of the gifted quality of 
life leads to a decline in compassionate interpretations of others‘ differences or 
weaknesses. Recall that this new outlook recruited by genetic enhancement described by 
a loss of empathy would most probably lead to a view of others either as impediments or 
tools we can use for our success and not as agents with feelings and inclinations that are 
similar to our own whose autonomy is to be respected. This would probably eliminate a 
great deal of cooperation that is currently in practice. In turn, this could also produce a 
decline in acts of sympathy, compassion and instances of acting fairly toward others such 
as our opponents in sport or any other domain.  
Thus, in addition to mapping out a likely root of the adverse effects on fairness 
and autonomy that are associated with gene doping, the perception of changes to human 
nature is also interconnected with values that are symbolized as closest to the heart of 
pragmatic ethics, particularly those that promote cooperative and harmonious living in 
society as technology progresses in its evolution. In the abovementioned ways, the 
conception of what it means to be human is clearly of high relevance to the issue of gene 
doping.  
Not only is the relative strength and relevance of the human value prominent, it is 
also very broad in its scope. The effects that fall under the umbrella of what is wrong 
with gene doping based on a sketch of human nature surpass athletes and the sports 
community. Certainly, losing the compulsion to adhere to fair play will destroy sport‘s 
contests but these consequences would also impact the entire human race as gene doping 
would influence how we view each other and interact. For instance, effects on the 
relationships between parents and their children and the way in which we view and treat 
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fellow members of society such as reductions in acts of sympathy and blaming people for 
their weaknesses could all resound in a genetically enhanced future. As I explained 
earlier, it is fair to foresee how empathy‘s reductions could lead to debunking the 
rationale behind why we agree with principles of justice and fairness to structure our 
societal institutions. Thus, in comparing the three values, the concept of what it means to 
be human seems to be the deepest factor explaining why we feel that these practices are 
unsettling. 
Moving on with the critical assessment between competing values, the value of 
autonomy appears to be the least strong but still relevant to the issue of gene doping in 
sport although perhaps with a narrower scope than the other two values. The reason I 
have evaluated it as a weaker value is because, we must balance autonomy with other 
values insofar as we would like to protect the structure of sport and participants. The 
force of the value of autonomy is strong in the case against genetically enhancing 
children below the age of maturity because of the nature of the technology giving rise to 
susceptibility of their right to an open future being interfered with by authority or 
governmental figures. The value of autonomy is relatively weaker in precluding adults 
from choosing to practice gene doping if they are rational and informed of the 
accompanying risks. Protecting the environment of sport for competitors who want to 
remain competitive but do not want to engage in potentially dangerous practices is a 
relatively strong reason to prohibit gene doping if it is in fact proven to be a dangerous 
practice. However, even then, autonomy of the other competitors is paternalistically 
restrained by the ban against gene doping for protection of the collective health interests 
of all athletes. Either with a ban or against it, the autonomy of some group of athletes is 
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limited. Thus, there are clearly some major limitations that weaken autonomy‘s force on 
this issue if we are going to depend on it as a basis for or against a ban on gene doping.  
Moreover, in terms of scope and relevance to the issue of gene doping, discourse 
in health care that I highlighted while reaching an interpretation of autonomy with which 
I could be satisfied reminds us that particularly when it comes to autonomy the cultural 
relativity of ethics can reduce the significance placed on particular values in a 
multicultural society where Western ethical principles preside. For instance, some 
cultures have no desire to uphold the value of autonomy and so they would view potential 
reductions in autonomy as not morally disturbing consequences associated with gene 
doping. Because I am trying to uphold a contextual feature of pragmatic thought, how 
does this translate into a universal ban against gene doping based on autonomy? 
Obviously, permitting nations to delegate whether they accept the use of gene doping by 
athletes or not is an unfeasible solution as this would drastically impact fairness in 
international sports competitions. This displays a prioritization of the value of fairness 
and the protection of sport and its participants over the value of autonomy that I believe is 
warranted. An alternative to a universal ban would require a conditional acceptance of 
gene doping only for cultures that do not uphold autonomy and this is obviously 
problematic. We should avoid generalizing people‘s values based on the groups to which 
they belong since variation exists within cultural and national boundaries and even within 
families.      
Fairness seems to be closer in relevance and strength on this issue to the concept 
of what it means to be human than it is to autonomy. As I mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, fairness seems to be a justifiable overriding factor for constraining some 
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aspect of autonomy at least in a ban against gene doping. Seeing as how all athletes are 
affected by amplified instances of competitors acting unfairly toward them by gene 
doping, the climate in sport could be enormously affected.  
The value of fairness is strengthened by a process advocated by Rawls in which 
we use a figurative veil of ignorance to describe how a rational and impartial person 
would judge performance-enhancing drugs or gene doping as unacceptable universal 
practices. This explains how those who choose to gene dope treat their competitors 
unfairly since they confine permissibility to themselves. The only way they could almost 
guarantee that they would benefit from gene doping is if not everyone practices it. The 
high potential of serious health complications associated with gene doping due to its 
nature and the futility of all users using it point to the fact that a rational person would 
object to its widespread use. This persuasively explains why fairness strongly conflicts 
with the use of gene doping by athletes. 
An alternative approach also firmly underscores the incompatibility between 
fairness and gene doping. Athletes enter the sporting arena with an expectation and 
agreement to the set of central skills and traits that are supposed to determine the winners. 
But athletes who cloud these factors treat their competitors unfairly by diverging from 
this structural goal of sport competitions. In terms of the scope of gene doping, fairness 
seems to primarily affect the entire institution of sport and the community it attracts 
unlike the value of humanness that blankets consequences across all members of society.  
Thus, in a round about way, I have put forth a defense for the hypothetical 
community that I am endorsing. My preference for a community that upholds my 
understanding of fairness, autonomy and the concept of what it means to be human has 
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been justified by ruling out the desirability of living in alternative communities that 
would fail to respect these values. Unless of course, one does not find the probable 
consequences that have been outlined in my previous chapter and summarized above as 
normatively troubling or noxious, basing one‘s community at least partially on these 
three values seems to be conducive to living well and harmoniously with one another at 
least when it comes to the consideration of permitting or banning gene doping in sport.  
In my first chapter, I proposed that the utility of this particular list of values would 
be also tested by evaluating whether they preserve the ―goodness‖ of sport by considering 
each value separately and envisioning the consequences that would likely occur if sport 
participants were to violate that value in sport. For example, if fairness was virtually 
absent from sport, what sorts of consequences would this lead to? The consequences of 
everyone failing to live up to the ideals of fairness in sport are probably similar to what 
could be envisioned if honesty was no longer something that athletes cared about. As was 
described in my introductory chapter, the consequences that would likely be yielded by a 
total disregard for honesty, and as it follows fairness, include cheating, deceptive rule 
violations, and if an acceptance of the rules must exist just so the game constituted by 
those rules can take place would result (Suits, 1978), prevention of any real game from 
taking place. 
Although autonomy of athletes already appears to be improperly guarded in some 
cases as described in testing measures that fail to protect the privacy and choice of 
athletes, much more worrying consequences can be associated with completely 
disregarding this value. If autonomy of athletes were totally disregarded, athletes would 
be thought of less as persons with rights and more so as replaceable commodities or 
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actors perpetuating the institution of sport. This could result in less attention to potential 
harms experienced by athletes in order to enhance the entertainment factor for spectators. 
For example, autonomy of gladiators who entertained spectators in ancient Roman arenas 
was clearly limited since these fighters were forced to fight wild animals as well as each 
other and convicted criminals to the point of death. Similar extreme sports could develop 
if autonomy of athletes was to be completely disrespected. 
As for the third value, namely the concept of what it means to be human, I 
understand human nature to be complex and capable of moral and immoral 
consequences. This concept is less attuned to envisioning consequences of disregarding it 
in sport. Since my approach to evaluating gene doping technology based on this concept 
stood on whether it would promote ethical actions or would not encourage us to perform 
more unethical actions, this is not akin to the assessment approach used on fairness and 
autonomy. A conception of sport that completely allows any change to our perceived 
human nature that could lead to unethical acts is essentially unlimited and thus need not 
be hashed out.  
Limitations of my Conclusions & Future Areas of Research 
As I stated at an earlier stage in my ethical analysis, the values I selected were not 
chosen until after I had conducted a thorough review of literature on the issue of gene 
doping but this does not mean that my choice of core values is exclusive and accurate or 
that no other relevant values are at stake here. As a pragmatic researcher, focusing on 
discovering absolute truths such as the intrinsic values of sport or the structural goal 
behind sport interferes with seeking out what is useful for our practices and decisions as 
it is impossible to know for sure when we have done so. Instead, if it seems reasonable 
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enough after examining it against all the available evidence, it can be used provided it is 
useful for inquiry. For example, while I cannot know for certain that the effects of 
mastery and control over our genetic traits will cause worrisome consequences, I have 
asserted that these are warranted concerns due to the apparent nature of genetic 
enhancement that would likely dispose parents to an attitude that discourages accepting 
children for who they are and disconnecting notions of sharing and solidarity among 
community members. The fact that I am able to justify my claims on this matter using 
logic and real-life experiences permits me to employ them in my ethical assessment of 
gene doping. Similarly, whether or not I have accurately and fully depicted the values 
that are most susceptible to hindrance or enhancement would not affect my conclusions 
on gene doping since pragmatic conclusions are context-dependent and hypothetical in 
nature. 
Due to constraints related to my master‘s program timeline, I have had to place 
delimitations on my research for the sake of manageability. The upshot of this is that 
there are various directions in which my research can be extended on gene doping. For 
example, my ethical inquiry focuses on three values around which gene doping debates 
center, namely fairness, autonomy and the concept of what it means to be human. This is 
not an exhaustive list as my ethical analysis could not entail more than what could 
reasonably be completed in the time allotted for a master‘s degree. Thus, my ethical 
analysis could be expanded to include more critical values that are at play within the 
issue. Conversely, one might choose to explore specific unanswered questions based on 
one or more of the three values that have become evident as I approach the concluding 
portion of my thesis. For example, one might choose to explore the line between general- 
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and specific-purpose traits. More specifically, a problem with exclusively allowing 
enhancement of general-purpose traits in society is that the line between general- and 
specific-purpose may turn out to be too difficult to draw. If a specific-purpose trait is one 
that is intrinsically tied to a clear and distinct goal, how can we know whether the 
enhancement of one trait that appears to be broad such as memory or intelligence is not 
intended for specific endeavours? Also, if this is a legitimate concern, how might the use 
of genetic enhancement be monitored? If genetically enhanced people‘s lives and day-to-
day activities must be overlooked by some ruling body aimed at ensuring that 
applications of genetic enhancement are ethical and safe, the interference that this would 
require might seem much too excessive to justify solely permitting genetic enhancement 
of general-purpose traits. Thus, the practicalities associated with such a policy might 
consolidate justification of a blanket prohibition against genetic enhancement procedures 
in society that does not demarcate specific- from general-purpose traits. Further 
examination of this issue is warranted since this topic seems to diverge from genetic 
technologies applied for athletic purposes with which my thesis is strictly concerned.  
Moreover, the fact that my pragmatic perspective allows me to see that other 
understandings of fairness, autonomy and perceptions of humanness are possible and 
could be more useful compels me to admit that Rawls and his ideas for example are not 
to be regarded as the be-all and end-all of fairness. Philosophers or other types of thinkers 
may enlighten us in the coming days with their acumen and thoughts on fairness or any of 
these other values for that matter. Today, the usefulness of principles of justice and 
fairness advocated by Rawls are clearly relevant for our needs. This is supported by the 
fact that much of what we do and how we govern societies are guided at least partially 
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and assisted by these principles. However, it is perfectly plausible that these principles 
will be supplemented or replaced by others that are more effective or possess less 
substantial weaknesses or limitations.   
For instance, given the implications of gene doping, we might actually have to 
modify certain currently used principles of justice or more broadly Rawls‘s concept of 
fairness as they rely on presumptions that we cannot modify our genetic makeup or innate 
traits. Specifically, it can be argued that advances in applied genetic knowledge might 
potentially disturb current ideas of what it takes to legitimately characterize a state of 
equal opportunities (Arneson, 2002). While we have always had the capacity to influence 
the traits found in future generations by deliberately choosing mates with traits that we 
want our children to possess, future genetic technology has the potential to convert the 
control over the genotypes of children to one of unparalleled degree in human history. 
 Let us take Rawls‘s Fair Opportunity Principle (FOP) for example that holds that 
social structures must be constructed so that stations that provide benefits to the 
individuals who fill them thereby giving rise to inequalities must be fairly available to all 
members of society. From this, one can infer the idea that two individuals identical in 
terms of natural ability and ambition should have more or less equal opportunities. This 
belief depends on the notion that if someone has the ambition and is willing to work hard 
enough to achieve some end, they deserve it. More importantly, this belief also requires 
the idea that innate capacities are non-changeable factors in one‘s life. Principles of 
justice and fairness including the FOP were formulated in a context like the present in 
which genetic features are fixed. We can always try and improve upon our weaknesses 
but beyond a certain point, we are constrained by the toolbox of abilities and features we 
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were given at birth. Conversely, where gene doping is possible, people can choose to 
significantly modify their own genetic makeup or that of their children.  
As cited in Arneson (2002), Buchanan describes how genetic intervention used to 
reduce the incidence of genetic diseases or disorders can be used to ―level out the playing 
field‖ as advocated by the FOP allowing more people to live longer and healthier lives. 
This allows us to infer that advocates of the FOP should hold ambition and individual 
choice at the exclusion of innate capacities as the only factors that should determine 
success in our pursuits. Clearly, this principle esteems self-chosen circumstances as fair 
determinants of our place in society. Therefore, provided socio-economic status does not 
impede one‘s access to genetic technology, should we allow persons to choose for 
themselves whether they would like to genetically enhance certain traits in order to allow 
them to obtain their desired achievements? And in that case, if we possess the means and 
resources, is it an obligation to enhance our children‘s genotypes to ensure that there are 
no barriers obstructing their chances of excelling in activities that they want to pursue? 
Or more forcefully, is it a state obligation to attempt to alleviate people‘s genetic  
weaknesses even if they do not infringe on their state of health just to implement equal 
starting positions in society so that ambition and perseverance alone can determine where 
we end up in the social hierarchy?  
Before even attempting to reply to these questions, we should inquire whether the 
privileged status we attribute to ambition and desire is rightly justified. In my 
introductory chapter, I argued that one premise that the FOP likely stands on is that 
ambition, work ethic, determination and the like stand alone as factors for which we can 
validly say that people are accountable because they are not merely imposed on 
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individuals as are socio-economic status and genetic endowments in the absence of self-
chosen genetic modification (Arneson, 2002). According to the FOP, social practices and 
institutions must step in to ensure that the inequalities emerging from non-chosen origins 
are compensated for or rectified. The upshot of this is that after creating equal starting 
conditions, outcomes should be dictated by the consequences of choices made by the 
individuals themselves. In essence, each individual can then rightly be held responsible 
for the position they end up in within the social hierarchy.  
However, ambition and desire to pursue certain activities are certainly impacted 
by many factors including but not limited to the geographical and cultural settings in 
which people spend their lives. Recall the example I provided in my third chapter where 
in the southern United States, the pursuit of football by adolescent boys but not females is 
basically a given. It cannot be disputed that this mentality is imposed on young people 
growing up in these communities which weakens the claim that accountability is 
legitimately allotted to one‘s desire to pursue certain activities and the commitment 
designated to those endeavours. In addition, the time, effort and dedication that people 
decide to assign to their pursuits can undoubtedly be influenced by whether their 
aspirations were encouraged and nurtured by their parents or others early on. 
Socialization‘s potential to impose a great impact on one‘s success in particular activities 
that is comparable in degree to one‘s socio-economic status and genetic endowments is 
uncontestable. As I described in my analysis of relational autonomy in an athletic world 
of gene doping, even the choice to genetically enhance one‘s self can be subject to 
socialization.  
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This is reflective of my perception of human nature and the relational sense of 
autonomy as outlined in my third chapter. There, I acknowledged that as human beings, it 
seems warranted to characterize us as largely defined by the relationships we have with 
other human beings so much so that a great extent of our identity, aspirations and values 
are products of our relationships and socialization. In the face of the fact that virtually all 
of our choices appear to be influenced by external sources, we should be careful not to 
imply that we are in no way responsible for our own actions and choices. After all, 
human cognition, individual autonomy and agency allow us to rationally engage in 
coherent decision-making.        
 However, through the preceding couple of paragraphs, I have intended to point 
out that the limitations of the FOP contribute to justifying my choice of grounding my 
arguments pertaining to fairness implications of gene doping in the ideas advocated by 
Rawls specifically in his DP. This principle allows us to concede that some inequalities in 
the allocation of primary goods are to be accepted but they must improve the situation of 
members of society that are the least advantaged. From this perspective, we can evade the 
challenging and seemingly impossible task of delegating for which, if any, factors people 
can be held responsible. Or, if it turns out that all factors are to some extent influenced by 
outside sources, we can also eschew having to rank factors based on the relative degree to 
which each factor is self-chosen to determine which should weigh more heavily on 
dictating our positions in the social hierarchy. I find these all to be unnecessary and in the 
end likely unproductive consumptions of our time, energy and attention. Once again, this 
seems to reflect Rorty‘s (1990) idea that ―A God‘s eye-view is one that is irrelevant to 
our needs and practices‖ (p. 2). 
  234 
What if a General-Purpose Trait Clouds an Essential Element of the Sport? 
Imagine a particular instance of genetic enhancement that is found to be acceptable 
on the grounds that it targets a general-purpose trait such as memory but the subject is an 
athlete and this general-purpose trait ends up aiding him or her by strengthening a 
capacity that controls a crucial skill required by the sport. For example, memory is 
considered a general-purpose trait but improving this capacity might strengthen the 
ability of a quarterback in football to recall plays and strategies when they would be most 
helpful. It is debatable whether the ability to remember effective strategies and plays is 
considered an essential component to the game that the sport intends to test.  
This example is akin to Tiger Woods and other golfer‘s use of laser eye surgery to 
enhance their vision beyond corrective standards which can improve some facet of their 
game. Similar to memorizing strategies and plays in the above example, the 
predominance of vision‘s role in determining the winner in golf is not entirely clear. In a 
prior chapter, I agreed that in order to determine which essential skills each particular 
sport holds as most important in determining the outcomes within that sport, it would be 
helpful to consult the community that surrounds each sport. This community includes all 
of the athletes, coaches, fans and sporting officials and others who participate in the sport 
in some capacity. Perhaps the athletes themselves should have the greatest say on this 
matter however. Additionally, we can certainly expect and accept some variation in the 
skills that are deemed to be essential to a sport across different levels of competition such 
as recreational, intermediate or advanced and whether the context is professional or 
amateur.  
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The reason I have posited these considerations is to exhibit how careful we ought to 
be with respect to genetic enhancement that partially passes the acceptability test on the 
grounds that it improves a general-purpose trait but does not entirely pass because of 
uncertainty as to whether the enhanced trait clouds an essential skill of the game. 
Likewise, we must explore how we are to confront cases where individuals have 
genetically enhanced general-purpose traits, if this is deemed acceptable, that end up 
clearly interfering with an innate capacity based on which the game intends to compare 
competitors. Excluding genetically enhanced people from particular sports in these events 
seems utterly discriminatory and reminiscent of the case introduced in chapter three 
involving Oscar Pistorius – a runner with two prosthetic lower limbs who successfully 
challenged the ban enforced by track and field‘s international governing body that 
prohibits athletes with carbon-fibre prosthetic legs from competing alongside able-bodied 
athletes.  
The ruling of this case that favoured Pistorius has possibly created precedence for 
how we are to handle genetically enhanced persons competing in future competitions. 
The ban against Pistorius and similar competitors were based on allegations that their 
legs make the biomechanics of their running significantly more economical. The 
economy of one‘s running is undeniably a crucial component to success in the sport and 
that is why there was an effort to disqualify him. However, the evidence against Pistorius 
was insufficient in proving that he possesses any significant advantage relative to his 
non-paraplegic competitors. Similarly, if challenged, banning a genetically enhanced 
athlete from competing against un-enhanced athletes would probably require being able 
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to convince the courts that a significant advantage emerges from the genetic enhancement 
with respect to an essential skill of the sport in question.  
Limits on Asserting the Ethical Permissibility of a Gene Doping Ban 
Through my pragmatic analysis, I have granted ethical permissibility to a position 
that opposes gene doping in sport since this seems to be more consistent with the desired 
community. Given my pragmatic approach and due to the fact that I limited my study to 
three values, this permissibility should be understood as conditional and context 
dependent. 
In contrast, World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) employs a fixed moral stance 
against gene doping that assumes that one does not need to consider the manner in which 
it is performed prior to concluding that it is an unethical practice. Regarding the 
principles that emerged from the 2002 Banbury Conference, several are incorporated into 
WADA‘s policy on gene doping in sport. The most crucial conclusion is the claim that 
genetic transfer technology for the purpose of performance-enhancement is inconsistent 
with the spirit of sport and is potentially dangerous for athletes. Based on these reasons, it 
was decided that prohibiting such practices from sport is a logical categorical sport 
policy. This is largely at odds with my pragmatic perspective however since a 
comprehensive understanding of the details behind the prospects of gene doping and 
whether reasonable safeguards can be placed against adverse effects perhaps associated 
with enforcing the ban are absolutely crucial to the validity of ethical arguments that 
support or reject a ban in sport. 
The heart of my research on this topic has been concerned with the ethical 
permissibility of gene doping in sport. Thus, the conclusion that I have deduced, namely 
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that we have sufficient reason to believe that gene doping will most likely threaten 
fairness, autonomy and what it means to be human still does not allow me to imply that 
the ban on gene doping from sport is morally justified. This is because other ethical 
problems that have been briefly discussed in my introductory chapter may arise due to 
particular measures that sport-governing bodies will have to employ in order to enforce 
this anti-gene doping policy. Of course, it might be argued that implementing a ban 
against gene doping could require superfluous governmental interference into our lives. 
Such an objection reveals potential dangers associated with failing to consider other 
values including privacy and liberty that could potentially conflict with the enforcement 
of this particular prohibition in sport. 
To illustrate, consider that the desired community values the autonomy of 
individuals. If control programs are to be sufficiently effective, they must enforce genetic 
testing. Of course, consent will be required for such genetic testing. Yet, if an athlete 
objects to testing, disqualification from competitions will likely take place. Rules and 
penalties of this nature will likely result in coercion in genetic testing and therefore the 
ban would fail to uphold the value of autonomy in the community.  
Also, given the particular challenges associated with testing individuals who have 
undergone genetic transfer technology, it is likely that some of these athletes will evade 
detection. On a practical level, detection of modified DNA would be extremely difficult 
because it would resemble ―normal‖ DNA. Tagging modified DNA has been suggested 
as a solution to this problem but of course a black market could emerge offering genetic 
enhancement procedures using untagged DNA to athletes who wish to avoid the penalties 
or sanctions associated with gene doping but who still desire the athletic advantages it 
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yields (Mehlman, 2009). This will lead to an unfair situation for athletes who choose to 
comply with the bans as they will be competing with a genetic disadvantage relative to 
the gene doping cheaters.   
 Thus, Mehlman (2009) describes an alternative detection procedure that could 
compare the athlete‘s genome to their genetic profile taken just after birth or even 
prenatally to prevent parents from employing genetic technology on their children. An 
appropriate objection to both detection measures is based on privacy given the highly 
sensitive information that could be deduced from an individual‘s genome. Genetic testing 
may threaten the privacy and autonomy of athletes because of the personal information 
that is made available through the individual‘s genetic map. Mehlman argues that 
ensuring confidentiality will prove to be challenging. Indeed, it seems unethical to deny 
an individual of their own genetic information and thus withhold important implications 
that that information makes evident if he or she has requested access to that knowledge. 
The disclosure of this information may also potentially violate the privacy of the athlete‘s 
relatives who could potentially share particular alleles or traits such as genetic mutations. 
This could plausibly lead to genetic discrimination by insurers or employers for instance.  
As explained by Mehlman (2009), the only way to effectively enforce a ban 
against germ-line gene transfer technology is to keep a record of genetic pedigrees which 
could be used as a baseline for tracking changes over generations. However, this method 
of putting a ban against germ-line genetic enhancement into effect could lead to false 
positives since naturally occurring mutations could emerge from one generation to the 
next which could be wrongly perceived as genetic enhancement. In addition, this 
detection method would also be linked to the same types of privacy violations and risks 
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of genetic discrimination as have been outlined for somatic gene transfer detection 
procedures. What is more, it would be very difficult to justify penalizing individuals for 
the actions of their predecessors.             
The existence of documented information of this nature about individuals or even 
their relatives is troubling when one considers possible use by health-insurers and 
employers. Genetic information of individuals has already been used as a source of 
discrimination in many social institutions such as health and life insurance industries. 
Therefore, this information decreases fairness if it leads to the denial of services or 
entitlements to individuals who have a particular condition or genetic predisposition 
(Billings, Kohn, de Cuevas, Beckwith, Apler, and Natowicz, 1992). 
This last point exemplifies how foreseeing the potential consequences on the 
values of the desired community may contribute to recommendations for the changeable 
features of detection procedures and control programs such as restricting access of 
information produced by genetic screening of individuals and for determining whether 
these program features will sufficiently safeguard against such threats.  
Thus, as I explained in my first chapter, it is of equal importance that ethicists 
determine whether the consequences that can be attributed to the incorporation of genetic 
testing in sport are useful in promoting or actually conflict with our vision of a desirable 
community. I have opted to omit this aspect of the gene doping issue from my thesis for 
the sake of time and manageability. Yet, this can clearly serve as another research 
question that could also be studied through the pragmatically informed steps I have 
chosen for my ethical inquiry. If the outcome of such a study of gene doping also finds 
the enforcement of a ban against gene doping to be problematic with the values of the 
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desired community, a comparison of that analysis with mine could elicit an assertion of 
whether an implementation of a ban or an absence of a ban is more problematic with the 
desired community. The evaluation could be aided by the three criteria I used earlier 
when judging the utility of each of the three values in this investigation. Only after this 
process could one be warranted in asserting the ethical permissibility of a ban on doping 
or lack thereof based on a pragmatic ethical inquiry like mine. However, it is also 
possible that the prohibition of the ban can be justified on grounds not covered through 
my framework despite the consequences associated with implementing the ban. 
Connections between the Tenets of Freestanding Pragmatism & My Own Analysis 
Some critics might object that my section on classical pragmatism is unjustifiably 
lengthier than my section on freestanding pragmatism considering that the latter is the 
paradigm chosen for my inquiry. However, I defend the distribution of my second 
chapter because I believe that a theoretical and conceptual understanding of pragmatism 
is necessary for an appreciation of the principles upon which my account of freestanding 
pragmatism stands. Prior to this juncture, my focus has purposefully been targeted more 
on the use of this method of analysis than providing explanations of it. I believe that 
seeing the freestanding pragmatic method in practice is a much more effective illustration 
than even the most in-depth description one could provide. What I concur should now be 
expanded upon, in retrospect, is how each of the six guiding principles of freestanding 
pragmatism is implicit in my ethical inquiry.    
Let us begin by recounting how contextualism is evident in my analysis. This 
principle of freestanding pragmatism emphasizes immersing one‘s self in the factual 
details of the problem. In this inquiry, a considerable portion of my investigative efforts 
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is dedicated to understanding fairness, autonomy and what it means to be human in the 
context of sport and how each of these values relates to the use of genetic technologies 
for performance-enhancement purposes. I explore special considerations in terms of 
distinct uses of the technology including both somatic and germ-line types of genetic 
enhancement, as well as unique implications associated with genetic modification of 
youth and adults. I also argue that certain implications are more likely tied to genetic 
enhancement of specific-purpose traits such as ―athletic genes‖ than they are to the use of 
genetic technology to advance health or other general-purpose traits.  
Secondly, instrumentalism plays a crucial role in guiding my analysis. The main 
objective of my research is to critically investigate the implications that gene doping 
would likely produce for the three values I have chosen. My conclusions regarding the 
ethical permissibility of this form of enhancement in sport are based on whether 
integrating this practice into sport is compatible with the values of my notion of a 
desirable sport community. For this reason, my research can be viewed as being 
instrumental in promoting fairness, autonomy and what it means to be human.   
 My analysis also endorses eclecticism given that the values selected were not 
chosen until after a thorough review of literature that encompassed all sides of the debate 
on gene doping. I repeatedly argue for the need to fairly consider alternative viewpoints 
and for sport-governing bodies to engage the sport community in the decision-making 
process. In these ways, my research also corresponds with a search for consensus – 
another one of the six principles that guides freestanding pragmatism.  
I apply the principle of theory independence, or an avoidance of breaking the 
issue down into components in the formulation of a theory, as I do not enter the analytical 
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process with a conclusion that I set out to prove. In my inquiry, the central theory being 
tested is that gene doping could potentially conflict with the value of fairness, autonomy 
and our conception of human nature. As I divulge in my introductory chapter, this 
neutrality is meant to prevent oversimplification of the complicating ethical issues 
involved in order to prove a particular theory such as that gene doping is undoubtedly 
against core societal or sport values.  
Similarly, I undertake the process of reflective equilibrium throughout each step 
of my analysis. For instance, as I specify my understanding of each of the three chosen 
values, I evaluate my assumptions including whether alternative accounts are less 
compatible with the tenets of pragmatic ethics. Moreover, when I attempt to predict the 
most probable consequences that will emerge due to gene doping, my arguments require 
crucial assumptions that must be made because, at this time, gene doping only represents 
a theoretical possibility. Additionally, reflective equilibrium takes place at the final phase 
of my inquiry as, rather than unquestioningly promoting the three values I initially 
identified as lying at the heart of the issue, I evaluate the relative strength, scope and 
relevance of each of these values with respect to gene doping.  
Consequences of Gene Doping and the Fallibility of Our Predictions  
Fox (2008) highlights something that seems rather obvious concerning Sandel‘s 
(2007) predictions about the way genetic enhancement will adversely impact humanity‘s 
humility, solidarity and appreciation of life‘s giftedness. Fox claims that genetic 
enhancement must be highly effective in modifying our traits in order for Sandel‘s claims 
of its impacts to actually materialize. If procedures yield minimal or nearly negligent 
effects on our traits, surely Sandel‘s fears regarding the consequences of full-fledged 
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enhancement will likely not be justified. However obvious Fox‘s point seems to be, it is 
important to remind ourselves of the potential fallibility of our enhancement forecasts. 
Of course, it is of vital importance to purport that all of the consequences I have 
identified as being the most plausible future results of gene doping can be mistaken. The 
lens through which I view future possibilities is without doubt contaminated by 
prejudices formed as a result of my current experiences and beliefs regarding what is 
possible due to my knowledge of historical events, perceptions, inclinations and nature as 
a human being living in a world without genetic enhancement technologies. Moreover, 
some may criticize my approach to ethical inquiry on the grounds that the reliability of 
my predictions can only be asserted once genetic enhancement is actually in practice.  
My response to this objection that I identified when I first justified my chosen 
theoretical approach is just as relevant now as it was in my introductory chapter. 
Particularly, we cannot afford to wait until genetic enhancement is practiced in sport or 
other domains to see which consequences arise from it and then implement a retroactive 
policy against gene doping. William James (1897) – a prominent pragmatist – supports a 
proactive approach to investigating moral issues whose solution he asserts ―cannot wait 
for sensible proof‖ (p. 10). 
Still, some may not be satisfied with this method of rebutting the aforementioned 
objection. Lindsay (2005) is one such scholar who believes that it is irrational to ban gene 
doping now based on its potential effects being incompatible with justice simply because 
we could very well have miscalculated our predictions. Lindsay suggests that by 
speculating about justice in a genetically enhanced context, we redirect our focus from 
real present day issues of distributive justice. Personally, I could not disagree more with 
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this claim. Rather than distracting us from current social problems of injustice, I believe 
that debating issues of justice in a genetically enhanced future world forces us to 
reconsider the existing shortfalls of contemporary institutions and structures in society 
that aim to promote justice. For example, by envisioning wealthy people in society being 
able to genetically enhance themselves and their children who would then grow up to 
incur even more advantages because of the exclusivity of genetic technology, it is clear 
that this would generate a viciously impenetrable cycle for people of meager means not 
being able to climb up the social ladder. Perhaps by considering such a speculative 
hypothetical situation, we bring to light current aspects of our society that do not resonate 
with fair or just distributions. It is possible that this could encourage us to work on 
formulating effective ways of improving the present situation. For instance, we might be 
able to reduce gaps in wealth and opportunities between the rich and poor segments of 
the population by developing more tactical tax breaks and provide more avenues for 
people of lower socio-economic status to improve their financial security. 
Unexplored Territory Outside of Fairness, Autonomy & Human Nature 
The fact that we could be wrong about our predictions merely suggests that it is 
critical to consider other potential consequences that have not been explored in my thesis. 
Possible effects of gene doping – some desirable, some not – have been offered by other 
scholars which I purposely excluded from my thesis as they do not appear to relate to the 
values that have served as the crux of my ethical analysis. For instance, Allison (2005) 
perceives a potential revival of sportsmanism and a corresponding reduction in 
athleticism as a desirable potential outcome of gene doping. In other words, gene doping 
will yield a revival in ideas including a recognition that there is no real intrinsic value 
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only a socially determined value associated with sport performances, that participation in 
sport rather than quality of performance is more valuable, that playing in many sports is 
superior to specializing in just one, and that winning is not the most important feature of 
sport.  
To be clear, Allison (2005) thinks that this revival of sportsmanism is only one of 
various possible directions that sport might take in the future. Other possibilities include 
the inception of a separate breed of elite athletes that I have examined and repudiated 
above. Depending on the angle from which you examine diversity, genetic diversity 
could be framed as increasing or decreasing due to gene doping. Within populations of 
athletes at the highest levels of their sport, athletes would probably be more genetically 
similar to their competitors; however, these individuals would be more genetically 
dissimilar than they currently are to non-elite athletes or non-participants. This leads 
Allison to question whether consumer interest in commercialized sports will decline due 
to spectators feeling like they cannot sufficiently relate to the athletes showcased in these 
elite events. This could in turn lead back to the initially described revival of 
sportsmanism or amateur sport. On the other hand however, the public may have a 
heightened interest in commercialized sport due the extraordinary performances of 
genetically doped athletes. Conversely, public interest could be targeted more on less 
vulnerable sports.  
The Inevitability of Gene Doping: Are Sport Governing Bodies Fighting An Uphill 
Battle? 
Baylis and Robert (2004) contend that although various strong reasons exist to 
oppose genetic technologies that would serve to enhance human capacities and traits, the 
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inception and introduction of these practices are inevitable. These ethicists allege that the 
source of this inescapability of the use of genetic technologies in society is the human 
ego that leads to our self-perceptions as the central figures or masters shaping the world 
around us and ourselves in our evolutionary development. This is congruent with the 
sport-specific charge that the modern-day athletic culture or institution of sport that is 
based on constantly intensifying performance levels gives way to a hopelessly uphill 
battle for sport governing bodies opposing genetic enhancement and conventional 
performance-enhancement practices.  
According to Loland‘s (2005) vulnerability thesis, sports that are most susceptible 
to the impact of genetic technologies are the highly specialized sports in which 
performance depends heavily on raw basic motor capacities and less on technical and 
tactical skills. For example, sprint running that tests maximal explosive strength and 
speed would be especially vulnerable to the effects of gene doping.  
Loland (2005) utilizes an analogy of the ecological crisis to briefly yet quite 
eloquently describe the potential effects that a lack of diversity might have on the 
sporting world. A higher degree of ecological diversity is an ideal as it increases the 
resiliency in responding to destructive changes. In the same way, Loland wants to claim 
that sporting performances that demand a complex and diverse array of both technical 
and basic motor capacities makes sport less susceptible to the potential corruption of 
genetic technologies. 
Furthermore, Loland (2005) argues that the contemporary highly commercialized 
and politicized international elite sports arena turns competitions between athletes into 
competitions between system resources that could potentially range from training 
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programs to techniques that are more dependent on the expertise of others such as genetic 
engineering. As illustrated by both Loland (2005) and Breivik (2005), this type of athletic 
environment where athletes are used merely as means disrespects persons and their 
autonomy. Breivik describes his concern with genetic technology techniques in which 
specialists and parents might deprive children of the right to choose their own lives, and 
considers whether the right to be born or to develop without any genetic modification 
should represent a fundamental human right. As explained above, I certainly agree that 
these are legitimate concerns and believe that they suffice in justifying a ban on 
genetically designing children. 
It is unquestionable that strategies in sport that attempt to alleviate doping are 
bound to fail if usage is an unavoidable side effect of the current configuration of sport 
and the vulnerability of highly specialized athletic contests. It can be inferred that without 
a restructuring of commercialized sport that demands record-breaking performances or a 
strategy that is informed by Loland‘s (2005) vulnerability thesis, anti-doping measures 
will inescapably fall short of achieving their purpose. Breivik (2005) lends credence to 
this view when he states that a fight against doping in sport will never succeed if it does 
not account for the overall system or the general sport culture. This supports the notion 
that a mere ban against gene doping might be not enough to promote the desired 
community. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the message that I have attempted to convey through the previous 
two subsections is that, however thorough our analysis, we must avoid being intransigent 
or stubborn with regard to what we reasonably expect are probable consequences of gene 
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doping. In turn, we should recognize that gene doping might produce highly different 
future conditions to which we must be ready to adapt. In this respect, just as it has been 
valuable for my purposes, I believe that a pragmatic ethics perspective will continue to be 
useful and insightful with respect to the issue of gene doping due to its inherent 
flexibility. We must be able to respond accordingly to the consequences of genetic 
enhancement once the technology ceases to merely represent a theoretical possibility and 
actually unfolds into practice.  
Regardless of the various compelling ethical reasons why we should vehemently 
oppose it, the arrival of genetic enhancement has been depicted as an unstoppable 
impending consequence of the perfectionist culture embodied by high performance sport. 
I believe that a genetically enhanced future of athletics would be well served if guided by 
sport policies and regulations that are informed by a pragmatic theoretical framework. 
Better yet, if sport governing bodies and officials are observant enough to acknowledge 
the futility of anti-doping measures through which they perfunctorily attenuate the 
symptoms rather than the cause of the problem, sport might undergo a revolutionary 
reconstruction converting it into an institution that is more conducive to our notion of a 
desirable community and less hospitable to gene doping. 
What we can conclude from my pragmatic ethical inquiry is that a ban against 
gene doping is justifiable right now because of the reasonably expected implications of 
these values – particularly fairness. However, we should continually reassess the ban 
against gene doping along pragmatic ethical principles based on the consequences that 
are produced once genetic enhancement emerges fully in society.  
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An effective continual reassessment of the ban on gene doping will most certainly 
require collaboration between the sport community and the researchers most 
knowledgeable about both current and future genetic technologies. We would need to 
establish channels of communication such that the sport community could be kept 
informed about new technological developments, techniques and their effects. To assist 
this objective, annual conferences could be launched with members of both the sport and 
medical community in attendance. The conference could also lead to publications in a 
special journal dedicated to the ethics and science of genetic technology in sport.  
I would also like to emphasize the need for bi-directional dialogue between 
members of the sport community and official sport-governing bodies in order to create 
more accountable and transparent public policy decisions on gene doping. The full 
potential of consulting those most affected by sport policies – the athletes – has yet to be 
realized. For instance, creating a setting for an open dialogue or forum can allow policy 
makers to analyze and report input from the sport community that in turn could directly 
affect policy decisions. It is also vital to point out that the values, preferences and 
opinions of athletes, coaches, fans and other stakeholders will likely change over time as 
society becomes better acquainted with genetic technologies and the sport community 
itself evolves. Thus, research must be updated periodically through regular public 
discussions so that proposed solutions are constantly evaluated in order to ensure that 
they reflect opinions encompassed by the sport community.  
At least some athletes would choose to devote their time, effort and energy to 
participate in these discussions that could be made possible through public or online 
forums because of their vested interests in the outcome of policy decisions on gene 
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doping in sport. Through these mechanisms, those interested can relay their feedback to 
policymakers. For instance, it is possible that an ―all or none‖ approach to gene doping 
bans oversimplifies the vast array of prospective uses associated with genetic technology. 
Moreover, it might become evident that qualitative differences exist among future uses of 
this innovation in sport that could potentially justify the acceptance of particular 
classifications of gene doping. Whether or not this will be the case can be discussed by 
the athletic community at the time for the purpose of deciding on rules and regulations 
that could allow athletes to engage in certain degrees or types of genetic modification 
such as therapeutic types of genetic modification that repair athletic injuries for instance. 
If it is made clear to athletes and others in the sport community that their efforts can 
affect policy, more persons would be encouraged to vocalize their opinions on related 
matters.  
Among the three values, fairness is especially convincing as a basis for a ban 
against gene doping in sport on the grounds that it can be more easily managed, regulated 
and invoked by rules. With greater athlete input in the governance of sport, the broader 
sport community could accept and share a reasonable and common ideal of fair play. The 
same could not be said if efforts were taken to monitor and regulate changes in 
perceptions or self-understanding of what it means to be human since people already 
have very diverse views on this subject influenced by culture, religion, geography, race, 
sex and politics. Such regulatory attempts might also result in undesirable shifts of what 
it means to be human that cannot be easily justified. Unlike fairness, reaching consensus 
on a concept of autonomy and maintaining a desirable construct of humanness might be 
more difficult for all people to grasp and agree upon as desirable. For instance, there 
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could be a great deal of discord concerning what represents a desirable or undesirable 
change in the conception of what it means to be human.  
Also, in contrast to autonomy, fairness is more conducive to agreement between 
different people and seems to be universally understandable and identified as acceptable 
even though a precise definition of fairness can vary from one culture or group to the 
next. For example, international sports competitions such as the Olympic Games require 
a certain degree of agreement on what constitutes fair play. Such events are structured so 
that competitors act in a fair and respectful way toward one another. In addition, policies 
and conditions in sport are established as fair and are implemented impartially, which is 
something most athletes desire and appreciate. In this sense, fairness is more critical to 
sport than agreed upon concepts of autonomy and what it means to be human. While the 
latter two values are significant in any discussion of gene doping in sport, they are less 
foundational than fairness to a position grounded in a pragmatic ethical approach that the 
current ban on such technology is defensible for the time being. 
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